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
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Tittmann, Johann August  
Heinrich, 1773-1831.


Remarks on the synonyms of

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**VOL. III.**

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**TITTMANN'S SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.**

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**EDINBURGH :**  
**THOMAS CLARK, 38, GEORGE STREET;**  
**J. G. & F. RIVINGTON, LONDON ;**  
**AND W. CURRY, JUN. & CO. DUBLIN.**

**MDCCCXXXIII.**



REMARKS  
ON THE  
SYNONYMS  
OF THE  
NEW TESTAMENT.

BY  
V  
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TRANSLATED BY  
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VOL. I.

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MDCCCXXXIII.

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## TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

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THE inspiration of the Sacred Scriptures is either a fact, substantiated by ample testimony, or a miserable fallacy, which should be openly and utterly repudiated, as calculated only to delude. Such, however, is the accumulation of evidence on this point, that the former alternative must be unequivocally admitted by every educated and unprejudiced man ; and the latter, or indeed any approximation to a doubt on the subject, entirely renounced. The canonical books of the Old and New Testament are the word of the living God.

This conviction leads at once to the necessity of an accurate interpretation of the Scriptures as a divine record. Men ought not to be satisfied without attaining to a clear comprehen-

hension of the substance of God's message. For if it is the word of God, of which there can be no legitimate doubt, then there must exist throughout the whole volume, as the product of one mind, one harmonious meaning consonant with the divine wisdom. And if it be a revelation from God to man, that meaning is intended to be ascertained, and may be ascertained by a diligent and humble application of the right means of knowledge. It ceases to be a revelation as far as it does not reveal, if the difficulty of comprehension lies in the terms of the message itself; and it impugns the divine wisdom to suppose that the impediment to discovering that which God intended to be discovered, is traceable to the mode in which it is expressed.

From these principles it flows that the differences yet existing among men, about the meaning of the inspired Scriptures, are criminal. Men are guilty of these differences of opinion. Had they adopted seriously and fully, and with that reverence for divine authority, which emancipates from prejudice, the right means of

understanding that which God has put on record, the supposed discrepancies with which that record has been rashly charged, and the conflicting opinions entertained by different men, as deduced from the same words, would have vanished.

With these views, every work which tends to establish and recommend sound principles of interpretation, should be received with thankfulness. The German critics have done much. Though many of them have been deeply in error, others have deserved the thanks of the Christian world;—and, among the many valuable treatises which have issued from the German Theological School, few rank higher than the unfinished production of Dr. Tittmann now presented to the English public. It proceeds, with great judgment, on the soundest principles of interpretation; and, in the course of an inquiry, conducted under the guidance of very superior acumen and erudition, it not only throws a valuable light on many passages of Scripture, but, which is peculiarly desirable as a part of the series of the Biblical Cabinet,

it exhibits a very excellent example of the mode in which judicious, ripe, and well-trained scholars approach the sacred fountain of truth. And while, in many instances, it brings out satisfactorily the peculiar force of the passage under discussion, it presents, collaterally, strong presumptive evidence, drawn from the extraordinary accuracy of the style of the sacred writers, that they were guided in their compositions by a supernatural power.

The object of Dr. Tittmann was to investigate the comparative force of those words in the New Testament which appear to be synonymous, *i. e.* which range under a common genus, as having one generic idea in common; but which have each of them, additional to this, a specific difference of meaning. Of these he has given an extensive list;—and this work, as far as it has gone, consists of enlarged observations upon some of these synonyms. It is deeply to be regretted that the completion of so able and useful a work was prevented by the death of its author.

To illustrate the specific force of each word,

Dr. Tittmann has brought the whole of his extensive erudition, and the accumulated stores of a long life of painful application, to bear upon each successive object of inquiry. He has elicited from other writers, with great felicity, the exact meaning of each word according to the *usus loquendi*; and he has shown, from sources of illustration altogether unconnected with the sacred writings, that the words used by our Lord, and by his inspired disciples, when taken in their most obviously correct sense, were the best which could have been chosen; and that if any other synonym had been adopted, instead of that which is given, it would not so accurately have expressed the intended idea.

A work so conducted and so remarkably effective, though it has been broken off in the midst, is a most valuable example to others who profess to interpret the Scriptures. It is “a pattern of well-doing.” Many persons, it is to be lamented, approach very rashly the interpretation of the word of God, with very inadequate preparation for it, and with little

more specific thought on the subject than a ruling wish to find there the opinions which, under other influences, they have previously adopted. There are men, who have been regularly drilled in the creeds and catechetical exercises of the Calvinistic or the Arminian schools of theology, to whom this remark applies. Their religious opinions are not drawn fresh from the living spring. They are rather the stamp and impress of those formularies, under the cramping pressure of which their minds rose to a stunted maturity. They have walked the round of a certain train of theological thought. They have acquired the conviction, that certain formal dogmas are proved by certain texts, and they can fluently quote these common places in their regular routine. But this system is a barrier to improvement. Its disciples scarcely ever escape from the shackles of such an education. The genuine force of the Word is often repressed by it; and hidden by the interpretation of earlier and less enlightened days, authoritatively bound upon it. And the more accurate meaning, which

might otherwise have been evident to men of such scholastic attainment, can never make its way against this rigid habit of interpreting according to the authorized human rule of faith.

There are others, however, who are less endowed with learning and critical acumen, but who have either imbibed the narrow views of some modern particular sect, or sectarian leader; or who have been thrown loose from a reverence for any systematic views of narrated truth; and who seem to regard the Scriptures as the sands of an African river, in which truth lies scattered like so many unconnected grains of gold, and from whence each day's labour is to bring forth some new and independent discovery. To them the laws of interpretation are fetters not to be endured; the same word, repeated even in the same sentence, does not necessarily retain the same sense; and, however a passage may be distorted, if it can be made to accord with the favourite fancy of the moment, this meaning is given forth with all the solemnity of an oracle.

Now to both classes of students here de-

scribed, and especially to the young, who may be unwittingly led to adopt the habits of either of these objectionable schools, the strict and steady perusal of Tittmann's work may be very profitable. It will give them practical experience of the nature of sound interpretation. It will show them the character of mind best fitted for such inquiry, and the judgment and caution, and extensive and accurate reading, with which first-rate minds approach a task so intensely interesting and important. It will place before them some of the successful results to which inquiries, so conducted, lead. And, in fact, a serious study of these few chapters may, with the divine blessing, lead to an enlarged and accurate investigation of the canon of revealed truth, and to a satisfactory conviction of the substance of its announcements, not drawn from the dogmatic assertions of human authority, or based on the inventions of an exuberant fancy; but flowing legitimately and clearly, from a well-directed grammatical exegesis of the averments of the inspired book itself.

On the immediate subject of the work, as far as it has gone, it would have been presumption in the translator to have added any thing from his own limited resources. On some collateral topics a few notes have been appended. And, on one point, which the learned author has scarcely touched, but which appeared to him materially to strengthen and confirm Dr. Tittmann's views, the translator has added, occasionally, a more enlarged annotation. He has endeavoured to extend the inquiry into the force of a word, beyond the immediate use of it at the time when the New Testament was written, to an anterior period, when the same word existed in an earlier language, and in a different character.

Ernesti says truly, (Biblical Cabinet, p. 27,) that “the usage of language is affected by many things, by the time, the religion, the sect or party, the habits of ordinary life, and the political institutions, all of which tend to form the character of the style.” And that “the proper province of grammarians, the highest exercise of their art, consists in discovering what is the exact meaning of each word, at

different times, in different authors, and in different styles." It is evident then, that even during the period in which one language flourishes, changes may and do occur in the meaning of words, and by the introduction of new words, derivative or otherwise. Hence an examination of the whole history and progress of the word in that one language becomes necessary to bring out an accurate result. But it must be ever remembered, that each language is not a separate and independent existence. Each successive nation of the earth was originally a migrating colony, which brought a language with them; and even after they were settled, their thinly peopled shores were still open to the ingress of other adventurers, the peculiarities of whose speech would blend with those of the earlier colonists. The English language is an illustration of this fact. It is a compound of Celtic, Gothic, Roman, Saxon, Danish, and French, and necessarily, therefore, extends a scientific investigation of the language into those which were spoken by the successive invaders of our island. And from this it will appear, that etymology

is nothing more than an extension of the inquiry, which Ernesti proposes, over a wider range of time and space. It is, in fact, tracing the history of the word, the original idea, and its various changes of form and modifications of thought, through the whole period of its existence, from the people among whom it is first discovered, down to more modern times.

Doubtless, in a multitude of cases, evidence may be adduced of a word having undergone, from custom or accidental influence, a very important modification in its force; though it is scarcely in the nature of things that such changes should occur arbitrarily and without a traceable reason; and such variations are much less frequent and extensive than some persons imagine. But, in the pursuit of philological inquiries, when a word occurs but rarely in surviving writings, and real difficulty arises from the scantiness of the contemporary evidence, in fixing the precise force of the word at the period required, it is surely a matter of great moment to be able to show what was

the meaning of the same word in ages anterior to the period under discussion, and what is the meaning or derivation of that word still extant in modern languages or dialects.

Ernesti admits this in some measure. He says, “There may be a deficiency of evidence as to the *usus loquendi* in the particular age and author.” (P. 80.) And he suggests, in such difficulties, among other aids, a consideration of “the analogy subsisting between similar languages, that is, between those which have sprung from a common origin, as the Hebrew, the Chaldee, the Syriac, the Arabian; or like those which stand in the relation of parent or derivative, as the Greek and Latin.” But the remedy is here timidly proposed. Ernesti does not take a full view of the subject. Has the Greek no parent? Did that copious and well-arranged language, with all the beauties of its grammatical inflexion, spring up at once, and independently, from the Hellenic soil, a host of armed men? If we can trace the progress of Greek to the Italian shore, may we not trace back the Greek to something else?

Is the progress of language, anterior to the formation of the Greek, so completely involved in obscurity, that we can discover no connection between the language of the Hellenic colonists and that of their Asiatic ancestors, whose language we know to have been a written language before Greek had a being?

Fair and cautious investigation shows, beyond all question, that although the radical words of the Greek language have undergone considerable metamorphosis, they have their source in the languages spoken directly to the eastward of the Grecian territories; and that the etymons of Greek and Latin words are found in abundance in the roots of Hebrew and its cognate dialects. And, in fact, the connection between the language spoken by the different divisions of the Shemitic and Japhetic tribes, emigrating westward, is so evident, that they may all be regarded as dialects emanating from one common source, which may still be recognized as the basis of all European languages.

In the 12th vol. of the *Encyclopædie Mo-*

derne, there is a short treatise on Etymology, by M. Champollion Figeac, which speaks of such inquiries as of great importance to literature, and in which he states the principles on which the investigation should be conducted, and without which it must be vain. “Ignorer ces règles,” he says, “c'est vouloir analyser chimiquement une substance solide en la brisant à coups de marteau.” The substance of the rule on which he proceeds in the etymological analysis of words in present use, is to detach all grammatical terminations, and initial augments, as prepositions, &c. to strip the word of all additions or alterations made for the sake of euphony; and then he affirms, that when any word has been subjected to this process, there will generally remain a monosyllable of two or three letters, which constitute the radical word.

If, then, this mode of analysis which M. Champollion recommends, be adopted, it will be found that the great proportion of words in modern language are directly referrible to an oriental source; and that the radical word

so denuded is oriental. Champollion gives, as an instance, the word *Individuellement*; *ment*, an adverbial termination, *elle* an adjectival termination, *in* the negative proposition, *di* the sign of separation. There remains then only *vidu* or *idu*; and this probably comes from *video*, which is ειδω, ιδω, with the prefixed digamma, and this leads us at once to the Hebrew יְדַיּ to know, or perceive.

Take another instance: *unencumbered*. *ed* is a participial termination, *en* is formative of certain verbs, *un* is the negative prefix, *in* is a preposition. After this denudation, there remains only *cum*; which is the Hebrew כּוֹן, to rise up, or to raise up; and which word is still retained even in its simple form in our language; *coom*, a heap, and *comb*, the erection of bees. French *combler*, Latin *cumulus*.

We might pursue this to any extent. But the evidence goes beyond this. It may be shown, that very many oriental words of early origin have retained the same sense in several languages throughout the period of this world's history; and that their progress, down to the

present time, may be distinctly traced. We must be limited here to one or two instances.

בָּרָע, in Hebrew, darkness, evening, the raven. In this sense, also, the word occurs in Chaldee, Syriac, and Arabic. We meet with it in Greek, εγεῖθος, *vesper*, *nox*, *caligo*, and ερεφω, *tego*, whence the German, *grabe*, and English, grave. In the Latin it occurs as *corvus*, Saxon, *crau*, English, crow, French, *corbeau*. Again, in another form, it appears in Saxon, *hraefn*, English, raven; and then it branches out, from the habits of the bird, into Saxon, *hraefian*, to raven, to rob; German, *rauben*; Belgic, *rooven*; Swedish, *rofwa*; old Latin, *reffare*; *rapere*, *rapina*; English, rob, rape, rapine, &c. &c.

Another instance may be given in the word עַלְבָּ, which word occurs in Hebrew and all its cognate dialects, in the sense to absorb, to swallow, to devour; *vorax*, *edax*, *gula*. In Gothic, and in all the families of the Gothic migration, it occurs in the form, *balg*, *venter*, *scortum*, *saccus*. In the Celtic family also, *balg*, *bolg*, *builg*, meaning *venter*, *saccus*, *uterus*, and *balgum*, *sorbitio*. In Latin, *bulga*, a bag, a budget. In English,

a bag, a boil, a blain, (*Scottice*) a bealing; to bilge, to bulge, to bulk, to blow, to bellow. In Latin *bellua*, *balaena*, Greek, βελονη and φαλανα, French *baleine*. In Latin, *polluo*, Greek βεβήλως, παλλακή, &c. &c.

Examples of this kind might be multiplied to any extent. The gradual course of a word may be traced as an historic fact through several languages, in which the original generic sense has always controlled the specific signification throughout a series of ages. And it must be evident that, in discussing the force of synonyms, much assistance may be derived from a cautious reference to such sources of illustration. If two synonymous words are under consideration, and the evidence in favour of the *usus loquendi* is but scanty, and intimates, without effectually establishing, the fact of a difference; it is a matter of no little moment, to be able to trace the word in question up to the earliest known period of its existence, and down to its remaining derivatives in modern times; and to show that the idea entertained, as that which was justified by the usage, is

confirmed by the generic character and force of the word at all times; and probably also that the specific use of it, which is sought to be established, did exist in another line of migration from the east than the Hellenic.

To this point, then, the Translator has ventured to apply a few observations, not because he aspires to associate any remarks of his with the pages of such a writer as Tittmann; but because this systematic application of etymological inquiry to exegesis, has not yet been adequately tried; and because experience teaches him that much may yet be done by this means, to illustrate difficult passages of Scripture. If the valuable glossaries of ancient and modern languages, of which we are possessed, are examined, with a view to this mode of illustration, treasures of invaluable importance may yet be brought forth; which, under the guidance of sound and well-weighed canons of application, may throw much new light upon rare words and obscure passages, both in the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures. And if these few hints shall turn the attention

of superior linguists to the subject, the Translator will not regret the intrusion of his own views on the public through the medium of these prefatory remarks. The subject is extensive, and the matter for illustration abundant, and requiring ample space for detail. Here, however, it should not be carried further.

Mr. Tittmann completed, before his death, another small portion of this work on the Synonyms. This, together with some other small tracts, on subjects intimately connected with the present treatise, it is the purpose of the Translator to give to the public at a future period.

The second volume also will include a general list of the Synonyms of the New Testament, which was arranged by Tittmann, and printed with short notices attached occasionally to some of the words.

EDINBURGH, *March 1, 1833*

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and now

MEMOIR  
OF  
DR. TITTMANN,

ABRIDGED FROM THE GERMAN.

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DR. JOHN AUGUSTUS HENRY TITTMANN, was born on the 1st of August 1773, at Langersalza, in Upper Saxony, at which place his father was then stationed as deacon in the church of St. Boniface. He was in infancy extremely delicate, but his health gradually improved, especially after the removal of his father to Wittenberg. Here his education commenced, and his progress was rapid. At fifteen years of age he gave the first public proof of his talents in an essay, "*De Virgilio Homerum imitante.*" Enjoying the privilege of such teachers as Schröck, Antoni, Henrichs, Hiller, and especially the illustrious Reinhard, he pursued his studies successfully, taking the

degree of M. A. in 1791. And in the year following, having determined to devote himself to an academical life, he went to Leipsic and studied under Professors Morus, Rosenmuller, Keil and Wolf. In 1793, he defended from the chair a dissertation entitled, “*De Consensu Philosophorum veterum in summo bono definiendo*,” and in the following month opened his first course of lectures. In 1795, he was made B. D. and was appointed to be the morning preacher at the University Church. His prelections to the theological students were so very much approved, that, in the year 1796, he was appointed to an extraordinary professorship of Philosophy; and in 1800 to a similar one in theology. In 1805, being just thirty-two years of age, he took the degree of doctor in divinity, and was admitted into the *concilium professorum*; and having thus obtained a vote in the Theological faculty, he had the means of being useful to his pupils, of which he readily availed himself for those who merited his favour.

On the death of Dr. Wolf in 1809, he was

appointed the third regular professor of the University. In 1812, he became the assessor of the royal consistory. In 1815, he succeeded Rosenmuller as the second professor, and canon of Meissen; and on the death of Dr. Keil in 1818, he rose to the very honourable position of *Academiae professor primarius*; and having passed also through the various intermediate grades of ecclesiastical honour, he was elected the *Custos prelatus* of the cathedral church at Meissen. These successive steps of honourable elevation, present to us a very striking instance of the steady progress to respect and usefulness, of a man of real worth and talent. It is remarkable also, that in all these several stations, his talent for business was as eminent as his theological attainments. He was ever, in the midst of an active devotion to the most complicated duties, the ready counsellor of his pupils in all their various doubts and difficulties. His advice also was sought with much avidity in the filling up of ecclesiastical and academical charges; and such was his accurate discernment of character, that he had

scarcely ever reason to regret his recommendation.

In the several stations which he held, Dr. Tittmann continued to lecture, during a period of forty years, on various branches of theological study. He gave courses of lectures on the exegesis of the New Testament, on the method of theological study, on church history, on the evidences, the morality, the creeds, and the dogmatic system of Christianity, all of which were highly valued.

His system of exegesis led directly to the bringing out the meaning from the sacred text itself, independently of all consideration of the opinions of commentators. His course of lectures on the method of study extended through a period of seven years. The views contained in his lectures on Church History, are given to the world in his admirable work, called, “A Practical Exposition of the Evangelical Churches in the years 1530 and 1830.”\*

\* *Der Evangelische Kirche in Jahre 1530, und in Jahre 1830, pragmatisch dargestellt.*

A very valuable tract from his pen on the same subject, appeared a few weeks before his death in the *Journal of Historical Theology*. In his lectures on the evidences of Christianity, he made use of a small work, entitled, “Thoughts on the Subject of a Defence of the Faith.”<sup>b</sup> His lectures on morals were deeply interesting; and nothing could be more beautiful than the simplicity of his teaching in dogmatic theology. It is to be regretted that a projected work on this subject, which he had commenced six times, but, in consequence of the difficulty of satisfying the rigid demands of his own accurate mind, had as often laid aside, was never completed. A few days before his death, he had mentioned his intention of devoting himself to it in the following spring.

In his lectures on “the Creeds,” he used, as a text-book, his “*Institutio Symbolica Ecclesiae Evangelicae*,” *Lips.* 1811. In the course of these prelections, he taught his pupils to en-

<sup>b</sup> *Ideen zu einer Apologie des Glaubens.*

tertain a due, but only a due regard for creeds, as human standards of religious opinion. And he drew, with delicate accuracy, the distinctions between the Lutheran creed and that of other churches.

Tittmann's ability as a lecturer was admitted by all who heard him. His manner was good, his style lucid and simple, and his readiness for extempore address great. He was remarkable also for his constant attention to the interests of his students, and for his great liberality, both with respect to the fees of the class, and the devotion of his time to the society of his students out of the class-room.

The works of Tittmann are not very extensive. They contain, however, much of the fruits of forty years of labour; often giving, in a few sentences, matter which others would have expanded into a volume. And in addition to those productions, which were strictly professional, he wrote many tracts and pamphlets on ecclesiastical law. He contributed papers to the Antiquarian Society, and re-

gularly, from the year 1822 to 1831, he wrote the preface to the Leipsic Missionary Report.

Dr. Tittmann was, according to the German technical style of speaking, a supernaturalist; and, however some of his views might for a short time, and by some persons be misunderstood, he was decidedly opposed to what is on the continent of Europe called Rationalism. He drew the distinction calmly and wisely between the departments of reason and religious submission to divine teaching. He vindicated the proper province of reason in judging of religious, as of all other truth; and maintained that the reason cannot receive, as true, any thing which is really opposed to the eternal and universally recognized laws of truth, which God has given for man's general guidance. He held, therefore, that there was in Christianity nothing contrary to these laws and to sound reason. At the same time, he held it vain to affirm, that the statements of a religious dispensation were limited to matters which the human mind, by the force of its na-

tural faculties, might have ascertained; but that, besides the natural exercise of the reasoning powers for the discovery of truth, there is still another source of religious knowledge, viz. the special teaching of the Infinite reason; by means of which the finite created mind may receive truths with which formerly it was unacquainted; that the Infinite mind, acting in the same way as we conceive him to act in his providential government, has, in the development of his purposes towards his creature man, from time to time made known certain religious truths; that this is the revelation of God; that it is in the Christian system; and that it must be regarded as a supernatural revelation, and is properly called so, because its ultimate source is not nature, but the immediate teaching of that being who, in other respects, operates ordinarily and regularly through the laws of nature; and that consequently it were vain and absurd to attempt to base the doctrines of Christianity on metaphysical subtleties; and that the only wise and safe course is to hold

stedfastly by the teaching of Christ and his Apostles.

The habits of Dr. Tittmann were of course rigidly studious and industrious. He rose in his youth at four, and in later years at five, in the morning. The morning hours he passed till nine in his study. He then went to his class-room, where he taught till twelve. From twelve to one he wrote letters and read the papers. He dined early, and took a short rest. At three he received visitors. From four to six he attended various literary societies; and then hastened again to his desk, at which he generally sat till eleven.

He married a widow lady in the year 1811, by whom he had three children, two of whom still live.

The outward frame of Tittmann was worthy to be the tabernacle of such a spirit as his. Benevolence beamed to the last from his blue and speaking eye; and his whole figure was noble and commanding. Dr. Tittmann died of consumption, combined with other local

affections. His general health began to wear a suspicious character in the month of October, yet, contrary to medical advice, he persisted in being carried in a sedan chair to the class-room, and continued to lecture three hours daily, until the 2d of December. From that day his strength rapidly failed, yet he only ceased from labour on the 23d, because his hands were too weak to hold the pen, and an inflammatory seizure in the throat prevented him from dictating. He died on the 30th. In the close of his illness he said one day, "I am a philosopher and a theologian, but never did I perceive so distinctly as now, that soul and body are two distinct things." Towards the evening of the 29th, he called for a mirror, saying, "I suspect I have got the *facies hippocratica*." During the evening he seemed to dream; and, in a plaintive accent, he said, "All I have now to do is to sleep." He revived a little, however, and in his last moments he imagined himself in the chair lecturing to his pupils; he repeated the words with which he

frequently concluded: “ *Sed haec sufficient; finis, finis in fide;*” and so saying, he fell asleep.

Happy and worthy of imitation, a life so actively and unremittingly devoted to the service of God, and the elucidation of his inspired word. And blessed they, who, according to their several ability, shall go and do likewise.

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*List of the Author's works.*

Grundriss der Elementar Logik, nebst einer Einleitung in die philosophie. Leipzig, 1795.

Theocles ein Gespräch über den Glauben an Gott. Leipzig, 1799.

Theon oder über unsere Hoffnungen nach dem Tode. Leipzig, 1801.

Lehrbuch der Homiletik. Breslau, 1804.

Pragmatische Geschichte der Theologie und Religion in der Protestantischen Kirche, während der Zweiten Hälfte des 18 Jahrhunderts Erstes Theil. Breslau, 1805.

De rebus academicis epistola ad virum summe reverendum perillustrem et excellentissimum Gottl. Adolph. Ernest. Nostitz et Taenkendorf. Lipsiæ 1808.

xxxvi LIST OF THE AUTHOR'S WORKS.

Ueber Supranaturalismus Rationalismus et Atheismus. Leipzig 1816.

Ueber die Vereinigung der Evangelischen Kirchen. Leipzig, 1818.

Die protestation der Evangelischen Stände auf dem Reichstage zu Speyer im Jahre 1529. Leipzig, 1829.

Confessio Fidei exhibita Imperatori Charles V. in Comitiis Augustæ, MDXXX. ex primo Melanchthonis editione recognita. Dresdæ, 1829.

Ueber die Fixerung der Stolgebuhren. Leipzig, 1831.

THE  
SYNONYMS  
OF THE  
NEW TESTAMENT.

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CHAPTER I.

ON THE ACCURATE DISCRIMINATION OF THE  
SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

THE anniversary of that day, my beloved fellow-citizens, is arrived, on which, with a view to do away a shameless traffic in indulgences, Luther enkindled a flame, that all but enveloped the dome of St. Peter's. But this flame having declined together with the pontifical sovereignty of Rome, it becomes those Christians whose primitive rights the sacred energy of Luther vindicated, to commemorate that day, not by idle triumphs, but by remembering the wise councils of that great man. It becomes them so to avail themselves of the be-

nefits which he conferred, that they may be seen to have been realized by judicious men, who do not merely boast themselves of their privileges, but use them wisely. Which course, as it has been often neglected by those who seemed to adhere to Lutheran views, so has it especially been the case with those who, forsaking the study of the interpretation of Scripture, have based their confidence on human forms and ecclesiastical authority, and thus rashly overthrown one of Luther's wisest instructions. For no opinion of Luther was more prominent than that the divine doctrine must be drawn directly from the sacred fount itself; and he therefore especially recommended the art of grammar and the study of the ancient languages; although it is generally supposed that, on account of his own education under a defective system, or from the multiplicity of duties by which he was subsequently overwhelmed, he was, in common with the greatest men of that age, not thoroughly trained to the subtleties of grammar. These subtleties, however, many in our day have learned to despise; and, as if the subject were exhausted, they have turned to sophistical disputation, and have learned to regard the whole business of the grammatic interpret-

er as lying in determining the vague signification of words, or in seeking out what they call the literal sense, but which they evidently do not understand. Of this folly, however, I will not now speak, as it is sufficiently evident that after such an improvement in letters as that which has recently taken place, the inertion of these men will scarcely be longer endured. But on that day which we are about to celebrate, it will be gratifying to all to whom the divine doctrine and discipline are precious, to remember that saying which was ever in the mouth of Luther: *the best grammarian is the best theologian*; that is, he who not only knows the principles of the ancient languages, but also so perceives the general art of speaking,—than which nothing more sublime has been invented by the human mind,—to be reducible to common rules naturally based in reason, so that he is able rightly to expound all the memorials of talent, and to open the fathomless treasures of human erudition, he is certainly best fitted to ascertain and to impart to others sacred truth. He is sadly mistaken who measures the business of the interpreter by the vulgar mode of speaking, as if he had nothing to do but what boys learn at school. Although even the elementary rules of grammar are not

to be despised ; because, as Quintillian says, to those entering the interior of even this art, many subtle distinctions will appear, which are not only fitted to exercise the acumen of opening minds, but to test even the science and erudition of the best informed men. But most truly Hemsterhusius has said, to understand a language, that is, according to the common notion, to get all the words and forms of speech packed close in the brain, appears but an idle and profitless attainment. (See his Oration on uniting the Study of Mathematics and Philosophy with that of the Linguistic Art.)

But while many things in respect to the grammatical interpretation of the New Testament require a nicer accuracy than is generally thought necessary ; this is especially true of those words commonly called synonyms ; so that, unless the most accurate thought has been exercised on them, it is much to be feared that no language whatever can be thoroughly understood. For that which, in the study of language, is regarded as the highest attainment, viz. to know whence, and for what reasons, certain names were given to certain things, is of such a nature that it cannot be attained without the accurate examination of synonymous terms ; neither can an inter-

preter remain ignorant of the origin and reason of them, unless he is himself willing to err in respect to the notions of things so expressed in words, or carelessly to acquiesce in loose analogous significations, however rendered. That this nicety, however, in discriminating and explaining synonyms is yet wanting, both in many interpreters of the New Testament, and in almost all our Lexicons, is not surprising. For this is in all languages the most difficult branch of study, and the least elaborated; and is, of course, so much more difficult as the times of the rise, perfection, and decline of a language are more remote from our own age; and that, as the foundation and origin of particular words fall into obscurity, the origin and relation of synonyms are less easily discovered. And although in the Greek language especially, on account of the refinement and exuberance of the Greek mind, the accurate discrimination of synonyms is extremely difficult, yet in explaining the writings of the New Testament, the definite marking of cognate and similar words is, on two accounts, attended with still greater difficulty. In the first place, because the customary speech of those writers is more nearly allied to the style of vulgar life than to that of erudite men, which is governed

by strict rules; and also that on account of the multitude of new ideas to be expressed by means of words then in use, their task must have been difficult to any one, but especially to those who were strange to the habit of accurate speaking and writing. For the multitude of common minds, if, on the whole, they agree in certain general notions or ideas of things, care not to ascertain accurately what is the force of each word; but make use of similar or analogous terms very promiscuously, and do little more than endeavour to express what they think in the readiest and most accessible terms. And hence they not only do not nicely discriminate between synonyms; but they heap together similar words, the true and nice distinctions between which, even learned men too much neglect. The language of men in common life is certainly more vehement and less modified; its terms are less nicely measured, and it often affirms both indistinctly and rashly; which, if an interpreter lose sight of, he will often be seeking in the force of words for a meaning which never entered the mind of the author; an error far too palpable in most of the interpreters of the New Testament. But, in explaining the sacred volume, the other point which we have

noticed is not less important. For these writers, in expressing new things, for which, in common parlance, suitable words were wanting, made use of analogous words which would be clear and perspicuous to the men to whom they wrote, but which certainly present difficulty to others who are estranged from their modes and habits of thinking. For in respect to things of which a people have no notion, there must be in their language a want of words or signs for them; and therefore if their range of knowledge is to be increased by new notions of new things, either new words must be coined, which ordinarily takes place in those things which strike the senses; or foreign words must be borrowed, which is frequently done; or the new idea is expressed as it best may, in analogous words then extant, whether in a simple or tropical sense. And that the Apostles have done this is no marvel, and surely not a ground of blame, seeing that the greatness and sublimity of the truths they taught,—truths mightier than the fetters of language—could not endure the regulated precision of established modes of speech. But, in explaining their writings, extreme caution is required, lest the interpreter, in rendering cognate and analogous words differing minute-

ly from each other, should attribute to them the same sense, when they are used in a different one; or should attach importance to the difference of sense, when they did not intend to do so. And truly this requires more caution than those who despise the niceties of grammar are willing to exercise; and hence it is, that in explaining the books of the New Testament, words which differ widely in meaning are assumed to be synonymous, while others which are allied to one common notion, are not acknowledged as synonymous, or are not explained with sufficient accuracy. And that I do not here speak unadvisedly, I will now endeavour to demonstrate.

But, at the outset, we must determine what synonyms are. For many have written only ambiguously and defectively on this point; and neither Ammonius,<sup>a</sup> Popma,<sup>b</sup> or others, who have written on “similar or dissimilar expressions,” have adequately discussed the nature of synonyms. The philologists of our own country, who seem, by nature, fitted beyond

<sup>a</sup> A writer of the fourth century. His work, *De Similitudine ac differentia quarundam dictionum*, was published at Paris, 1521, and London, 1637.—*T.*

<sup>b</sup> See Ausonius Popma *de differentiis verborum item de usu antiquae locutionis.* Lipsiae, 1734.—*T.*

all others, for the examination of such difficulties, have thrown the first light on this subject. Among these, after Stosch, Fischer, and Adelung, Eberhard is admitted to stand pre-eminent. We yet admire, however, the superior mind of Aristotle, who defined so subtilely and elegantly the notions of indefinite things, that he has given us a most perfect example of accurate speaking and thinking. He says, *συνώνυμα, ὅν τό, τε ὄνομα κοινὸν, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός. οἷον ζῶον, ὅ, τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ ΒΟῦς.* Synonyms, therefore, according to Aristotle, are those things which, having by nature a common genus, are called by a common name. From these he distinguishes *όμώνυμα*, which, though possessing a different nature, have a common generic name, *οἷον ζῶον ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον τούτων γὰρ ὄνομα μόνον κοινὸν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἔτερος* (ante Categor. § 1, 2.)<sup>c</sup> Whence

<sup>c</sup> Far otherwise speaks Dionysius Thrax\* (See Bekkeri Anecdot. vol. ii. p 636.) *όμώνυμόν ἐστιν ὄνομα, τὸ κατὰ πολλῶν ὄμωνύμως τιθέμενον, οἷον Αἴας ὁ Τελαμώνιος καὶ Αἴας ὁ Οἴλεως, μῆν Θαλάσσιος καὶ μῆν γηγενής.* Συνώνυμον δέ ἐστι τὸ ἐν διαφόροις ὄνόμασι τὸ αὐτὸν δηλοῦν, οἷον ἄστρος, ξύφος, μάχαιρα, σπάθη, φάσγανον. But the Scholiasts (ibid p. 867,) appear to differ, unless we examine them very accurately. Certainly grammarians say that the *όμώνυμα* is a word common to diverse persons or things,

\* A grammarian resident at Rhodes, a disciple of Aristarchus, and who, according to Suidas, published some grammatical work.—T.

it appears, that he called those things *synonyms* which bore a common generic name, and had in them also the same reason why the name was given. And so far the definition is good; for it correctly intimates what they have in common. But one point is yet unnoticed, viz: that *synonyms* differ, and in what they differ. And, although this is almost an endless subject; for *synonyms* differ in as many ways as there is room for distinctions in the same word; yet this must not be lost sight of, lest *synonyms* be confounded with words of precisely similar power and meaning. For it is to be understood, that *synonyms* are words of the same genus, but of different species, in which fact especially the nature of *synonyms* lies; but, since all the species are not of the same mode, for some are subject directly to the genus, and others to the species, it becomes necessary to explain accurately both the affinities and the differences which exist. Eustathius (on *Iliad.* 8, 20.) has spoken more fully, and it is as well to quote

as *Ἄτας, μῆσ, κύων, φοῖνξ*, but that the *συνώνυμα*, is a similar signification conveyed by diverse words, *διὰ πλειόνων ὀνομάτων ἐν ὑποκείμενον σημαίνει, ὡςπερ οἱ Περιπατητικοὶ πολυώνυμα λέγονται*. They differ, therefore, from Aristotle, who says that *synonyms* are not terms peculiar to a genus, but names of things ranged in one common genus.

his words, for Henry Stephen does not appear to have rightly caught his meaning. He says, ἐπὶ τῶν παροξυνομένων ἀνθεώπων, τέσσαρα ταῦτα λέγεται ὄνόματα παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ. Θυμός· χόλος· μῆνις· κότος· ὁ Θυμὸς μὲν καὶ χόλος ταῦτα ἔστιν· ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ κοινότερον μεθ' "Ομηρον λεγομένη ὁργή· καὶ εἰσὶ τὰ τρία ταῦτα, ὁ Θυμὸς ὁ χόλος καὶ ἡ ὁργὴ συνώνυμα κατὰ τοὺς γραμματικούς· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους πολυώνυμα· καὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ βροτής· μέρος· ἀνθεώπως. — καὶ οὕτω μὲν χόλος καὶ ὁργὴ καὶ Θυμὸς πολυώνυμοισιν ἐν ταυτίτητι σημασίας. These words very accurately express that which constitutes the nature of synonyms, viz: a certain notion common to several words, in each of which a certain specific difference resides; as there are four species of ὁργή, Θυμός· χόλος· μῆνις· κότος, all which may be predicated of an angry man; but yet in each there is something by which it may be distinguished from the others. If, therefore, we regard the grammarians, synonyms are words contained under the same genus, but each of which has its peculiar species; so that, though they are all comprehended under one common notion, yet each has besides its distinguishing peculiarity.

Synonyms are, however, of two kinds, of which the one may be called *logical*, the other *grammatical*. And we would call those logical, in which there is a diverse notion of the forms

or species which class under the same genus; as in the example cited from Eustathius, *ἀργή* is the genus, but the several species are *θυμός*. *χόλος*. *μῆνις*. *κότος*. diverse certainly in their specific nature, but cognate in one common and more general quality; for all may be predicated of an angry man. We call these logical synonyms, because their relation lies in the reason of the thing, which interlinks many things with a common name or thing; or, as Aristotle says, *ὅτι ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τοῦνομα τῆς οὐσίας λόγος*. But there are other synonyms which the older grammarians appear to have called *πολυώνυμα*, the synonyms of things, which, on various accounts, are called by various names, as *βερτός*. *μέρος*. *ἀνθρώπος*. These, as they differ, not in the notion of the thing expressed, but merely in the reason of the particular term given, may be called grammatical synonyms, unless some should prefer to call them etymological. For often many terms are appropriated to the same thing, which differ only in the etymology; as the same men are called, in a different relation, *ἀνθρώποι*, *βερτοι*, *μέροπες*. But, if any one maintains that such words should be excluded from the list of synonyms, I shall not object; since properly, those things only are synonymous which have, in fact, the same name as sub-

jects to the same genus. And in this sense later writers have used the term. But since, to both kinds of words, this is common, that they are the signs of things which possess in common one generic distinction, they would not be altogether incorrectly called synonyms, by any one who wished to comprehend under one term this whole genus of cognate vocables. This, however, must not be conceded, that words which signify the same thing in the same mode, are to be accounted synonyms. For how many have erred who have classed together the *συνώνυμα* and *ἰσοδυναμοῦτα*. It is one thing to signify in some way the same object, it is another to have the same force, that is precisely the same meaning. Nor does Aquila Rom.<sup>a</sup> (de *συνώνυμίᾳ*) speak altogether unadvised-when he says, we avail ourselves of this kind of elocution, when we consider one word not to express sufficiently the dignity and greatness of the subject; and, therefore, introduce others having the same signification. But it is a very different matter what the Scholiast on Aristophanes says, Ἡδος τοῖς ποιηταῖς παραλλήλοις λέξεσιν *ἰσοδυναμούσαις* χρῆσθαι. (vid. *Ioh. Chr. G.*

<sup>a</sup> I suppose the author means Peter de Aquila, or Aquilanus, who wrote, in 1737, a book, *Questiones in quatuor libros sententiarum*.—T.

*Ernesti Lexicon Technol. Graec. Rhetor.* p. 334.) More correctly J. A. Ernesti, the ornament of this university, taught in his *Institutio Interpretis N. T.*,<sup>e</sup> that “in the same language, or, at least, in the same dialect of it, among the same people, during the same age, there are no synonyms of words specifically applied; if, however, such exist in any language, they are the product of different dialects or periods.” This remark is true, and worthy of much attention, if synonyms are to be regarded as equivalent words; the number of which will always be few in any language in proportion to its refinement, as in Greek; for it may be fairly doubted, whether in a language so far refined, any words can be found of precisely the same force, *i. e.* which indicate the same thing, precisely in the same way; for although they may denote the same thing, as *βασιλεὺς*, *ἄναξ*, *τύραννος*, or may signify the several species of the same genus, as *ξίφος*, *ἄρο*, *φάσγανον*, yet they differ in certain points; and, although the traces of this difference may be, by length of time and indiscriminate use, almost obliterated; yet they may be recovered from accurate writers, and can even be followed out by means

\* See *Biblical Cabinet*, vol. i. p. 50.—T.

of the etymology itself. Wherefore, great care should be taken, lest in words of this kind, which seem to mean the same thing, we neglect the specific difference of meaning; and this especially in terms which relate to morals and to the affections of the mind; which, although they may appear very nearly allied, yet in degree, or mode, or in specific character, may, nevertheless, differ very widely. And this is, in fact, one of the most fruitful sources of synonyms.

And hence, therefore, both in other books, and in the books of the New Testament, those words only can be regarded as synonyms, which have the same common notion, to which several species or modes are subjected; so that they may be all referred to the same generic head; but each, at the same time, so distinctly differing that, as species, they may be accurately distinguished from the genus itself.

There are, however, three kinds of words especially in the New Testament, which may be erroneously taken for synonyms; and concerning these I will speak shortly. The first class consists of those which signify either the *cause or the effect*; and are so much more likely to be regarded as synonyms, because the writers of the New Testament, as is very

common in popular writing, are wont to unite very closely cause and effect. For example, writers of dogmatic theology are very apt to use promiscuously those words which are applied by the sacred writers to the redemption of man, as *ιλασμός*. *λύτρον*. *ἐξαγορασμός*. *δικαιώσις*. *χαταλλαγή*. *ἄφεσις*. *ἀμαρτιῶν*; so that these words appear to signify precisely the same thing, or, at all events, to be synonymous. And the three former we might grant to be synonyms, although, even then, their specific difference should be noticed; but the others which follow, differ widely from them. For these denote the effects of the work of Christ—those benefits which flow through Christ to the real believer; while the cause or reason why such benefits are referred to Christ as their author, is expressed by those words, which show what Christ has done. For when the sacred writers say that Christ accomplished, *ιλασμός*, *λύτρον*, *ἐξαγορασμός*, they mean to express that which he did to obtain *χαταλλαγή*, *δικαιώσις*, *ἄφεσις*. *ἀμαρτιῶν*. The *δικαιώσις* is the effect of *ἐξαγορασμός*, and so is the *χαταλλαγή*, and they who have considered it as synonymous with *ιλασμός* have greatly erred. For the *χαταλλαγή* is not referred to God, but to men; it is the effect of the *ιλασμός* and the *ἄφεσις*. *ἀμαρτιῶν*. For after that men have ob-

tained, through Christ, the assured hope of pardon and future happiness, nothing hinders their return to a state of gracious favour with God; and, that lifted up and encouraged by that hope, they should both cease to dread any thing from God towards themselves, and cease to act contrary to his will. And although men are said to be “enemies by wicked works,” the force of this is not that God is angry with them; although, on account of his perfect holiness, he cannot approve of human perverseness, nor grant to man a salvation for which he is utterly unfit; but it is, that, men alienated from the love of virtue, and struggling against the sanctity of the divine laws, are in their thoughts, their course of life, and even in their fear, opposed to the will of God, and are in despair of attaining a happy end; than which, nothing can render man, who is “sold under sin,” more wretched.<sup>f</sup> But from this benefit which is re-

<sup>f</sup>This is a most important theological dogma, brought out and illustrated by accurate scholarship. It lies at the basis of useful evangelical instruction. That which divines have called the law-enmity on the part of God towards men, has been made too much of by some, in the face of the Gospel announcement, that “God was, in Christ, reconciling the world to himself, and not imputing to men their trespasses.” If men are to be encouraged to seek a better state, they must be shown, that the impediment does not lie in the religious system, but in their own wilful indifference and mistrust.—T.

ferred to Christ, it follows that man may be reconciled to God. The ἄφεσις ἀμαρτιῶν, precedes, and then follows the καταλλαγή. Because θεὸς ἦν ἐν χριστῷ κόσμον καταλλάσσων ἐαυτῷ, μὴ λογιζόμενος αὐτοῖς τὰ παραπτώματα αυτῶν it is now the duty of men to return to a state of grace with a holy God. δεόμεθα οὖν ὑπὲρ χριστοῦ, καταλλάγητε τῷ θεῷ (2 Cor. v. 19, 20.)

In the same way, δικαιώσις and ἄφεσις ἀμαρτιῶν are improperly regarded as synonyms. For δικαιώσις is the whole gift of salvation;<sup>g</sup> but the ἄφεσις ἀμαρτιῶν is the cause and necessary condition by which the δικαιώσις exists. Many passages show that they thus differ as cause and effect, but those, especially in which they are plainly distinguished as to order of time, as Rom. iv. 25. But as these words have been taken for synonyms, it has, of course, happened that when they ought to be plainly subordinated one to the other, they have been treated as parallel in order, and by this means a serious confusion has been introduced into ideas of the first importance. For not even now, in explaining the substance of the Gospel concern-

<sup>g</sup> Rather, it is the putting man in such a state before God, forensically, as that all the practical realization of salvation from sin and its consequences shall follow.—T.

ing the salvation accomplished by Christ, and really obtainable by men, do they altogether abstain from those formulae which, taking their rise from the Vulgate rendering of certain words, subsequently, when the Romish Church had obscured the true benefits of the death of Christ, were adopted almost of necessity by our own theologians; and then, at length, contrary to the plain meaning of the sacred writers, were received among the evangelic dogmata, and defended with more zeal than propriety; and even now, are attempted to be justified. If any true evangelical theologian could persuade himself, in explaining the doctrine of salvation, to use words which actually accord with the Greek, and not those uncertain ambiguous terms borrowed from the Vulgate, as *justitia, justificatio, satisfactio, &c.*, he certainly, as doing much to place the evangelic doctrine in its true light, and to defend it from the defilements of its enemies, would deserve much praise.<sup>h</sup> In the mean time, let us give dili-

<sup>h</sup> It is almost impracticable to unravel the web which Romish sophistry has woven around the truth to hide it. The ingenuity of ages has been devoted to this subject. For instance, the true notion of repentance has been almost entirely lost, through the false view which the Romanists have promulgated about *penance*. They have endeavoured to show that the very word comes from *poena*, punishment, and

gence that the words which, in their teaching, the sacred writers have used, be understood in their true force and meaning.

Another class of words in the New Testament which have been mistaken for synonyms, is that of those which express the *state or the action*. In explaining these, error often is committed, when persons who know not the true force of the words, endeavour to excuse the rashness of their own interpretation by the supposed inaccuracy of diction in the sacred writers ; and thus confound those words which express the action with those which denote the state or condition of the thing. And if any one should say that this is of no moment ; for that in both words the notion of the same thing is dominant ; it is easy to shew how greatly he is deceived. For, in the first place,

that penance or repentance is a voluntary infliction for sin. But the fact is, that our word *repent*, and the French *se repentir*, are not at all derived from this source, but from the Hebrew word פָּנָה, to turn ; and this etymological view of the word brings us away altogether from the false doctrine of Rome, and exhibits to us the idea of repentance in its true light, and in perfect accordance with the New Testament word for it, μετανοία, a change of mind, a *turning from* sin to God. From the same source, we have the French word *pente*, inclination, and in our own language, pent-house, a sloping roof, inclining towards the main building.—T.

the words are of a different genus, and cannot therefore be accounted synonyms; as, for example, creation and the thing created; slaughter and death; who would call these synonyms? Moreover, as the thought is widely different when we speak of a certain action, and when we speak of the state or condition effected by that action, it is inevitable that many errors must arise if words of these different kinds are accounted synonymous. Yet this is a fault so frequent with our lexicographers, that I do not hesitate to affirm it to be a fruitful source of many serious errors. Examples of this may be found in those words especially which have their origin in a common root, as *δικαιώσις*, *δικαιοσύνη*, and *δικαιώμα*, and many others; which, when they are referred to the same thing, are improperly regarded as synonyms, and are therefore frequently explained as if it were the same thing whether the Apostle had written *δικαιώμα* or *δικαιώσις*. And this is still more objectionable when words of this class are used to express important general notions, for the accurate setting forth of which customary language scarcely suffices. For in these cases it must often happen, and most unfortunately for the ascertaining the Apostle's meaning, that words which describe the action are confounded with the

idea of the state and condition of the thing acted on; which, in passages where the sacred writers have spoken of the wickedness of the men of their generation not unfrequently occurs.

Finally, the third kind of synonyms which are erroneously assumed to exist in the New Testament, is more difficult of development. It embraces those words which so far signify the same thing, that they equally regard certain persons, or certain times and places, and therefore are falsely assumed to be synonymous, and are not explained as to their specific difference, because a certain general notion is assumed as the basis of them all. There are many such words in the New Testament, which are used only of certain persons or of a certain time or place, each of which express a very different idea, although they have reference to one and the same thing. Such are *μετανοεῖν*, *ἐπιστρέφεσθαι*, *ἀνωθεν γεννηθῆναι*, *ἀγιασθῆναι*, *κτισθῆναι*, *ἀνακαίνουσθαι*, which, though they are all predicated of amendment of heart and life, yet they exhibit the notion so differently, that they cannot be accounted synonymous. Some indeed, as *μετανοεῖν*, *ἀγιασθῆναι*, express the common notion of amendment; others, as *ἐπιστρέφεσθαι*, *ἀνωθεν γεννηθῆναι*, are spoken of a change

in the Jews' mode of thinking and acting ; the rest, and indeed most words of this class, require the improvement of the manners and life of men already corrupted and defiled by sinful association. And if these words are accounted synonymous, then they are all understood in one sense as of renewing, restoring, and, as it were, forming again human nature, when they ought to be understood of the amendment of the life of men already in existence, and already corrupted ; and any one capable of judging, will readily admit the confusion that must thus be introduced. For, although we are not disposed to deny that human nature, even at its best, needs the aid and discipline of the Holy Spirit, that it may obtain a blessed end ; nay, we will readily grant that all the posterity of Adam must despair of eternal happiness, unless they steadily pursue that course which the sacred books prescribe, and which is most assuredly pointed out to them by inspiration ; yet this also we think evident, that no opinions have been held concerning man's moral state more dreadful, or which ought more justly to be mollified by the favourable use of ambiguous words, than those which apply the Scripture statements, concerning men in a state of actual

corruption, to the moral state of human nature itself;<sup>1</sup> and this arises from no other cause than that words, which were affirmed only of certain men in certain places and times, were, as if they involved the same general notion, regarded as synonymous. Certainly this will be granted by all, that a passage concerning man's moral improvement is usually treated as if it spoke indiscriminately of the new-born infant and of the worst man on earth. And we

<sup>1</sup> It is to be feared that the author has, in these latter remarks, allowed the benevolence of his feelings to carry him away from the line of accurate investigation which he prescribes, and in which he generally walks with much caution. The whole of this passage is far too general and loose in its statements, to warrant an almost sceptical view of the established theology of ages, upon some important points of doctrine. We must not receive even upon so respectable an authority, the mere assertion that, *πιστρέψοθαι* and *ἄνωθεν γεννηθῆναι* are expressions only to denote a change from Judaism to Christianity; nor would it be a sound canon of criticism, that there is an ambiguity in doctrinal terms in the inspired writers, which should be thrown into the scale in favour of man's present moral condition as a fallen being. It is easy for perverted intellect, or unsound scholarship, to assume this ambiguity, and build on it a false and ruinous dogma; and in fact, this is the fruitful source of most heretical opinions; while, before the meridian light of such acumen as that which Mr. Tittmann generally shows, all seeming ambiguity vanishes.—*T.*

might easily multiply such examples if we had room, or if more examples were needed to sustain a self-evident observation. So far however I have spoken, lest the errors into which men fall respecting synonyms, should be accounted of little importance. The ills under which we suffer in this respect are undoubtedly curable; but they lie deeper than is generally thought; nor will they be heard till, in compliance with the advice of Luther, we return to the strict accuracy of grammatic investigation.<sup>k</sup>

<sup>k</sup> Certainly much of the wild theology, which, to the disgrace of the Christian church in the 19th century, has disturbed the peace of its members, may be traced to the sad inaccuracy with which the word of God is read in the original languages. Women and boys, and sometimes men, (see such publications as the *Morning Watch, passim*) with a little smattering of Greek and Hebrew, set up for critics and inventors of new views; and so extensive is the want of a habit of strict exegetical interpretation, that not many of the pastors of the present day in our country, are prepared by the ponderous metal of a sound scholarship, to confound and silence their frivolous and baseless speculations. The mists which they raise could not live in the light of such writings as this very able work on the synonyms of Scripture.—T.

## CHAPTER II.

IT is generally allowed, that one great difficulty in explaining old authors, lies in the accurate observation of the use of words. For, as in the grammatical laws of a language, no such rigid necessity exists, but that an occasional deviation may be permitted; so in the use of cognate words, a still greater latitude of meaning obtains; for those laws arise from fixed causes, and cannot therefore be lost sight of, unless the causes themselves are removed, (although custom introduces many forms of speech which are contrary to the rule and genius of a language;) but the wider use of particular words is not controlled by certain laws, but is frequently so guided by custom, that not only at different periods, but in writers of the same period, the force of a word materially differs. And this justifies the masters of the hermeneutic school, when they affirm that, next to the grammatical and logical knowledge of a language, regard should be had, especially in rendering the older writers, to the *usus loquendi*, or sense in which particu-

lar words were received, both generally in the language in which the book is written, and specially in the writings of its author. And as this attempt is not without difficulty in common cases, so is that difficulty considerably increased in the examination of those writers, who have more frequently receded from the customary use of words, whether it be from ignorance of their own language, or that the novelty and magnitude of their subject compelled them to a more lax application of the terms already in use. The writers of the New Testament Scriptures were of this class.

In no class of words, however, is the difficulty greater than in those called synonyms; that is, in those which, although they may be referred to one common notion, yet each presents some particular mode and specific marking of the thing signified. For in regard to such words, not only must great care be taken lest many words should be falsely accounted synonymous; but the determining of those that really are synonymous, is rendered extremely difficult; partly because in the natural progress of language the specific force of a word is frequently changed; and partly because the sacred writers, freed from the ambition of mere

human eloquence, have rather followed the leadings of a mind illumined by the divine spirit, than laboured after the beauties of an artificial eloquence. In noticing, therefore, the specific difference of particular synonyms, caution is required lest, in the interpretation of certain passages, we should search in them for more than the writer himself intended. At the same time, they appear to err greatly who, in forming lexicons of the New Testament, do not at all regard the true relation of synonyms, but treat of words which are in a certain degree cognate, though really very diverse from each other, as if they were equivalent and identical in their form and meaning.

For, although it must be granted that in all passages the distinction between synonyms cannot be so urged, as that we shall always gain much towards exhibiting the force of each passage, yet accurate interpretation requires that we should diligently notice the difference of words, lest in places in which the writer meant to convey different ideas, we should swerve from the sure rule of discrimination, and, by an ambiguous version, render the mind of the author yet more obscure. After repeated meditation on this subject, it seemed

desirable to exhibit a specimen of a synonymic lexicon of the New Testament; and, for this purpose, we have chosen words which are least foreign to the character of these sacred days.<sup>1</sup> They all regard that moral habit of the human soul which is to be divinely wrought in it by the Holy Spirit. These are ἀγαθός· δίκαιος· ἀγιος· ἀγνός· ὅσιος· ἱερός· καθαρός· ἀκέραιος· ἀπλοῦς· ἀκακος· ἀμεμπτος· ἀμωμος· ἀνεπίληπτος, with their nouns. It will be evident to all, that in these words one common notion exists, to which may be referred whatever of moral excellence is desired in man; yet in each there is a difference of mode, under which that excellence is regarded. All these terms may be predicated of the same man, yet we think of the same man differently, according as we use the one or the other of these expletives. But they differ also between themselves, as to the mode of expressing this superiority of nature; we will divide therefore the whole group of words into classes.

ἀγαθός· δίκαιος.

ἀγαθός and δίκαιος agree, as either may be said of a person or a thing which is in a right state with regard to another, so that it is just what each one would wish it, and may justly

<sup>1</sup> See page 1.

require it to be. Yet they differ. For the word *ἀγαθός* regards the good or the benefit which springs from a good person or thing, but *δίκαιος* implies only that a thing is precisely what it should be, without any regard to the question whether good or evil may flow from it.

For he is *δίκαιος* who observes the *δίκη* (justice). Therefore, God is *ποιτὴς δίκαιος*, 2 Tim. iv. 8. for he will render to every man according to his works. But that is called *ἀγαθός* which in some way is profitable to men and supplies their wants,<sup>m</sup> as *δόματα ἀγαθά*, Matth. vii. 11. *δενδρον ἀγαθόν*, Matth. vii. 17. *γῆ ἀγαθή*, Luke viii. 8. *δοῦλος ἀγαθός*, Matth. xxv. 21, 23. *δεσπόταις ἀγαθοῖς*, 1 Pet. ii. 18. collated with Tit. ii. 5. Hence *ἀγαθοί* and *πονηροί* are opposed, Matth. v. 45. and elsewhere. For the *πονηροί* do *πόνος* to others. And this is not contradicted in Matth. xxii. 10. *συνήγαγον πονηρούς τε καὶ ἀγαθούς*. For it is ill rendered by some, *men*

<sup>m</sup> *ἀγαθός* is, however, sometimes used not to express the qualities of the mind but of the person. In Exodus ii. 2. where it is said of Moses **כִּי טוֹב דָוָא**, which the LXX. renders by *ἀστείος*, Aquila uses *ἀγαθός*. And *ἀγαθός* is, in fact, sometimes used in this sense in purer writers. So in Theocritus Idyl. xxiii. 2. *τὰν μόρφων ἀγαθός*. We have the same use of the common notion of the word in our old adjective, *goodly*, as it occurs in Exodus ii. 2. that he was a *goodly* child. And again in 1 Samuel xvi. 12, where, in the Septuagint, it is *ἀγαθός ὁράσει*, our version is, *goodly to look to*.—T.

*born of a good or bad race.* For they are called, unworthy, as the parable plainly declares. And it would be both absurd and unjust, promiscuously to invite men of any condition, and then when they were assembled, with severe rebuke to cast out those who were found to be of an inferior condition. In Romans vii. 12. the commandment is said to be both *δικαιαία καὶ ἀγαθή* the one, because it teaches nothing but what is just; the other, because it regards the happiness of those to whom it was given, v. 13. In the same way they are opposed in Rom. v. 7, Scarcely for a righteous man (*δίκαιον*) would one die, but for a good man (*ἀγαθόν*) some would even dare to die. Though a man be free from crime, it is not necessary that he be freed from the risk of suffering; but for a benevolent man, (Matth. xx. 15.) some would not hesitate to die.

*Δίκαιος* then, is of more extensive meaning than *ἀγαθός*; for *δίκαιος* is one who follows the law of right and equity, whether it issues to others in good or ill; but *ἀγαθός* is he who does good to others; and even those who are *πονηροί* may sometimes “give good gifts,” Matth. vii. 11. But since the law of equity requires, that if it is allowable and possible we should do good to all, and not always use our own right,

in which, certainly, real probity consists; they also are called *δίκαιοι*, who fulfil the offices of humanity, as well as those who observe strict justice. In the New Testament, therefore, not only is he who acts justly and blamelessly called *δίκαιος*, Rom. iii. 10. (so it is affirmed of Christ, Acts iii. 14; vii. 52. 1 Pet. iii. 18.) but he also who is benign and tender, equitable and clement. So Joseph, Matth. i. 19., is said to be *δίκαιος*, because he was unwilling to expose his wife to public ignominy; and so God himself, because he pardons sinners, Rom. iii. 26. 1 John i. 9. Many think that this signification of *δίκαιος* in the New Testament, springs from the Hebrew, in which צְדִיק often denotes the same with חִסְדָּה.<sup>n</sup> But even among

<sup>n</sup> There can be no good ground for this idea. Among the scores of instances in which צְדִיק is rendered in the LXX. δίκαιος, we find but one instance in which that version puts δίκαιος for חִסְדָּה, viz. in Isaiah lvii. 1. καὶ ἀνδρες δίκαιοι ἀγρονται. And here there is no propriety in the rendering; it very improperly confounds two different words in the verse, and destroys its beauty. Our English version draws the correct distinction. “The righteous צְדִיק perisheth and no man layeth it to heart, and merciful men חִסְדָּה are taken away,” &c. Certainly several passages occur in which the LXX. renders the noun חִסְדָּה by δίκαιοσύνη; but even these generally would be better rendered more strictly according to the original notion of mercy in the Hebrew word. Gen. xix. 19. xx. 13. xxi. 23,

the Greeks, *δίκαιος* not only signifies just, he who observes the right, and constantly does what the law requires, but he also who observes the duties of humanity. For he who preserves the *δίκη*, in all things is equitable, and never excessive; he is lenient when called to punish; he is merciful when called to aid the wretched, even to his own inconvenience. For *δίκη* requires not only, that we should render to each his due, in which civil right consists, but that we should give liberally to each, as far as we are able, consistently with justice to others; for the difference between justice and equity is altogether exploded from the law of morals. And as the notion of *δίκη* originates in the idea that things are equally distributed, he is called *δίκαιος* who both observes that which is lawful and right, and who does what virtue and equity require. Ruhnken on Xenophon, Memor. iv. 4, 5, says, “*Δίκαιος* is spoken of a person or thing in whom nothing is excessive, nothing deficient, which is ade-

&c. In the first case, our translators have rendered it mercy, and in the other two, kindness. But, in fact, the term *δίκαιος* is only applied to men in such instances as the case of Joseph referred to in the text, as indicative of that justice and equity out of which the external act of kindness and mercy, in question, is assumed to flow. He was *δίκαιος*, and, therefore, he was kind and merciful.—T.

quate to its appointed functions, and perfect in its numbers. There is another notion akin to this, when that is said to be *δίκαιος* which preserves uniformity and consistency in all its parts." Hence, in Xenoph. Cyrop. ii. 2. 26, a chariot is said not to be *δίκαιος*, that is, it would not keep an even course, when drawn by horses of unequal strength or swiftness. Wherefore, *δίκαιος* often signifies that which is fit and suitable, as *γῆ δίκαια*, in Pollux i. 227; and *γῆδιον δίκαιοτατον* Cyrop. viii. 3, 38,<sup>o</sup> is not the most fertile soil, but the most congenial. The Romans used justice or just in this sense, like the German *gerecht*, as expressing that which is proper and fit, that in which there is nothing defective or redundant. But the Jews, whose minds were imbued with the notion of civil justice, only when they sought the blessings of divine grace, had in view justice in its strictest sense, but were totally alien from the sublime moral feeling which we admire in that saying of our blessed Lord, which declares God only to be *ἀγαθός*, good, that is the *summum bonum*.

In the word *δίκαιος* therefore, the notion of just, right, equitable, prevails. In the word *ἀγαθός*, the notion of benefit and utility.

<sup>o</sup> See Schneider's edition of Cyrop.—T.

ἄγιος· ἀγνός· ὄσιος· ἴερός· ἀμίαντος· καθαρός

All these words so far agree, that they denote purity of mind, blamelessness, and integrity of spirit. They differ, therefore, from *δίκαιος* and *ἀγαθός*, for these have reference more immediately to the reason of acting. It is possible for a man to be *δίκαιος* or *ἀγαθός*, who cannot be said to be *ἄγιος* and *ἀγνός*. But, besides this, these words differ from each other in respect to the way in which that integrity of mind is regarded.

*Ἄγιος* and *ἀγνός*, though they have the same etymological origin, differ in their use. For in *ἀγνός* the proper idea is, that the thing or person is pure, either in body or mind; but the word *Ἄγιος* indicates more especially the reverence which is due to such a person or thing. *ἀγνός* properly denotes cleanliness of body, but subsequently, like many similar expressions or ideas, being transferred to the mind, it signifies mental purity. That is *ἀγνόν* in which there is nothing impure. In the Orestes of Euripides, l. 1621, *ἀγνός γάρ εἰμι χεῖρας ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς φρένας*. Hippolyt. v. 316, 317, *ἀγνάς μὲν, ὡς παῖς, χεῖρας αἴματος φέρεις; Χεῖρες μὲν ἀγναί, φεγγὸς ἔχει μίασμά τι*. In the first place, it is used for chastity, 2 Cor. xi. 2. Tit. ii. 5. (Plato de Legg. viii. p. 647. E. μέχρις μὲν παιδογονίας ἡθεοί, καὶ

ἀκηρατοι γάμων τε ἀγνοι ζῶσιν. In Homer it is the epithet applied to the goddesses, but only in the Odyssey.) Hence ἀναστροφὴ ἀγνὴ 1 Pet. iii. 2, is a pure life contaminated by no crimes; and 1 Tim. v. 22, we have σεαυτὸν ἀγνὸν τήρει, it being previously enjoined “neither to partake of other men’s sins.” In 2 Cor. vii. 11, κατεστήσατε ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνούς εἶναι ἐν τῷ πράγματι, is not, as some have rendered it, contrary to the genius of the language, “Ye have proved yourselves to be pure from this crime.” (For it is not said, ἀγνός ἐν τῷ, but ἀγνός τινος and ἀγνός τι) but, ye have proved in this matter, *i. e.* by this event, that ye are pure.” Therefore, in 1 John iii. 3, God is said to be ἀγνός, as he is free from all evil, and in James iii. 7. the wisdom from above is said to be ἀγνή, because it is most pure, and because he who is imbued with it has a pure mind; and they are in error who explain the passage as if that wisdom required and imparted purity: ἀγνός, therefore, especially denotes the absence of all impurity.

But ἀγνός more particularly regards that which is worthy of veneration and demands our reverence. For although ἀγνός is often used of sacred things, as ἱερὴ ἀγνή, Odyss. φ v. 259; for sacred rites ought especially to be free from impurity; yet ἀγνός is more directly used

as a matter of custom, to express the notion of sanctity. For, it frequently happens, that words which bear a common origin, and therefore seem to denote the same thing, diverge in their use to different significations, so that each has its peculiar and proper range of application; whilst this diversity cannot be traced to any difference of form in the word, but very frequently to the omnipotence of custom. As there is no reason in the different form of the word, why *σαρκινός* and *σάρκινος* should so differ that *σαρκινός* should be that which has a fleshly mind, even though it exists not in the flesh; but *σάρκινος*, that which is composed of flesh as a material, (whilst *πνευματινός* denotes both a spiritual existence and a spiritual mind) and yet by no example could it be demonstrated that *σάρκινος* denotes that which has both the mind and the nature of the flesh. And, therefore, no number of manuscripts can sustain that reading in Rom. vii. 14.<sup>P</sup> *ἄγιος*, therefore, is rarely or never used by the Greek writers for that purity of mind, which theologians have called sanctity, but it constantly de-

<sup>P</sup> Rom. vii. 14., *ἴγε τὸ σάρκινος εἶμι*. This is a various reading which is scarcely worth the remark, it is supported by so few MSS., except as it shows the accuracy of Titmann's examination of the sacred text.—T

notes that which is sacred and consecrated to the gods. That, however, in the books of the New Testament it should be used for sanctity of morals is not surprising. For it is well known how careful the Jews were to secure cleanliness in all their sacred rites. That could not be sacred which was in any way polluted. Hence, even in the word קָדֵשׁ the cognate notions of purity and sanctity exist, as will abundantly appear from an examination of Levit. xi. 43, 44, (compared with 1 Pet. i. 16,) Deut. xxiii. 14; 2 Sam. xi. 4; Exod. xix. 22; 2 Chron. v. 11; Isa. lxvi. 17.<sup>9</sup> They are in error, therefore, who affirm that the primitive notion of *ἄγιος* is, that which is set apart from vulgar and profane use, and consecrated to

<sup>9</sup> One or two seeming instances to the contrary occur in Scripture, in which the word קָדֵשׁ is used for a harlot, Genesis xxxviii. 21, compared with verse 15, where the more common word זָנוֹנָה is used for the same person. Here, evidently, the idea of consecration is separated from that of purity. The קָדְשָׁתָּה were the prostitutes consecrated to the service of heathen and idolatrous temples. See also Deut. xxiii. 17; Hosea iv. 14. The general use of the word קָדֵשׁ in Scripture, however, unites both the idea of sanctity and purity. And the anomaly in this other application of the word is explained by the common habit of fallen man both to pollute sacred things, and to throw a veil of religious pretence over impurity; in fact to substitute formal consecration for real holiness.—T.

peculiar uses. *ἅγιος* is that which is sacred, and that only can be sacred which is not unclean. And hence its various uses in the New Testament may be accurately obtained. In that sense, which among the Greek writers is its proper force, viz. that which is sacred, which it is wicked to injure or contemn, *ἅγιος* is spoken in the New Testament of things or persons sacred to God. Rom. xi. 16, *ἢ ἀπαρχὴ ἄγια*, Luke ii. 23, *ἅγιον τῷ κυρίῳ κληθήσεται*, of the prophets, Luke i. 70; Acts iii. 21; 2 Pet. i. 21; of the priesthood, 1 Pet. ii. 5; of the Apostles, Eph. iii. 5, 8; of the Angels, Matth. xxv. 31; 1 Thess. iii. 13; of places, Acts vii. 33; especially of Jerusalem, Matth. iv. 5; and of the temple; 1 Cor. iii. 17; still more frequently, as Acts ix. 13, of Christians, (as in Daniel vii. 21. viii. 24. **קדש**) Then, it is that which is to be venerated or treated with all honour, and primarily with respect to God, Apoc. iv. 8. John xvii. 11. Luke i. 49. *ἅγιά γε αφή*, Rom. i. 2. *διαθήκη ἄγια*, which it is impious to violate, Luke i. 72. 1 Cor. iii. 17. Then the idea of purity being added to this, it frequently denotes that which is free from error and vice, or from actual defilement, 1 Pet. i. 15. 1 John ii. 20. Mark vi. 20. Ephes. i. 4. 1 Cor. vii. 34. 2 Pet. iii. 12. And in 2 Pet. ii. 21, the com-

mandment is called *āgía*, not because it makes holy, but because it is holy in itself, and ought to be inviolate. The use is similar in 2 Tim. i. 9, *κλῆσις ἀγία*; for as *κλῆσις* involves the notion of inviting to a certain thing, it follows, that with the addition of the adjective, it implies by the adjective, that thing to which invitation is given. And hence *κλῆσις ἀγία* is not a calling which makes holy, or which contains in itself the energies of piety, still less does it mean the whole Christian doctrine, but it is the actual call to a life of sanctity; for they to whom the *κλῆσις* comes are invited that they may be *āγιοι*. So Hebrews iii. 1, *κλῆσις εἰρηνάριος*. Nor is it inevident why the word *āγιον* is, in the New Testament, the almost constant epithet of the Spirit. Not that it is invariably associated with the word *πνεῦμα* when something divine is signified. For sometimes *πνεῦμα* stands alone, as Matth. xii. 31; 1 Cor. ii. 4; 1 Tim. iii. 16; 1 Pet. iii. 18; John iii. 34, or the word *Θεόν* is added, as Matth. xii. 28; 1 Cor. vii. 40; or *τοῦ πατρός*, Matth. x. 20, compared with Luke xii. 12. But where *āγιον* is added, *πνεῦμα* always denotes something which has been wrought by divine power, or the cause itself by which the effect is produced. In both classes of passages *āγιον τὸ πνεῦμα* is said, not only because it is from

God, but because it is in its very nature divine ; and, therefore, entirely pure, holy, and worthy of reverence.

*ὅσιος* is, in its meaning, more nearly allied to *ἄγνος*, and *ιερός* to *ἄγιος*; yet there is a difference. For *ὅσιος* is properly, pure from all crime; one who has committed no crime, but religiously observes every sacred duty.<sup>r</sup> Therefore it does not denote integrity generally, but piety more especially, and the religious observance of offices of piety. *ὅσιος* is pious. Wherefore *ὅσιος* and *δίκαιος* are often used together, the one denoting that which is holy, the other that which is right, as in Sophocles οὐ Θεμις οὐδὲ *ὅσιον*. and in Josephus, A. I. viii. 9, 1, καὶ τῶν δίκαιων καὶ ὁσιῶν ἔργων in Charit. i. 10. πρὸς ἀνθρώπους δίκαια καὶ πρὸς Θεοὺς *ὅσια*. Schel. Euripides, Hec. v. 788. *ὅσιος* is, ὁ περὶ τὰ θεῖα δίκαιος. So in Tit. i. 8. St. Paul, 1 Tim. ii. 8, rightly exhorts to lift up holy hands, *ὅσιως*, i. e. which have committed no impiet : for truly enophon says, Agesil. xi. 2, τοῦς Θεοὺς οὐδὲν ἥττον ὁσίοις ἔργοις η̄ *ἄγνοις* *ιεροῖς* η̄δεσθαι. God himself is in the New Testament said to be *ὅσιος*, as that holy being whom it is impious to dishonour. In Apoc. xvi. 5; Acts ii. 27, τὰ *ὅσια* means those pious

duties which it were virtuous to perform, and wicked to neglect. But the word occurs in a peculiar sense in Acts xiii. 34, δώσω ὑμῖν τὰ ὄσια Δαβὶδ τὰ πιστὰ. Many interpreters illustrate it by a reference of it to the Hebrew **תִּשְׁבַּח**, which the LXX frequently renders by ὄσιος; and they think, therefore, that in this place τὰ ὄσια Δαβὶδ means the mercies promised to David by God, Isa. lv. 3. But they never can properly render ὄσια by mercies or bounties. Paul speaks of a certain thing which it was predicted in Ps. xvi. 10, should happen to David, οὐ δώσεις τὸν ὄσιον σου ἰδεῖν διαφθοράν. This thing, in the words of Isaiah, he calls τὰ ὄσια Δαβὶδ. But in Isaiah it is a term expressive of the covenant that God was about to make with the Jewish people; this covenant is called ὄσια Δαβὶδ, since properly it is made with David. ὥμοσα Δαβὶδ, ἐώς τοῦ αἰῶνος ἐτοιμάσω τὸ σπέρμα σου. Ps. lxxxix. 3, 4. The ὄσια Δαβὶδ was nothing more than the covenant made with David, who was at that time the head of the Jewish people. The very words of Isaiah which Paul quotes teach this; and I will covenant with you an eternal covenant, τὰ ὄσια Δαβὶδ τὰ πιστά. The subsequent statement shews what covenant is intended. τὰ ὄσια πιστά is the same as ὄρκια πιστά in Homer.

*Ιερός* strictly denotes that which is consecrated or sacred, as given or devoted to God.<sup>s</sup> Whence ἀνίσθαι is to consecrate, and ἄφεται they who are consecrated; and is frequently spoken of animals who are devoted to God and wander in a free pasture. (Synes. ii. ep. 57, ὁσπερ ἐν ιερῷ περιβόλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ ζῶντος ἄφετον, ἀνειμένον ζῶν.) Therefore in the word *ιερός*, which is accurately rendered sacred, nothing is intended but that the person or thing is sacred to God, irrespective of mind or morals; but especially that it subserves a sacred purpose, as the temple in the New Testament, as the sacred things themselves, in 1 Cor. ix. 13, and repeatedly in Homer and other writers. It is not used in the New Testament of moral habits. Those who, in this sense, are said to be sacred to God, are called ἄγιοι. See Valesius ad Harpocrat. p. 143. Valekenar. ad Ammon. p. 184, s. et vv. dd. ad Hesychius v. ὁσίους. Taylor. ad Aeschin. p. 50.

*Καθαρός* is used to express a mind or a life free from vice; and sometimes those things which they who use them do not defile them-

<sup>s</sup> Suidas, *ιερόν* ἄγιον, τῷ θεῷ ἀνατεθειμένον, and the Editor of Suidas refers this definition to the Schol. on Aristophanes.—T.

selves with, as Luke xi. 41; Matt. xxiii. 19; Rom. xiv. 20; Tit. i. 15; Heb. x. 22. Now the *καθαρόν* is that in which nothing sordid or base is intermixed, Matt. v. 8; *καθαρὰ συνείδησις*, 1 Tim. iii. 9, *θρησκεία καθαρά*, James i. 27. *καθαρός* therefore is spoken of purity of mind, as *ἀγνός*, and yet there is a degree of difference. For in *καθαρός* it is implied that there is no foreign admixture or addition that affects the use or the senses, so as to render the person or thing unfit or objectionable, as dirt or stain, odour, colour, or any useless thing whatever. The dying words of Cyrus, in the Cyroped. viii. 7, strikingly illustrate this idea, *οὐδέ γε ὅπως ἄφεων ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ, ἐπειδὰν τοῦ ἄφεονος σώματος δίχα γένηται, οὐδὲ τοῦτο πέπεισμαι ἀλλ' ὅταν ἄκρατος καὶ καθαρός ὁ νοῦς ἐπεριθῇ, τότε καὶ φρονιμώτατον εἰκὸς αὐτὸν εἶναι.* And as Xenoph. Oecon. x. 7, calls a body, *καθαρὸν σῶμα*, not because it is free from defilement, but from every false adornment; so James uses *θρησκεία καθαρά* for that in which there is no mixture of falsehood. Very nearly allied, however, to this word is *ἀμίαντος*, which James, in this passage, uses in conjunction with *καθαρός*, (Compare Heb. xiii. 4.) Yet if they had not been different in sense, they would not have been used together. Certain-

ly to be *καθαρός* a man must be *ἀμιαντός*. For unless he is immaculate he cannot be pure. In *ἀμιαντός* then we find the cause of the *καθαρός*. *καθαρός* then has a more extensive signification than *ἄγνος*. For to it the thought of impurity is necessary. It is freedom from impurity; but any thing may be said to be *καθαρός* in which there is no foreign admixture, whether it be itself good or evil. *ἄγνος* is that which is not contaminated by any thing in itself really evil. But wine, though it be combined with the purest water, can no longer be said to be *καθαρός*. That which is *ἄγνος* is necessarily *καθαρός*; but many things that are *καθαροί* are far enough from being *ἄγνοι*.

These four words then, if we use them in reference to the human soul and life, may be discriminated thus. *Καθαρός* is pure from every thing which would change or corrupt the nature of the subject with which it is combined; *ἄγνος* is pure from every defilement of mind, *στοιχός* is pure from crime or impious deed; *ἄγνος* is that which, on account of integrity of mind and morals, is sacred to God and revered; and finally, *ιερός* is simply that which is consecrated to, or set apart for God; *καθαρός* is pure, immaculate; *ἄγνος* is chaste, clean, sinless; *στοιχός* is

pious; *ἅγιος*, holy, and *ἱερός*, sacred or consecrated.<sup>t</sup>

*ἀκέραιος* • *ἀπλοῦς* • *ἄκακος* •

agree as far as they each denote a certain simplicity of mind; yet there is a difference between them.

For *ἀπλοῦς* strictly is that in which there is nothing complex or perplexed, but, as it were, free from involvement, and therefore, plain and open.<sup>u</sup> In Matth. vi. 22, and Luke xi. 34, the

<sup>t</sup> It is not a little surprising that the actual use and application of these several words can be so distinctly and philosophically defined, seeing that their origin or etymology is so decidedly obscure. There must have been distinct reason in their etymological history, for their specific application, in a sense so capable of definite insulation; and yet this appears to be all but lost. *ἅγιος* may come from חָג Festum, dies festus; and *ἱερός* or *ἱερος*, from **חרם** a verb which, in Hebrew, Chaldee, Syriac, and Arabic, means, set apart or devoted to God, as a victim, (and in this sense *ἱερός* is used by Greek writers, both of the temple, victim, sacred vases, omens, &c.) and probably the first and simple idea is **חר** the sacred fire. *καθαρός* may be derived from **כָּשֵׁר** rectus, and in Chaldee, vasa, &c. polluta ad rectum et licitum usum aptare. *ἀμίαντος* from **μύαντη**, viscera, venter, intestina, whence the Latin, mingo. But after all, these etymologies are questionable; and, to be established, would need a very strict investigation into other derivatives of the same roots still remaining in different modern languages.—T.

<sup>u</sup> As compounded of a privative and *πλεω*, plico.—T.

eye is properly called ἀπλοῦς, as seeing distinctly without double or distracted vision. And to this is opposed the ὁρθαλυὸς πονηρός, that is, which does not rightly perform its office, but sees διεσπαμένως, or distractedly. So the mind that is drawn different ways, as towards God and mammon, does not rightly perform its office; but that which desires and follows after one thing only, as the chief good, that mind attains its object. There is in the word ἀπλοῦς the cognate notions of plain and straight; ἀπλοῦς is simple, because, in it there is nothing involved or intricate. In Plato, Hipp. Min. 230. E. ἀπλοῦς and ἀληθῆς are placed in connexion, and are put in opposition to πολύπροπος καὶ ψευδῆς. Themistius, Orat. xxii. attributes to friendship the βλέμμα ἀπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον. Hence it is not surprising, that frequently ἀπλοῦς is associated with the idea of liberality; 1 Tim. lvi. 173. ἀπλοίκον καὶ τῶν ὄντων κοινωνικόν. Lucian combines it with γενναῖος, in the same way as Horace, Epist. ii. 2. v. 193. simplex hilarisque, and Tacitus Hist. Lib. iii. c. 86. ine-  
rat tamen simplicitas et liberalitas. In this sense also ἀπλότης occurs in the New Testament, Rom. xii. 8; 2 Cor. viii. 2. ix. 11. It denotes the candour of an ingenuous and sincere mind.

But the meaning of *ἀκέραιος* is, not combined with many other things as parts. For though the origin of this word may be doubtful,<sup>x</sup> since it is frequently confused with *ἀκήρατος*, yet this is undoubtedly its true signification. For it occurs in the Timaeus *ἀκήρατοι οἱ οὐδαέοι* *ἀκέραιοι, οἱ ἔξω κῆροι*; and rightly; for he who is *ἀκέραιος* may be said to be *ἀκήρατος*, being corrupted by no admixture; and similarly, he who is *ἀκήρατος* may be said to be *ἀκέραιος*, for he would be corrupt unless he were *οὐδαέος*. Either word, therefore, is frequently used of the same thing, and in the same sense. So in Euripid. in the Orestes, v. 568, and the Helen, v. 48, they are used indifferently in a similar

<sup>x</sup> I can scarcely regard the origin of this word as doubtful. The word *κροτία* occurs in Matth. v. and elsewhere, and Scapula gives as its meaning, eminentiae et apices in aliqua re, ut cornua, &c., and deduces it from *κρέας*. Now *κρέας* is nothing but קְרָה from קְרָה evenit, occurrit, and thence, both in Hebrew and Chaldee, קְרָות accidentia, casus. In Matth. v. it occurs in the sense of a little addition to the letters of the alphabet. In the Arabic it occurs فَرْد

foedatio cutis, vibices. *ἀκέραιος* is, therefore, free and clear from any extraneous addition, mark or stain. Phavorinus is very minute in his account of the word. *ἀκέραιοι, ἀκακον, ὀλόκληρον. σημαῖνει δὲ καὶ τὸν ἔξω κῆρας, καὶ τὸν εἰληφειν καὶ ἴγια, ἀπὸ τοῦ κέραος, κέραιος, καὶ μετὰ του σπεριτικοῦ ἄλφα, ὁ ἀιγγυντος καὶ ἀελικεῖς.*—T.

expression. The same *λέχος* of Menelaus is, in one place, said to be preserved *ἀκέραιος*, and in the other, *ἀκήρατος*. It does not, however, follow from this, that *ἀκέραιος* and *ἀκήρατος* have the same meaning. It is one thing for two words to be predicated mutually of the same thing, since what the one accords with, the other may accord with also; and it is another thing for them to have precisely the same signification. In the neglect of this difference, the lexicographers of the New Testament have very frequently erred. But to return. *Ἀκέραιος*, therefore, when it is spoken of mind, signifies, simple, entirely free from false or evil admixture. Euripid. Orest. v. 912. *Ξυνετὸς δὲ χωρεῖν ὄμβος τοῖς λόγοις θέλων, Ἀκέραιος, ἀνεπίληπτος ἡσηκηώς βίον*, evidently in the same sense as Matth. x. 16. *φρόνιμοι ὡς αἱ ὄφεις, καὶ ἀκέραιοι ὡς αἱ περιστεραί*; and Romans xvi 19. *σοφοὺς μὲν εἰς τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ἀκεραίους δὲ εἰς τὸ κακόν, i. e. wise towards that which is good, and free from all evil.* Phil. ii. 15. *ἄμεμπτοι καὶ ἀκέραιοι.*

Finally, *ἄκανος* is he who is both free altogether from the influence of evil counsel *κακίᾳ*, and who fears no evil from others, as it is commonly said, simple and ingenuous, both these ideas exist in the word *ἄκανος*; one who neither purposes evil nor suspects it, since he

is altogether alien to it. See Ruhnken. ad Tim. v. *ἀπάντης*. It does not denote every species of simplicity, but that ingenuous simplicity which exists in an upright mind, free from suspicions. So in Romans xvi. 18, ἔξαπατῶσι τὰς παρδίας τῶν ἀπάντων. Such men are easily deceived. Plato Alcibiad. ii. p. 81. *οἱ μὲν μεγαλοψύχους* [καλοῦσιν] *οἱ δὲ εὐηθεῖς. ἔτεροι δὲ ἀπάντους καὶ ἀπείρους καὶ ἐνέους.*<sup>y</sup> Sometimes, however, it is used in the former sense, to denote a man free from all evil, Heb. vii. 26.

'*Απλοῦς* therefore is free from all duplicity, *ἀκέρατος*, unmixed with evil, *ἀπάντης*, free from all evil suspicion, *ἀπλοῦς* is open, sincere, *ἀκέρατος* blameless, *ἀπάντης* ingenuous ; and all of them imply simplicity.

ἄμεμπτος· ἄμωμος· (ἀνεπίληπτος· ἀνέγκλητος·)

ἄμεμπτος and ἄμωμος are both expressions for freedom from blame ; they however differ. He is *ἄμεμπτος*, in whom nothing is yet accounted wanting ; *ἄμωμος*, he in whom there is nothing reprehensible. Each is free from reprehension : the former, as perfect and absolute in all his numerical parts ; the latter as devoid of error. Hence a law which is *ἄμεμπτος* Heb. viii. 7, is a law which cannot be found fault with,

<sup>y</sup> See Plato Dial. ex recensione Bekkeri, Part I. vol. ii. p. 276 — 7.

because there is nothing wanting to it, which ought to be there ; it answers all the purposes of a law. Whilst, on the other hand, Peter, in Epist. 1. i. 19. speaks of Christ as of a lamb, ἄμαρτος καὶ ἀσπίλος, inasmuch as he was without any spot of defilement. We have also in this sense, ἄμαρτους καὶ ἀνεγκλήτους in Coloss. i. 22. Nor, does the sense of the word differ in that very difficult passage in Hebrews ix. 14, ἐς διὰ πνεύματος αἰωνίου ἐαυτὸν προσήνεγκεν ἄμαρτον τῷ Θεῷ, where ἄμαρτος does not relate to a perfect expiation in which there is nothing wanting ; but this is the idea of the Apostle ; that we are to be purged from all impurity by the blood of Christ, who by the eternal spirit (*i. e.* by the δύναμιν ζωῆς ἀκαταλύτου, Heb. vii. 16.) offered himself a victim, uncontaminated and immaculate<sup>z</sup> (*omni macula carentem*) and in Ephes.

<sup>z</sup> That is, not that by the sanctifying influence of the Holy Spirit, operating as in the case of fallen and corrupt men, he succeeded to present, *i. e.* to make himself, without spot, *notwithstanding his tendencies to sin* ; an error which has lately crept in among us ; but that he being a divine person, and therefore immaculate and uncontaminated, did by the Holy Spirit offer himself a victim, and, on account of that immaculacy, a fitting victim. This is a beautiful instance, in which accurate exegesis throws a very valuable light on a question, at once of much interest and much difficulty. Had the Christ been in his human nature corrupt and sinful, he could not be ἄμαρτος ; for that corrupt nature in us, is itself

v. 27. the church is therefore said to be made ἀγία καὶ ἀμωμος, ἡ μὴ ἔχουσα σπῆλον ἡ ἐυτίδα, ἡ τι τῶν τοιούτων. For *μῶμος* properly is a shame, stain, or disgrace, visibly attached to any thing.

But the idea of the word ἀμεμπτος sets forth one who cannot be blamed, because nothing is wanting to him, for which, if wanting, he would deservedly incur blame. Hence in 1 Thess. v. 23. Paul desires to be preserved ἀμεμπτως until the coming of the Lord, and in c. ii. 10. he says, ὅσιως καὶ δικαίως καὶ ἀμέμπτως ὑμῖν ἐγεννήθημεν; showing in the subsequent verse, that he had not failed in his duty towards one of them. He had acted ἀμέμπτως because he had done no less than it was right that he should do. So ἀμέμπτως δῶρα διδόναι, Xenoph. H. G. I, i. 10. ἀμέμπτως δέχεσθαι τοὺς ἀνδρας Cyrop. iv. 2. 18. ἀμεμπτον δεῖπνον Sympos. 2, 2. Although, ἀμεμπτος is sometimes used in both senses, especially by the Attic writers, who, even in administering reproof, are more polished in their style than others. They seldom make use of the other word, because it would appear a higher style of praise to the *μωμος*, or stain which renders us unacceptable in ourselves; but in that holy thing which was conceived by the overshadowing of the Holy Ghost, we are μὴ ἔχουσα σπῆλον, &c. He is, as a divine person from first to last, ἀμωμος; and we are so in him.—T.

use a word, which not only implies that no spot or stain exists, but that nothing is wanting which could properly be desired.

ἀνέγκλητος and ἀνεπίληπτος are cognate words. He is ἀνέγκλητος who is not accused, and cannot properly be accused by any one. But in 1 Tim. iii. 2. the Apostle, says the Christian Pastor should be ἀνεπίληπτος, *i. e.* one in whom no *just* cause of blame exists. Whilst in v. 10. the word ἀνέγκλητος is used to infer, that in δοκιμασίᾳ, *i. e.* as the result of public investigation, *in der öffentlichen umfrage*, he stands unaccused. For it was the custom even in apostolic times, to constitute the minister by the consent of the church, that is of the people.<sup>a</sup> The people therefore were interrogated,

<sup>a</sup> It is surprising how far men's peculiar preconceived notions will carry them. The author sees a popular appointment of a candidate to be a minister, in the mere popular investigation into character, even if the δοκιμασίᾳ can be explained in that way. He loses sight of the fact, that the whole of the passage is an injunction to an individual, to Timothy, the prelate, v. 15. how he is to conduct himself in the church of God, so that, c. v. 22. he may not lay hands rashly on any man, and become a partaker in other men's sins. The rule here laid down for the δοκιμασίᾳ, even stretched to the uttermost, will be found very much in accordance with the church of England custom, of reading a paper in the congregation where the candidate customarily worshipped, called a *si quis*, intimating *si quis*, &c. If any

as to whether any subject of reprobation was found in the candidate, and if he was found ἀνέγκλητος he was ordained. This is the true observation of Grotius de imperio summar. potest. circa sacra c. 10. § 8. ἀνεπίληπτος, i. e. who gives no cause for reprobation, *μὴ παρέχων κατηγορίας ἀφοριμήν.* (Schol. Thucyd. v. 17.) So 1 Tim. iii. 2, and in vi. 14. ἀσπιλον καὶ ἀνεπίληπτον; ἀνεπίληπτος because ἀσπιλος. The word, however, differs from the others. For as ἀμεμπτοι and ἀμωμοι denote those who are not blamed, ἀνεπίληπτος denotes one, who though he is blamed is undeserving of it. In Lucian. Pisc. 8. Tom. 1 p. 377. a man blamed and accused, when called on to defend himself says, *εἰ μέν τι ἀδικῶν φαίνωμαι—ἡν δὲ καθαρὸς ὑμῖν καὶ ἀνεπίληπτος εὐρίσκωμαι.* At times, however, this word is used in a more lax sense, regard being had only to the fact of blame, and not to the real force of the cause of it; for the ἀμεμπτοι and ἀμωμοι, are but few, but the ἀνεπίληπτοι are few indeed.

one knows any thing against him that he is to declare it. But all notion of authority on the part of the people, as founded on this passage of Scripture, in the matter is a mere invention. The scrutiny of character might be a popular matter, and the choice of ministers already ordained to be pastors of particular churches might be so too, and probably was; but the ordination, as a matter of right, in the primitive church was entirely vested in the clerical order.—T.

## CHAPTER III.

IN a former notice of some obvious synonyms in the New Testament, it was observed that the distinction between synonymous terms, must not be so pressed in every instance, as that we shall be chiefly playing on the force of particular terms; yet that, in seeking an accurate interpretation, we should observe diligently the minute differences of words, lest in any passage in which the author aimed at a nice distinction of idea, it should be lost sight of through inaccuracy. This remark, however, in the hands of one little familiarized with the nicer beauties of style, may be easily so far perverted as to induce him to affirm, that all inquiry into the differences between synonyms is utterly useless. For, if even the sacred writers often use synonymous terms promiscuously, and that it evidently matters little whether they used the one word or the other, it were scarcely worth while to attempt to discriminate accurately between them. And there are certainly many writers, who consider elegance of style to consist in the not frequently using the same word, but rather in substituting another, in an interchange of ana-

logous terms, that the same word may not occur in the same period, or even in the same page ; although the example of the best writers shews that true elegance consists in the precision with which each word is applied to express its particular idea. For they who write accurately, do not use even the smallest particles indiscriminately, however trivial the difference between any two may appear ; nor do they hesitate to use the same word often in the same passage, if the same notion is to be conveyed ; for there are scarcely two words in any language, which signify precisely the same thing. But since many maintain the opinion, that the New Testament writers are not so elegant as some, and consider that they have used many similar words promiscuously, we grant to them this far, that the specific force of synonyms must not be pressed in every place, so that we should always expect to trace an emphatic sense ; or that we should curiously search out the difference of each word as conveying a special force to the passage ; for this is beyond the powers of the most able and polished writer ; yet at the same time we think that in the writings of men, who do not appear so particular as others in the choice of words, the investigation of synonymous terms is more decidedly required. For those who

labour their style of writing closely, are wont to select words more for the sake of ornament, and therefore frequently indulge an interchange of synonyms; whilst they who are unpractised in writing as an art, generally use words which common custom has affixed to the thing that they mean; and hence it occurs, that men who make use of common language, accumulate in their compositions, a greater number of synonyms than more learned men; for they are accustomed to view each thing in its peculiarities, rather than to generalize and to abstract. And this custom must be diligently noted in interpreting the sacred writers; as it is too evident that, through neglect of it, commentators have rashly and carelessly adduced from their accurate and specific sentences, only some jejune and common place thought. For it often happens, that although the sacred writers were strangers to that elegance of style which is formed artificially by study and practice, yet their true meaning cannot be ascertained, unless we accurately make out the precise and specific signification of every word used. This is especially true with respect to the particles, the force of which has been sadly neglected by the Lexicographers of the New Testament. For instance, we read in the Lexicons that,

ἄχει and μέχει

do not differ, and they adduce the authority of Eustathius, who says, p. 1062, γίνεται τὸ ἄχεις ἀπὸ τοῦ μέχεις ἀποβολῆς τοῦ μὲν καὶ τροπῆς τοῦ φωνήνετος. Eustathius, however, means nothing more than that ἄχεις is formed from μέχεις; not that they mean the same thing. For who would affirm that it would have been the same thing, if, in Rom. v. 13, 14, the Apostle had written μέχει γὰς νόμου ἀμαρτία ἦν ἐν κίσμῳ and ver. 14, ἀπὸ Ἀδὰμ ἄχει Μωσέως. It must be generally evident that a different idea would then be expressed from that of the Apostle, who wrote ἄχει νόμου i. e. before the law was brought in, and μέχει Μωσέως i. e. until Moses had brought in the law. Rightly therefore is it written ἄχει γὰς νόμου ἀμαρτία ἦν, for the ἀμαρτία existed before the law. But in ver. 14, it is said ἐβασίλευσεν ὁ Θάνατος μέχει Μωσέως, not because death had ceased to reign from the time of Moses, but because it continued through the whole of that period, (μὴ ὄντος νόμου) which period closed with Moses. For neither did he wish to say that death reigned both before Moses and after Moses; but that it reigned before Moses, μὴ ὄντος νόμου. Evidently then the word ἄχει involves more especially the idea of the whole time or place in which any thing is done; and the use of the genitive case denotes the thing or event be-

fore which it is considered to be done; whilst *μέχρι* has respect rather to the end or close of the time or space within which any thing is done. If, however, any one should think this distinction more subtle than correct, let him remember that *μέχρι* is never put absolutely, but that *ἄχρι*, as Eustathius has rightly observed, (Iliad, π. 1062, 48,) is very frequently put *simpliciter* *κατὰ τὸν παλαιόν*, to signify *διόλον*. For whatever is meant by *ἄχρι*, as Iliad Δ. 522, Π. 324, P. 599, that is understood to last during the whole implied space of time; but in *μέχρι* the *terminius* or close, whether of time or place, is desiderated; and therefore it is always added.<sup>b</sup>

If, therefore, *ἄχρι τινός* occurs, it signifies the thing or the time before which any certain thing existed. So in Acts xx. 11, *ὅμιλόσας ἄχρις αὐγῆς*, means that he continued with them subsequently, before the dawn. And in ver. 4, *συνείπετο δὲ αὐτῷ ἄχρι Ἀσιας*, signifies that they accompanied Paul before they came into Asia, and then preceded him, (*προελθόντες*) Had it been *μέχρι Ἀσιας*, it would have been doubtful whether

<sup>b</sup> Once certainly in the *Odyssey* it occurs, *νήστεες ἄχρι κνέφαος*, that both notions are intended to be expressed by the same particle. But in Iliad, N. 143. occurs *μέχρι θαλάσσης διελεύσεσθαι*, and Ω 128. *τέο μέχρις ὁδυρόμενος καὶ ἄχεινα σὸν ἔδειτο κραδίνην*. where it is plain that a totally different sense would be brought out, if *ἄχρι* had been written instead of *μέχρι*.

they left Paul. The writer did not intend to say that they only accompanied Paul into Asia, but that they went together with him so far, and then went forward to wait for him. So in passages in which *ἄχει* is joined to a verb, it has the notion of a certain period of duration, Gal. iii. 19, *ἄχεις οὖς ἔλθη*, Apoc. xv. 16; xvii. 17. And Rom. xi. 25, *ἄχεις οὖς τὸ πλήρωμα τῶν ἐθνῶν εἰσέλθη*. *i. e.* so long as while the Gentiles are entering, not merely till they shall have entered. So also Acts xx. 6, we sailed and came to Troas, *ἄχεις ἡμερῶν πέντε*, before five days had expired, *i. e.* on the fifth day. I am aware that both words are occasionally used for each other, as in Xenophon, Symp. iv. 37. *περίεστί μοι καὶ ἐσθίοντι ἄχει τοῦ μὴ πείνην ἀφικέσθαι, καὶ πίνοντι μέχει τοῦ μὴ διψήν*, (if this is the true reading, though I strongly suspect that *μέχει* should be read in both instances.) But it does not follow from such an instance that both particles have precisely the same meaning; but as we have before said, it is of the nature of synonyms, that they have reference to the same thing, but in a different way.

Some may affirm, however, that in the New Testament these two particles are used indiscriminately; for it is written in Matthew xi. 23, *ἔμεναν μέχει τῆς σήμερον*, and in Romans viii. 22,

*συστενάζει ἄχει τοῦ νῦν.* But these passages do not affect our rule. For, though we grant, that in the former instance, it might have been *ἄχει*, yet this was not necessary, because the verb *μένειν* implies state or condition, rather than action; for he who remains to this day, has evidently continued through the former period, and has not even now perished, or he would not have remained to this day. But in the other instance, if it had been written *μέχει τοῦ νῦν*, the idea expressed would have been that the creature had groaned unto this day, and then had ceased; for he who does any thing *μέχει τινός*, is not thereby affirmed to do it longer than it has thus been asserted to have been done. The creation is, therefore, affirmed to sigh *ἄχει τοῦ νῦν*, that is, to this day, and not even then to have ceased from sighing, which was precisely the sentiment that the Apostle intended to express. In the former passage, the duplex force of *μέχει* is given in the word *μένειν*. And if any one will accurately examine other passages on this principle, he will find that it is not a vain and unmeaning distinction. For, in all the places of the New Testament, when *μέχει τινός* occurs, the notion exists, that the thing which is said to be done, is only done, or only endures *μέχει τινός* up to

a certain point of time, and then has an end, except in the one passage in Matthew already referred to. For, in Matthew xiii. 30, let both grow together, *μέχρι τοῦ θεμελιών*, it is manifest that the husbandman did not wish the tares to continue longer than till the time of harvest, as the subsequent statement shows. See also, Mark xiii. 30; Acts xx. 7; Romans xv. 19; Ephes. iv. 13; Phil. ii. 8, 30; 2 Tim. ii. 9: 1 Tim. vi. 14; Heb. iii. 6, 14. xii. 4. For the common notion that *μέχρι* denotes the intermediate time, yet so as not to exclude the consequent, cannot be proved from Rom. v. 14. (See Theodoret in loc.) For it is not intended here that death reigned also after the time of Moses; but that it reigned before Moses, *ἄχρι νόμου*, through the whole of that time until Moses; although there being no law, sin was not charged. Two passages, however, viz. Matth. xxviii. 15, and Acts x. 30, may seem to oppose this; but in the first instance, *διεφημίσθη ὁ λόγος οὗτος μέχρι τῆς σήμερον*, it is evident that the saying, which was reported, and passed current to that day, was thenceforth manifested to be a fraud. And in the latter, although Cornelius affirmed that he was fasting, *μέχρι ταύτης τῆς ὥρας*, there is then every probability that his fast had terminated at that hour,

as he had called together his kinsfolk and acquaintance. And, although I would not stand out too strictly, if it should be said, that here, as in Xenophon,  $\muέχσι$  is put for  $\ddot{\alpha}\chi\sigmaι$ , yet this which I have stated seems to be the very force of the language. For, if Cornelius had intended to say that he had fasted for four successive days to the very hour when he met Peter, he should have said, not  $\eta\muην$ , but  $\epsilonἰμι \eta\mu\sigma\tau\epsilon\mu\omegaν$ . Some may call these needless subtleties, and think that no good comes of such nice discriminations ; but really, it is often in such minute observations as these that the religious reverence of the interpreter for the sacred writings appears ; for he who once conceives, that in explaining the sacred books he may acquiesce in any lax inaccurate explanation, will speedily lay aside all veneration for them, and learn as speedily to engraft his own views, and even the most dark and ill-founded notions upon the writings of the New Testament.<sup>c</sup>

<sup>c</sup> This is an invaluable remark, and founded upon a very accurate, minute criticism, which directly illustrates its value. No man who has been much among the theologians, so called, of the present day, will fail to perceive the importance of this observation, if his own mind has been in any measure trained to correct exegesis. The wild and interminably varied and varying notions of men on Scriptural truth, if they have not their source in this habit of loose and inaccurate construing, at least, find in it their pa-

But to return. It is written in Luke iv. 13, ἀπέστη ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ὁ διάβολος ἄχει καιροῦ. It was seen that this could not be rendered, for a certain time. Therefore, the lexicographers say, that ἄχει denotes the same as the Latin *usque*, and they render ἄχει καιροῦ, *ab hoc ipso tempore*. But they never can demonstrate ἄχει καιροῦ τινος to be *ab hoc tempore*, nor that *usque* is used in that sense. For it is not said ἄχεις ἀπέστη ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, but ἄχει καιροῦ. But μέχρι καιροῦ differs from ἄχει καιροῦ. In Heb. ix. 10, it is said, μέχρι καιροῦ διορθώσεως ἐπικείμενα, i. e. εἰς τὸν καιρὸν τὸν ἐνεστηκότα, v. 9. Therefore, μέχρι καιροῦ denotes up to a certain time, *scil.* for sometime, as often μέχρι καιρῶν, μέχρι τινός, (whence μέχρι παντός, always, Charit. v. 4. Aristaenet. ii. 14.) s. ἐώς καιροῦ (τινός) Sirac. i. 23, 24; Dan. vii. 12. ἐώς χρόνου καὶ καιροῦ. But ἄχει καιροῦ is ἐώς τέλους, s. μέχρι τέλους. Clearly then ἄχει, as we have before said, denotes not the end, but the duration, or the whole period of time, in which the thing in question continues; but μέχρι design-

*bulum vitae.* Doctrinal notions are formed anterior to critical investigation, and then are vindicated and confirmed by the most extravagant and unjustifiable forcing of the words of eternal truth. And wherever this habit of mind has become established, the most polished and pointed shafts of enlightened criticism fall ineffectively from it, as arrows from the thick hide of the rhinoceros.—*T*

nates the end at which it ceases to be, unless some word be added, by the force of which the notion of a termination or close is removed, as in *μέχρι παντός*. Nor does the rule fail in Acts xiii. 11, “Thou shalt be blind, not seeing the sun, *ἄχρι καιροῦ*, which is commonly rendered, until a certain time. But this is not the meaning of the words. It would then have been written *μέχρι καιροῦ*. Nor have we any reason to conclude that Paul would indicate to him that he should only be blind for a certain time. But we must now notice some other synonyms which have not, as yet, been accurately distinguished.

*ἄιδιος*.      *αιώνιος*,

Agree, inasmuch as they denote a long continuance of time, even perpetuity. But they differ; for *ἄιδιος* has a wider meaning than *αιώνιος*. For, since there are properly two notations of time, the past and the future, (for that which we call time present, is the whole of time, of which the past and the future are, as it were, forms.) *άιδιος* includes both,<sup>a</sup> and

<sup>a</sup> This is the case with the Hebrew word **עַלְיָה**, *seculum*, from **עַלְיָה**, to conceal. It applies equally to ages of time running into the inconceivable, concealed and obscure, either with reference to the past or the future. One example out of many, will suffice, Ps. xc. 2, “Before the mountains were

expresses an existence in all time past, and which yet has not an end; but *aiώνιος* only that of which no end is conceived. Therefore, *άιδιος* sometimes denotes both, as Rom. i. 30, *άιδιος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θεότης*; and sometimes that which, although it had a beginning, yet is not considered to have an end, as Jud. v. 6, *δεσμοῖς ἀιδίοις*; and Diodorus Sicul. i. 51, *τάφους ἀιδίους οἴκους τροσαγορεύουσιν*.

On the contrary, *άιώνιος*, although it may appear to be capable of denoting all duration throughout all ages; yet strictly in the New Testament, it is used of duration through all future time. So continually it occurs in conjunction with *ζωὴ, δοξα, κρίσις, τιμὴ, κόλασις, λύτρωσις, κληρονομία, βασιλεία, κρίμα, πῦρ* (2 Cor. iv. 18, *τὰ aiώνια* opposed to *πρόσκαιρα*.) Whence it is quite needless to argue about this word, and to show more fully that it is not always used absolutely of eternity. But there are passages in which *aiώνιος* is applied to that which endures for a long period;<sup>e</sup> as Rom.

“**וּמְעוּלָם עַד-עוֹלָם אַתָּה אֱלֹהִים**” “from everlasting to everlasting thou art God.” It is somewhat remarkable that the Latin adverb, *olim*, which is the same word, **עוֹלָם**, has retained both senses from its etymon, and not only refers to past time but to future. “*Et haec olim meminisse juvabit.*” *Virgil.—T.*

<sup>e</sup> There is this tendency to excess in the human mind in

xvi. 25, *χρόνοις αἰώνιοις σεσιγημένου.* 2 Tim. i. 9, *χάριν δοθεῖσαν πρὸ χρόνων αἰώνιων,* Tit. i. 2. Nor is it necessary in these passages to recede from the meaning which usage has confirmed; nor is any light derived from a comparison with the Hebrew. For in all these three passages *χρόνοις αἰώνιοι* occurs. But these words do not mean ancient times, elapsed ages, as they are commonly rendered; but enduring ages, un-terminated, of which no end is then actually contemplated. Therefore, the mystery *χρόνοις αἰώνιοις σεσιγημένου*, is that which has been unknown from unmeasured time, (*diutissime, in ewigen Zeiten.*) But what can this form of speech mean: *πρὸ χρόνων αἰώνιων*, if *χρόνοις αἰώνιοι* is ages or times past. It may easily be ren-dered, from the most distant times, (for this for-

all nations. We are the creatures of a day, and every thing is fading round us. And, although we have the idea of eternal duration, every thing connected with our experience, our joys, our affections, are fleeting and transitory. Man catches at the glimmering notion that he has of eternal du-ration, and loves to attach it to the perishing events and things around him. And hence the strongest expressions are used. If we love, it is, *for ever*; if we convey or be-queath our estate, it is, *for ever*. And even in the He-brew Scriptures, the same word **עולם** which is used to ex-press the idea of eternity, is applied repeatedly in a sec-ondary sense to express a long period of time. Exod. xii. 14.  
—T.

mulæ can be referred to this idea,) but how, before the past ages, can be the same as, from the most ancient times, this they do not show, neither can they. The matter is very plain, *αιώνιος* is that which endures through the *αιών*; *χρόνοις αιώνιοι*, therefore, are those successive periods which fill up or constitute the *αιών* or created time, and *πρὸ χρόνων αιώνιων* is before those remote times, before the longest time of which memory remains, heretofore, long ago. But this leads us to consider the terms;

*αιών· χρόνος· ὥρα· καιρός.*

And we doubt not, but that the remark will be made by some one, that these words so far differ, that they cannot be accounted synonymous; for, that *ὥρα* does not denote time generally, but only a definite part of the day, and that *καιρός*, properly means, opportunity. Yet it is generally known that there are, in all languages, many words, to which usage and custom have affixed a force which was peculiar to other words, and have thus converted into synonyms, words which originally had a separate and specific signification. And in words of this kind, which are thus accounted synonymous, this is the greatest difficulty, that the ascertaining the distinction between them as synonyms, depends mainly upon the accurate

observation of the usage with respect to them ; for the reason of that difference is but seldom to be sought with success in their etymology,<sup>f</sup> especially among the New Testament writers. These words, therefore, so far agree, as that they have each in them a common notion of a time in which something is conceived to be, or to have been, done. Yet they differ ; for *χρόνος* and *αιών* have the notion of indefinite time ; *ὥρα* denotes a certain and definite space of time, (as it were *ὅρος*, *terminus*. *καιρός* is *the* time, that is, the opportune point of time, the very time at which a thing should be done. But even *χρόνος* and *αιών* differ ; for *αιών* signifies an

<sup>f</sup> I do not wish to attach too great importance to etymology, for I am fully conscious, both of its difficulties, and of the dangers it presents to the student ; I admit, also, the force of the author's remark in the text. At the same time, I am satisfied that there are many words, the sense of which may be made out most accurately by reference to the etymon ; and that there are synonyms, the distinctions between which are preserved in the respective etymons. Take, for instance, Luke iii. 5. *καὶ πὰν ὅρος καὶ βουνὸς ταπεινωθήσεται*. The distinction between the hill and the mountain is marked in the Hebrew etymon, *הַר* being from *mons*, *montana loca*, and *בָּן* from *גְּבֻעָה*, dropping *בָּן*, *collis*, a hill, or *bank*, which is the same word retained in English through the Anglo-Saxon, *banc*. And thus it stands in the Hebrew, which the LXX has rendered almost literally, *כָּל־הָר וּגְבֻעָה*. Isaiah xl. 4.—T.

indefinite course or flow of time, so that, if it is used simply, it is without the notion of an end or close; but *χρόνος* denotes the time itself in its actuality, by which we perceive the succession of things. Therefore, it is said correctly, *χρόνος αἰώνιος*; but no one ever said, *αἰών χρόνος*. In the New Testament this holds good also. For *αἰών* always denotes the perpetuity of successional time, unless a definition of that time is added. Whence the formula *εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα*; and in Matth. xii. 32, it appears to be said of the whole period of a man's life on the earth; but not so in Matth. xxviii. 20, ἔσομαι μενδὲ ὑμῶν ἐως τῆς συντέλειας τοῦ αἰώνος; for here, as in 1 Cor. x. 11, *συντέλεια τοῦ αἰώνος*, is spoken of that change in the character of time, or of the age, up to which period the Lord had promised to be with his disciples.<sup>g</sup> But in Ephes. ii. 7,

<sup>g</sup> Συντέλεια τοῦ αἰώνος, as it occurs in the New Testament, does not denote the end, but rather the consummation of the *αἰών*, which is to be followed by a new age. So in Matth. xiii. 39, 40, 49, and xxiv. 3; which last passage, it is to be feared, may be misunderstood in applying it to the destruction of the world. The same idea exists in this formula in Hebrews ix. 26, which has its parallel in Ephes. i. 10, πλήρωμα τῶν καιρῶν.

[ It were scarcely warranted to found any thing on the use of a term so vague by the Redeemer's yet ill-informed disciples. It must be remembered, that they were not teaching, in this instance, by inspiration, but asking in ig-

*αιῶνες ἐπεξχόμενοι*, are ages to come. The Apostle, however, uses it, in this instance, to denote those, his own express and present times, in which was at length manifested, ver. 8, “the exceeding riches of grace.” And *ἐπεξχόμενοι* is not necessarily to be understood of time which is not yet present, but simply denotes a time which has followed another; as James v. 1, *ταλαιπωρίαι ἐπεξχόμεναι*, are calamities which are already present or thought to be so.

So also the word *χρόνος* is never used to express a certain and definite time; but when it occurs apparently in that sense, the force of the idea will not be found in the word *χρόνος*, but in the adjuncts. For, in two passages in Luke viii. 29, and xx. 9, where *χρόνοι* appears to signify years, there is another reason for it; for *χρόνος*, as a sort of aggregate of times, by the usage of recent writers, has been put for the space of a year, as the most known and familiar aggregate of times; in the same way as *ῷα* is used loosely and popularly for the

norance. Many such instances occur in the evangelic history. Luke ix. 33. John xiv. 5, 22. On such passages no doctrine can be founded, any more than on the fallacious averments of Job’s friends; nor any criticism on the use of terms by the disciples, in a popular and inaccurate sense, except as to the *usus loquendi*.]—T.

parts of a day.<sup>h</sup> Yet  $\chiρόνος$  by itself is not a specific limited time. And, in fact, it may well be doubted whether  $\chiρόνος$  *in aροί* should be rendered, many years. It is a frequent error in lexicons, that if a Greek word can be rendered so as to make sense by any particular Latin word, they affirm that the two words have the same meaning; and hence the greatest monstrosities have sprung up in the lexicons, especially in respect to the prepositions. For who could ever be persuaded that  $ἐν$  signifies *ad*, *in*, and *cum*, or that  $εἰς$  could be *de*;  $ἀπό$ , *ad* and *in*, and *κατά*, *ex*, &c.?

*Καιρός* always denotes a certain specific time, with the superadded notion of opportunity. (Ammonius says very accurately ὁ μὲν καιρός δηλοῖ ποιότητα χρόνου,  $\chiρόνος$  δὲ ποσύτητα.) For that which is done opportunely, is understood to be done at a certain period of time; while that which is done rashly, and not at a fixed time, is almost necessarily done inopportunely. Whence it occurs, that sometimes the word may be used indefinitely; and yet it may be gathered from the whole tenor of the address, what that is of which the *καιρός* is affirmed. So in Matth. xxvi. 18, *ο καιρός μου ἐγγύς εστιν*, the *τοῦ ἀποθανεῖ*

<sup>h</sup> See Du Cange Glossar. Med. et Inf. lat. and Hemsterhusius ad Aristoph. Phil. 1084.

is not, in fact, omitted, (for it is written  $\delta\chiαιρός μου$ , and not merely,  $\delta\chiαιρός$ ,) but from the very time in which he gave this injunction to his disciples, it might have been known what was  $\delta\chiαιρός αὐτοῦ$ . But when  $\chiαιρός$  is combined with another word, then it does not denote the opportunity of the thing; but the whole formula does it, as  $\chiαιρός σύκων$ , Mark xi. 13,  $\chiαιρός τῶν καρπῶν$ , Matth. xxi. 34, where the lexicons very incorrectly render  $\chiαιρός$ , the time of year. For  $\chiαιρός$  denotes any opportunity whatsoever, not only of time, but of place, and of the apt and convenient means for doing any thing; as the notion of opportunity involves in it the notion of time. For, if the place is convenient for a certain act, then  $\chiαιρός εὔχαιρός ἐστιν$ , that it should be done there. If the thing itself is fit and convenient, it may then be made use of. Wherefore, we must not at once condemn the views of some, regarding Mark xi. 13,  $οὐ γὰρ ἦν χαιρός σύκων$ , that it refers to the opportunity of place; (*Abresch. Lect. Aristaenet.* vol. i. p. 16, 17, *Triller. ad Thom. Mag.* p. 490.) if, indeed, it be necessary to vindicate our Lord's act at all. Nor, indeed, would the excuse be sufficient, that the place was not suitable to that kind of fruit; if we could, for a moment, imagine that our Lord,

disappointed in his expectation, had acted in anger, a passion from which the divine mind is free. But, in fact, *καιροί* is often said of any opportunity (as the Latins use *tempora*,) in which any thing can be conveniently done. I will also make one passing remark on the formula which occurs twice in the New Testament, Ephes. v. 16, and Coloss. iv. 5, ἐξαγοράζομενοι τὸν καιρόν. In both places the Apostle exhorts Christians to live prudently and cautiously; and, therefore, commands them ἐξαγοράζοδαι τὸν καιρόν. Luther renders this, *schicket euch in die Zeit.*<sup>k</sup> This gives the idea certainly. In my view, however, ἐξαγοράζοδαι τὸν καιρόν, is, according to the manner of merchants who accurately examine goods, and choose the best, diligently to watch the time, and to make it our own, that we may over-rule or control it; as Pindar well says of Damophilus, Pyth. iv. v. 509, ἐῦ νν (τὸν καιρόν) ἔγνωκεν. Θεράπων δέ οι, οὐ δράστας, δηπαδεῖ. You are not to yield to time, and to serve it, but you may command it, and it shall do what you approve. And evidently this idea agrees best with the relation of both the passages.<sup>l</sup>

<sup>k</sup> So also Rom. xii. 11, he renders the words *τῷ καιρῷ δουλεύοντες*, which reading, by the by, though admitted by Griesbach, has always appeared to me doubtful.

<sup>l</sup> The same formula occurs in the LXX. Dan ii. 8. Lu-

But, since opportunity is generally fleeting, and of very short duration, as Pindar says, ὁ γὰρ καιρὸς πρὸς ἀνδρῶπων βραχὺ μέτρον ἔχει, therefore, πρὸς καιρὸν means, at a time, considered as no longer enduring than while the opportunity contemplated lasts; as Luke viii. 13, οἱ πρὸς καιρὸν πιστεύοντες, are they who believed for a time, while it was convenient, and no danger threatened; but ἐν καιρῷ πειρασμοῦ ἀφίστανται. And now we may explain that singular formula, which occurs in Apoc. xii. 14, καιρὸν καὶ καιροὺς καὶ ἥμισυ καιροῦ. It is usually rendered, three years and a half; and rightly; for the same space of time is, in ver. 6, and c. xi. 3, spoken of, as ἥμερας χιλίας διακοσίας ἑξήκοντα; and in xi. 2, μῆνας τεσσαράκοντα δύο. But that this number is used for any space of time, according to the Hebrew mode, is evident. (see Eichhorn on Apoc. xi. 2.) And, therefore, καιρός, in this place, is not

ther renders it. “*Ich sehe, dass ihr Frist suchet.*” But the idea is the same here also. “I know that you accurately watch the time.” They knew that the king had forgotten his dream, and therefore, they asked him to tell it, not so much for the purpose of delay, as with a view to avoid the necessity of giving the interpretation. [The idea is, in my opinion, more directly expressed in the Chaldee, and well rendered in our English version. “I know that ye would gain the time.” זֶבַן דַי עֲדָנָא אַנְתָּן זֶבַנֵּן” *emere, acquirere.*] —T.

a year, but is said of the time of a year. For there is a difference, when a word is predicated of this or that thing, and when it actually denotes that thing. It is used in Dan. vii. 25; xii. 7. The LXX renders it (compare ver. 11.)<sup>m</sup> not of actual years, but of a certain indefinite period of time, according to the usage of prophetic language; for as to the true sense, this formula means no more than, *aliquamdiu*, a good while. Compare James v. 17.

A similar reason obtains in respect to the word *ѡ̄α*. For, as *ѡ̄α* properly denotes a definite and limited time, we may understand from this, why it may be predicated of any certain specific period, although custom has appropriated it specially to the hours of the day. Nor are they in the right, who say that it

<sup>m</sup> The LXX has rendered the Chaldee word **תְּעִדָּה** which properly means, time, by *καιρός*, as Dan. ii. 8. iii. 5, 15. vii. 12, *ἐώς καιροῦ καὶ καιρός*. the same word is also used for a year, in the iv. 13. vii. 25. xii. 7. And it is curious that the word which they have rendered in c. xii. 7. *εἰς καιρὸν καὶ ἥμερον καιροῦ*, in c. iii. 5, 15, they have rendered *ѡ̄α*. But it is possible, that both in Daniel and the Apocalypse, this description of an indefinite time may arise out of a religious reverence for the number seven divided into two parts; or, that it may be referred to that time during which the temple, after it was profaned by Antiochus, was deserted by the Jews. See Josephus Bel. Jud. i. 1, 2, proem. § 7. and 2. Mark x. 3. See Grotius on Daniel vii. 25.

means the least portion of time. For in such passages as Matth. viii. 13; ix. 22; x. 19. Luke xii. 39, 46, no one would think that  $\omega\gamma\alpha$  was a moment or mere point of time, when it is evident that he who affirms an event to occur,  $\epsilon\nu\tau\tilde{\eta}\omega\gamma\alpha\epsilon\chi\epsilon\iota\eta\eta$ , means a more definite time than if he had said  $\epsilon\nu\tau\tilde{\omega}\chi\tilde{\epsilon}\nu\omega\epsilon\chi\epsilon\iota\eta\eta$ . And though  $\pi\varrho\delta\omega\gamma\alpha\nu$ , may be rendered, a good while, in the same way as  $\pi\varrho\delta\omega\kappa\alpha\iota\gamma\omega\nu$ , yet it were still incorrect to say that  $\omega\gamma\alpha$  means any minute portion of time. Certainly when a small part of time is intended, the word  $\omega\gamma\alpha$  might be used, for it denotes a small part of the day; and therefore,  $\pi\varrho\delta\omega\gamma\alpha\nu$  is the same as *aliquod tempus*, at some time; but it does not follow from this, that  $\omega\gamma\alpha$  is, a little time, generally. There is a difference, however, between  $\pi\varrho\delta\omega\gamma\alpha\nu$  and  $\pi\varrho\delta\omega\kappa\alpha\iota\gamma\omega\nu$ . For that which is said to endure,  $\pi\varrho\delta\omega\gamma\alpha\nu$ , is conceived not to last longer than till the hour is expired, *i. e.* for only a short time; but that which is said to be done,  $\pi\varrho\delta\omega\kappa\alpha\iota\gamma\omega\nu$ , is conceived as being done precisely up to another point of time.

Another formula also differs from  $\pi\varrho\delta\omega\kappa\alpha\iota\gamma\omega\nu$ , viz.  $\pi\varrho\delta\omega\tau\omega\kappa\alpha\iota\gamma\omega\nu$ . It means, conveniently, as time shall permit. Lucian. i. Deor. Dial. iv. 209. The force of the article may be noticed in the formula,  $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\kappa\alpha\iota\gamma\omega\nu$  Rom. v. 6. See Lucian, i.

Hermot. x. 749. *κατὰ καιρόν* is, opportunely, in the needful time, to do it, that it be done rightly. When it is said that Christ *κατὰ καιρόν ἀπέδωε*, it does not mean, at a time fixed of God, but at an opportune time, *zur rechten Zeit*; when we were *ἀσθενεῖς*. If a definite or appointed time were meant, it would have been *κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν (αὐτοῦ)*. The Greeks, almost in the same sense, use *εἰς καιρόν*, opposed to *πρὸς καιροῦ*, 1 Cor. iv. 9. *Καιρός* means, the moment of time, *ώρα*, a portion of time. Therefore, *πρὸς καιρόν* is, at some certain time, (*auf eine gewisse Zeit*) *πρὸς ὥραν*, for a short time, (*auf eine kurze Zeit*.)

In Galatians ii. 5, *πρὸς ὥραν* is ill rendered by some, as if it were the same as *πρὸς καιρὸν ὥρας*, 1 Thess ~~ii. 17~~. For, *πρὸς καιρὸν ὥρας*, is not, for a short time, but, for that time, that particular period in which *ἐνέκοψεν ἡμᾶς ὁ Σατανᾶς*. Luther gives it correctly, *eine Weile s. eine Zeit lang, aliquamdiu*, for some while, for a specific period. And, finally, *ώρα*, by itself, is never the opportune time, opportunity, as *καιρός*; but some word is added, to define and specify that which is uncertain in the notion of *ώρα*, time, as John ii. 4; xvi. 21; Mark xiv. 35; John xii. 27. But these things are so manifest, that I need not add another word. And I know not how it is, that only in lexicons of the New Testament such trifling exists.

ἀμαρτία. ἀμάρτημα. παράπτωμα. ἀδίκια.  
ἀνομία. ἀδίκημα.

The discrimination of synonyms, which is at all times sufficiently difficult, is still more so in words applicable to disposition of mind. For as many virtues or vices are so nearly allied, that the difference cannot easily be pointed out, so the words which represent them are frequently used indiscriminately. It is, however, often very desirable to trace with accuracy that difference. The words above written, so far agree that they have the common notion of sin generally, yet they differ. There is a greater degree of affinity between ἀμαρτία, ἀμάρτημα and παράπτωμα. They involve the notion of vice or fault, which brings blame or injury. But in the first place ἀμαρτία and ἀμάρτημα, differ. For ἀμαρτία properly denotes the innate vice, from which the ἀμάρτημα springs.<sup>n</sup> It is true that ἀμαρτία is in

<sup>n</sup> It is worth while to endeavour to ascertain the real force of the word ἀμαρτία, a word which, as Titmann states, is used repeatedly for the evil act, but which is also used emphatically, ἡ ἀμαρτία, for the evil principle. Its root or primitive in Greek is probably ἀμάρα which Scapula renders, a duct or canal for water, by which water may flow down upon any place. This will bring it into near connexion with the Hebrew root אָמַר which is to speak or put forth,

the New Testament used for the vicious act itself, as John viii. 21, 24; xvi. 8, 9; 2 Pet. i. 9, ii. 14;<sup>f</sup> but the proper force of the word will be found in many places, especially in the seventh and eighth chapters of Romans. Neither would any one inconsiderately affirm, that in John i. 29, *ἀμαρτία* had its specific signification. Certainly the Saviour took away not only external sins and iniquities, but *ἐν αμαρτίᾳ* the very corruption of the soul itself; for if this be not extirpated, mere propriety of outward conduct, which Melanchthon calls civil right-

to cause to flow. The *ἀμαρτία* may be regarded as a stream of influence, flowing down upon the human race. There is, however, another Hebrew word nearly allied to this: viz. **חַמְרָה** which not only carries the idea of an influence, but of an *evil* influence. In all the cognate dialects, Chaldee, Syriac, Arabic, Ethiopic, it has the idea of turpitude and impure commixtion and excitement, muddy confusion in water, acetous fermentation in wine, bitumen arising from hot natural springs, collection of mud or clay brought down by tumultuous waters, bitter and brackish waters, &c. And from hence we derive the Latin *amarus* and the French *amére*. The *ἀμαρτία* is then a defiling influence, a bitter principle, a principle of disturbance flowing down upon the moral creation of God. It may be noticed, in corroboration of this etymology, that the word *amar* repeatedly occurs in Gaelic, as a river channel, a mill-course, a ditch or canal.—*T.*

<sup>f</sup> Those places should be accurately distinguished from each other, in which *ἐν αμαρτίᾳ* or *ἀμαρτίᾳ* occur.

eousness, would be utterly unavailing to real sanctity. In Rom. vii. 7, it is manifest that in the words, *ὁ νόμος ἀμαρτία*; ἀμαρτία is not the incitement to sin, but that which is in itself evil and vicious. Paul denies that the law is ἀμαρτία, but concedes properly that the law excites to sin: *χωρὶς γὰρ νόμου ἀμαρτία νεκρά*. But the whole argument in this chapter shows that ἀμαρτία is not the sin or transgression, but the corruption which is by nature in the soul. Some say that ἡ ἀμαρτία is put collectively for all sins, as we say, *die Sünde*. But it is evident in the view of the Apostle, that the ἀμαρτία is in us before the ἐπιθυμία; and that for a time sin was dead, but that when the law reigned, sin gave rise to lust and he became *καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἀμαρτωλός*. And therefore he does not understand ἀμαρτία to be actual transgression, but, what all who know themselves must perceive, an innate corruption, and *τὸν νόμον τῆς ἀμαρτίας ἐν σαρκὶ*. And in Rom. v. 12, sq. it is scarcely to be doubted that ἀμαρτία is used in the same sense. The ἀμαρτία which came by one man, *δι' ἑνός*, into the world, is distinguished from *τὸν ἑνὸς παράπτωμα*; and it is not said, that by *παράπτωμα τοῦ ἑνός* death came into the world, but ἀμαρτία, and by ἀμαρτία death, and that death came upon all men, for

that all have sinned, which could not be said if death to all arose from the act of Adam. Also it may be said with correctness, *ἀμαρτίαν οὐκ εἰλογεῖσθαι, μὴ ὅντος νόμου*, for it is *νεκρὰ χωρὶς τοῦ νόμου*; but it could scarcely be said that *sin* is not imputed. For death reigned before Moses, (v. 14), seeing that all have sinned.

They then are not to be justified, who affirm that the sacred writers, not only in the same passage, but actually in the same formula, use the same word in two different senses. Such an ambiguity is utterly foreign to the simplicity of their writings. Even the frequent interpretation of Hebrews ix. 28, *χωρὶς ἀμαρτίας ὁφελήσεται*, without a peculiar sacrifice, is scarcely warrantable. Besides *ἀμαρτία* never denotes sacrifice for sins. For in Hebrews x. 6, *ὅλοντάτα καὶ περὶ ἀμαρτίας οὐκ ἡθέλησας*, the expression is elliptical, and the full terms are *θυσίαν* (s. *προσφοράν* v. 18.) *περὶ ἀμαρτίας*, i. e. sacrifice offered because of sin. And there is no confirmation of the false rendering obtained, by comparing it with Rom. viii. 4, *πέμψας περὶ ἀμαρτίας*, i. e. he sent his Son on account of sin, that he might condemn, *κατακρίνη τὴν ἀμαρτίαν*. Now *πέμπειν περὶ τίνος* is so plainly to send on account of any thing, that it is wonderful to see interpreters attempting to bring

any thing further out of so plain and simple an expression. But *ἀμάρτημα* is always used for the actual transgression. Mark iii. 28; iv. 12, Rom. iii. 25; 1 Cor. vi. 18. And *παράπτωμα* differs from both those former words; for although Jerome's distinction is not correct, that *παράπτωμα* means the lapse towards sin, and *ἀμαρτία*, the completed act itself; yet in the word *παράπτωμα* the notion inheres of sin rashly committed as by one unwilling to do an injury; but in *ἀμαρτία* and *ἀμάρτημα* the act is expressed which he who does, does willingly whether he errs in improperly thinking that he is doing right, or whether he acts under the impulse of passion. Elegantly therefore in Matth. vi. 14, 15; xviii. 35, the word *παράπτωμα* is given in preference to the other two; for it is a milder term than *ἀμαρτία* as applicable to a single fault. In Ephes. ii. 1, both words occur. And sometimes, in fact, *παράπτωμα* is used with reference to any transgression, as Rom. iv. 25; 2 Cor. v. 19. But in the important statement in Rom. v. 12, and following verses, the distinction between *ἀμαρτία* and *παράπτωμα* had need to be accurately drawn; and Paul draws it. For the *παρακόν* of Adam he calls, *παράπτωμα*, v. 15, 17, 18, by which the *ἀμαρτία* came into the world; and in verse 20, he says

ιόμος, παρεισῆλθεν ἵνα πλεονάσῃ τὸ παράπτωμα· οὗ δὲ ἐπλεόνασεν ἡ ἀμαρτία, ὑπερεπερίσσευσεν ἡ χάρις. But wherefore? why does he not say, οὗ δὲ ἐπλεόνασε τὸ παράπτωμα? Evidently because it is effected by the law, that those sinful acts which were less criminal, as the mere result of imprudence or of error, now might become more criminal, inasmuch as they who commit them, know themselves to be sinning. But he says, ἐπλεόνασεν ἡ ἀμαρτία· for the ἀμαρτία ἀφορεῖν λαβοῦσα διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς makes the individual καὶ ὑπερβολὴν ἀμαρτωλός. I am aware that too much stress must not be laid on these nice distinctions; yet it is certainly more satisfactory to follow out, in interpreting the sacred books, these delicate distinctions of the force of terms, than blindly to acquiesce in an ambiguous and misty interpretation. Paul, with the same accuracy of speech, very tenderly in Rom. xi. 11, when, speaking of the Jews rejecting Christ, calls that act *παράπτωμα*, which our Lord in John xvi. 9, calls *ἀμαρτία*. It would be a false interpretation to say, that *παράπτωμα* in this place means the same thing as *ἥτημα*, which has reference to their misery.<sup>p</sup>

<sup>p</sup> The etymology of the word *ἥτημα* will not bear out the author's idea. It is derived from the Hebrew **חַטָּאת**,

*ἀδίκια*, however, and *ἀνομία* differ from all the others. For in them the general notion only of transgression or fault exists. But these words involve the nature of the act, on account of which it is faulty. That is *ἀδίκια* by which the *δίκαιον* is injured; that is *ἀνομία* by which the law is violated. For as he properly is *ἀδίκος*, who is not what he ought to be, and therefore who violates right; so *ἀδίκια* is said of any impropriety which is repugnant to the *δίκαιον*. So 1 John v. 17, *πᾶσα ἀδίκια ἀμαρτία*. But in *ἀνομία* the idea properly is the non-observer-

*peccare, errare*, and which occurs in the same sense in Syriac and Chaldee. In Arabic also لب و حطى.

And in the Ethiopic it is used not only in this sense, but in that which more commonly is attached to it in Greek, of *deficit, indiguit, orbatus est*. This etymology is confirmed also by the occurrence of the word in Greek, in both forms of *ἡττάομαι* and *ἡσσάομαι*, a difference evidently originating in the soft sound of *ת*, in Hebrew, and *ل* in Arabic, which slides easily either into the *σ*, or *τ*. And in fact the dominant idea of *ἡττα* or *ἡσσα* is that of *moral* inferiority. So *ἡττῶν οἶνον, ἡσσῶν ἡδονῶν*. Schleusner says, *ἡττᾶσθαι eleganter de iis usurpatur, qui cupiditatibus pravis indulgent et vitiositati serviunt*. This, however, is the primary idea, and not, as he states, secondary and derived. The meaning therefore of *ἡττημα* in the passage referred to, would be that of moral deterioration or depression in consequence of fault. “ If their error be the riches of the world, and their *degradation* the enriching of the nations.”—T

vance or transgression of the law, whether the law be unknown or wilfully violated. He is *ἀνομος*, strictly speaking, who has not the law, Acts ii. 23. 1 Cor. ix. 21; and then subsequently who regards not the law, and who violates the law. *ἀνομία* is the violation of law, *ἀδίκια* the doing contrary to right. And *ἀδίκια* has the wider sense. It may be conceived of without a law, but there can be no *ἀνομία* without *ἀδίκια*. See Xenoph. Memor. iv. 4. 12, 13. Finally, *ἀδικημα* is that which is done in *ἀδίκια*, which is unjustly done, Acts xviii. 14, xxiv. 20. Apoc. xviii. 5. Xenoph. Memorab. ii. 2, 3. *αἱ πόλεις ἐπὶ τοῖς μεγίστοις ἀδικήμασι ζημίαν θάνατον πεποιήκασιν, ὡς οὐκ ἀν μείζονες κακοῦ φόβῳ τὴν ἀδίκιαν παύσουτες.*

## CHAPTER IV.

ALL real adepts of the hermeneutic art have taught latterly, that, in interpreting old writings, not only must regard be had to the common usage of words, but that the extreme nicety of discernment consisted in noticing diligently the mode of speaking peculiar to each author. This remark is more abundantly confirmed, in the rendering of the New Testament. At the same time, the observance of it is combined with greater difficulties than has been generally supposed. For in other Greek writers, the more ornamented style was conformed to the more polished forms of speech, which, though they may undergo some change from diversity of dialect, follow as to the use of words a permanent and unvarying rule. But the style of the sacred writers, neither corrected by literary study, nor by the practice of writing adapted to the modes of general and popular thought and diction; and, as it were, overwhelmed by the greatness of those new announcements, for the expression of which all

wonted language would appear inadequate, renders the observation of the use of words more difficult, and requires a more minute scrutiny than that of works more artificially composed. This remark, which is applicable in many respects, is peculiarly so with reference to the use of synonyms. For it was truly said, that he only could rightly understand and feel the elegance of the Greek writers, who could learn to distinguish the various shades of style, by means of the synonymous terms, as a delicate tint arising out of the intermixture of a multitude of subtle atomic particles. What then are we to do with those writers, of whom all agree that they were altogether strangers to those subtleties of composition; whilst many believe them to have been so barbarous, as scarcely to allow that they spoke the Greek language at all? Certainly if the sacred writers had no regard to the rules of the Greek language, especially to that of analogy, then their writings might be interpreted without any consideration of those rules; so that he might be accounted the best interpreter of Holy Scripture, who, neglecting the laws of Greek composition, should investigate this barbarous mode of speech by the opinions and customs of this age. But that

this were a most improper mode of procedure, is proved in a variety of ways, more especially by the diligent observation of the synonymous terms; for this shows plainly that the style of the sacred writers, although very far from possessing Attic elegance, and full of those defects which may always be detected in those who have acquired a language by actual use, rather than by study, abounds with acute thought and accuracy of expression; so that he who would attain to the full perception of the sublimity of the sacred writers, which shines most conspicuously in their simplicity, would do well to compare them with the compositions of those authors who have thought and spoken most acutely.

And, in pursuing our inquiries, these sacred days will direct our choice of the words best suited for observation. For the great truth which, on the feast of our Lord's nativity, Christians would desire to commemorate, is contained in John iii. 16: “God so loved, ἡγάπησεν, the world that he gave his only begotten Son,” &c. Let us direct our attention therefore to this point, and consider what is the force of the word ἡγαπᾷ which John uses, and in what respect it differs from the cognate word φιλεῖ.

Ἄγαπᾶν φιλεῖν.

The accordance in some measure of these two words, is sufficiently plain. But some deny that they at all differ, on the ground that words which express the same affection of mind, are frequently used indiscriminately. That they differ, however, will appear from the fact, that each word has certain meanings peculiar to itself, and which the other will not admit. For if in both words the same precise idea existed, both would be used of the same things. But the usage is otherwise.<sup>q</sup> For as φιλεῖν properly

<sup>q</sup> Φίλος, from whence φιλεῖν, from φίω, or according to others from πίλω, to press, is he whom we embrace, kiss, cherish. Vid. Etymol. 794. 12. 777. 778. Eustath. p. 1583. 55. φιλεῖν. τὸ ἀγαπᾶν καὶ τὸ τοῖς χείλεσιν ἀσπάζεσθαι, καὶ τὸ τὰ χείλη συμβάλλειν. conf. 1799. 51. Vid. Ev. Scheidius ad Lennep. Etymolog. p. 1063. But ἀγαπᾶν, which appears to be derived from ἀγάω, ἀγάπη, denotes properly the love that springs from admiration and veneration; and from this the other notions of the word flow, as to cherish, to receive kindly, to acquiesce, &c. Hesychius gives correctly, φιλεῖν. κατὰ φυχὴν αγαπᾶ. It is evident, therefore, why friendship is called φιλία not ἀγάπη. It denotes an intimate union of souls.

[There is great probability that φιλεῖν, strictly to kiss, and πίω or πίνω, to drink, and πεινω to persuade, are all derivatives from פָּ, the mouth. And that ἀγαπᾶν, is derived from אַהֲבָה *amare* by the natural substitution of γ, as a harder sound for the mere aspiration הָ. We find in several passages of Scripture, the word הָאַהֲבָה, *amor*, which, by the accommodation of the sound of the second radical to the style

means, *to kiss*, and ἀγαπᾶν never has this sense, so has ἀγαπᾶν its peculiar meaning *to be satisfied*, *to acquiesce*, in which sense φιλεῖν is never used. Moreover, if these words were precisely similar, there would be no distinction made by the more elegant writers, as Xenophon, Plato and others. For although in the Memorab. ii. 7, 9, 12, they are twice apparently interchanged σὺ μὲν ἔκεινας φιλήσεις—ἔκειναι δέ σε ἀγαπήσουσιν and a little further on, καὶ αἱ μὲν αὐτὸν ἐφίλουν, ὁ δὲ αὐτὰς ἡγάπα, yet he would greatly err, who should conclude that Xenophon thus unthinkingly interchanged words of synonymous import, because he had used both words *vicissively* of the same persons. For if we inspect the passage more accurately, we shall readily perceive why Socrates should say to a man anxious about the support of his poorer relations; Now when their indolence grieves you οὔτε σὺ ἔκεινας φιλεῖς, οὔτε ἔκειναι σε; but if you would teach them to seek by labour to maintain themselves, σὺ μὲν ἔκεινας φιλήσεις, ὅρῶν ὀφελίμους σεαυτῷ οὔσας, ἔκειναι δέ σε ἀγαπήσουσιν, αἰσθόμεναι χαίροντά σε αὐταῖς. There existed no cause of Greek pronunciation, would give at once the word ἀγάπη. And this etymology of the two words accords with the manifest distinction in their use. φιλεῖν being used to express the more direct demonstration of regard, ἀγαπᾶν the principle, or internal feeling of delectation and kindness.—T.]

mutual love; for neither could he love them who in their poverty were only an annoyance to him, nor could they love him, when they saw him unwilling to support them. For there is no greater impediment to mutual love among relations, than the receiving of aid unwillingly given; or the being compelled to give to the undeserving. But if he obeyed the advice of Socrates, he might find that he would at length love them whom he had taught to be useful to himself, and that they might love him, when they perceived that he was no longer unwilling to take care of them. And then, that which Socrates predicted, took place, *αἱ μὲν ὡς κηδεμόνα ἐφίλουν, ὁ δὲ ὡς ὀφελίμους ἤγάπα.* We admit, therefore, that Xenophon adopted the interchange of the words; but not blindly, or from a false regard to eloquence, which, by the mere variation of words, the imitators of ancient writers too eagerly sought. Certainly, if we rightly read the passage, Xenophon changed the terms, because he now wished to intimate what would occur after these women had understood that they would no longer be a burden to the man; and that he also now perceived some probable fruit of their labour. For now they could really love him who, as a parent, nourished them; he could affectionately

regard them whom he saw worthy of his care. There is a similar passage in Dion. Cass. lib. xliv. ἐφιλήσατε αὐτὸν ὡς πατέρα, καὶ ἡγαπήσατε ὡς εὐεργέτην. But one, yet more important, occurs in Plato, Lysid. p. 215. A. "Ο δὲ μὴ ἀγαπῶτο, πῶς φίλον; ὁ δὲ μὴ του δεόμενος, οὐδέ τι ἀγαπῶν ἄν; ὁ δὲ μὴ ἀγαπῶν, οὐδὲ ἄν φίλον. It is clear that φιλεῖν denotes the sense of love, but in the word ἀγαπᾶν properly is implied the cause of the φιλεῖν. Properly, ἀγαπᾶν is to make much of any thing, to admire, either for utility sake, or some other reason, and then to wish well, to cherish, to regard; but φιλεῖν denotes the love which takes its rise naturally from the thing loved. But since love is frequently without reason, it occurs, at times, that φιλεῖν is used in instances in which no just cause of love exists. Ἀγαπᾶν is never applied to an improper love.

In the New Testament, certainly, passages occur in which ἀγαπᾶν and φιλεῖν are used indiscriminately; but there are others in which each is used in its own proper sense. Of the former class, are those in which Jesus is said φιλεῖν and ἀγαπᾶν; and Luke xi. 43, ἀγαπᾶτε τὴν πρωτοκαθεδρίαν, for which the Evangelist says, in c. xx. 46, φιλεῖν τὴν πρωτήτην. But we must not class with these John xxi. 15, where, to the question, ἀγαπᾶς με πλεῖστον τούτων, Peter replies, ναι

κύριε, σὺ οἶδας ὅτι φιλῶ σε. And our Lord twice repeats the words of Peter, φιλεῖς με i. e. dost thou so far love me? It is, however, worthy of observation, that in the New Testament, men are never said, φιλεῖν τὸν Θεὸν, but ἀγαπᾶν; but God is said both φιλεῖν and ἀγαπᾶν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. For since, in the word φιλεῖν the direct affection of the mind is expressed, but in ἀγαπᾶν the regard to any thing, as that which we venerate, it is the part of men ἀγαπῶσι τὸν Θεόν; but of God, both φιλεῖν can be affirmed, with respect to men, if they do rightly, John xvi. 27; and ἀγαπᾶν, when he wishes them good, and seeks their salvation. So, in John iii. 16, where ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ is recorded, it is rightly said ἡγάπησεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν κόσμον, not ἐφίλει; for it could not be affirmed of God, that he φιλεῖν τὸν κόσμον, the world not being worthy of his love. Although it is used, therefore, when God is considered as approving men, yet an adequate cause is stated, or, at least, made apparent from the circumstances, v. c. John xvi. 27. In John xi. 3, 5, 36, speaking of our Lord's love to Lazarus, the words φιλεῖν and ἀγάπᾶν are interchanged. For, in ver. 3, the sisters are recorded to have intimated to Jesus, ὅν φιλεῖς, ἀσθενεῖς; and in ver. 36, it is said, that the men who saw his grief, said, οὐδε, πῶς ἐφίλεις αὐτόν. Whilst, in ver.

5, John adds ἡγάπα δὲ ὁ Ἰησοῦς τὸν Λάζαρον. But if we take all things into account, the reason will appear plain, why in this 5th verse John did not write ἐφίλει but ἡγάπα. For this love applies, not only to Lazarus, but to his sisters, with reference to whom, ἀγαπᾶν was the more correct expression. For the sense implied, is that of friendship or delectation, and not of that kind of affection which is involved in the word φιλεῖν when used of a woman. For, although φιλία especially denotes friendship, (for ἔρως is the special word for love,) yet φιλεῖν is never used of the friendship between the sexes, unless when the idea of love is conjoined.

But, lest this should be considered as an over-nice distinction, we will refer to another example. In Matth. v. 43, it will be manifest why our Lord commands ἀγαπᾶν τοὺς ἐχθρούς, and not φιλεῖν. For the φιλεῖν, a virtuous man could not feel towards a bad man; but he might the ἀγαπᾶν towards any man to whom God was willing to be beneficent. Love cannot be required, but favour or kindness may. Kindness is a duty of humanity; but love can exist only where there is congeniality of soul, (Luke vi. 32, 35.) The Lord requires that we should feel kindly to an enemy, and seek as much as possible his benefit; but he does not require

that we should actually love bad men. On the contrary, when they are reproved, who, from an excessive desire to preserve life, lose sight of the real object of living, John xii. 25, it is rightly said, ὁ φιλῶν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ. For he who is ἀγαπῶν τὴν ψυχὴν, consults his real interest. But in Luke vii. 5, the Jews are recorded to have said, ἀγαπᾷ τὸ ἔθνος ἡμῶν, *i. e.* favoured, cherished. Concerning Mark x. 21, ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς ἡγάπησεν αὐτόν, interpreters have differed. But it is needless to invent a strange sense, as if ἀγαπᾶν meant, to address with bland and friendly words, and then as nearly allied to it, to approve, to praise, which would rather be the force of φιλεῖν. Besides, if our Lord had approved of the young man, he would not have added, that one thing yet more trying and difficult to overcome remained. For, when our Lord saw that he was not ill-disposed, yet that he confided too much in his possessions, with a view to his benefit, he added an admonition to which his covetousness would not submit. Jesus, therefore, ἡγάπησεν αὐτόν, that is, meaning kindly to him, warned the rich man, that he might, at the same time, impress more fully the minds of his disciples.

Briefly then, in fine, φιλεῖν is to love, ἀγαπᾶν is to regard; in Latin, the one is *amare*, and the other *diligere*, which two words differ in the

same manner. See Wetstein on John xi. 4, and Ciceron. ep. ad Dolabell, ix. 14. ad Attic. 17. ad Div. xiii. 47.

It will now be plain how it is that  $\varphi\imath\lambda\varepsilon\tilde{\nu}$  and  $\dot{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\pi\tilde{\alpha}\nu$  have each their peculiar signification; that  $\dot{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\pi\tilde{\alpha}\nu$  never means to kiss,  $\varphi\imath\lambda\varepsilon\tilde{\nu}$  never to acquiesce, or to cherish with reverence. For although it may be doubted whether the radical sense of  $\varphi\imath\lambda\varepsilon\tilde{\nu}$  is *osculari*, yet it is evident that this meaning accords best with the notion of love, but not with the notion of regard, in which reason rather than feeling reigns. On the contrary, the impetus of love, (οὐμή Lucian. Amor. ii. 436,) which exists in the word  $\varphi\imath\lambda\varepsilon\tilde{\nu}$ , is not found in the mind of him who,  $\dot{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\pi\tilde{\alpha}$ , acquiesces, is satisfied when he attains that which he thinks worthy of his desire. Lastly, since, in the word  $\dot{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\pi\tilde{\alpha}\nu$  exists the notion of admiring and reverencing, he is said properly,  $\dot{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\pi\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ , who reverently or respectfully addresses or receives any one. The third word which the Greeks use for love, viz.  $\dot{\varepsilon}\varphi\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ , does not occur in the New Testament.

$\dot{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\delta\omega\epsilon\gamma\tilde{\nu}\cdot\dot{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\delta\omega\pi\omega\tilde{\nu}$ .

These words are so nearly allied, that they scarcely appear to differ. For the words of which they are composed,  $\dot{\varepsilon}\varphi\gamma\alpha\zeta\epsilon\sigma\tilde{\alpha}\iota$  and  $\pi\omega\tilde{\nu}$ , frequently are not distinguishable in sense; yet

they differ. For ἀγαθοεργεῖν is properly ἐγγε-  
εσθαι τὸ ἀγαθόν, good occupation, *bene agere*, to  
be doing good, whilst ἀγαθοποιεῖν is, to do some  
good thing. In the word ἀγαθοεργεῖν, the action  
is regarded, the notion of acting; in the word  
ἀγαθοποιεῖν something more is considered, the  
doing some particular good. The same thing  
is done both by ὁ ἀγαθοεργῶν and ὁ ἀγαθοποιῶν, viz.  
τὸ ἀγαθόν. But he who is said ἀγαθοποιεῖν is only  
considered the author of good, while he ἀγα-  
θοεργεῖ, *i. e.* while he is occupied with ἐγγοις  
ἀγαθοῖς. It is not granted to all that they  
ἀγαθοποιεῖν, can effect good; but there is no one  
who may not ἀγαθοεργεῖν, occupy himself with  
good works. For, as in the verb ἐργάζεσθαι is  
more especially understood, the labour of ac-  
complishing some object, so also ἀγαθοεργεῖν is  
to labour in doing good; but ἀγαθοποιεῖν is to  
effect the good for which any one is ἀγαθοεργῶν.

In the New Testament, ἀγαθοεργεῖν occurs  
but once, 1 Tim. vi. 18. It is commonly ren-  
dered *bene facere*, to be kind towards the poor.  
But it is questionable whether the notion of  
beneficence is there expressed, and not rather  
that of acting well; for the notions of bene-  
ficence and liberality are in the following words:  
εὐμεταδότους εἶναι κοινωνικούς. Paul commands Ti-  
mothy to exhort the rich not to boast in their

riches, but rather to place their hope in God; and therefore he wishes them ἀγαθοεργεῖν to do well, πλουτεῖν ἐν ἔργοις ἀγαθοῖς, to be rich in good works, to be ἐνμεταπότοις and κοινωνικούς that is, beneficent and liberal; and thus to lay up a real treasure to be enjoyed in another world. It will hence be plain that there is no reason for attaching the idea of beneficence to ἀγαθοεργεῖν.

On the contrary, ἀγαθοποιεῖν is to effect some good, to do good acts, as opposed to bad acts. So in Mark iii. 4. Luke vi. 9, 33, 35, it is opposed to κακοποιεῖν. Nor, in the former place in Luke, is it exchanged for ψυχὴν σῶσαι — ἀπολέσαι. But this is the example by which the general notion of ἀγαθοποιεῖν is illustrated. Hence also, in 1 Pet. ii. 15, it is said, that Christians may repel calumny by ἀγαθοποιοῦντες, *i. e.* by a steady observance of those good deeds which are subsequently enumerated. In 1 Pet. iv. 10, ἀγαθοποία is properly beneficence.

In fine, ἀγαθοεργεῖν is *bene agere, gut handeln*, to do well; ἀγαθοποιεῖν, *bene facere, gutes thun, to do good.*

Ἐπ.κένειν (Ἐπ.κειν.) σύζειν.

The older interpreters had evidently no little difficulty with John vi. 44; in which passage the Lord says, οὐδεὶς δύναται ἐλθεῖν πρός με, ἐὰν μὴ ὁ

*πατήσῃ, ο πέμψας με, ἐλκύσῃ αὐτόν.* For, since the word *ἐλκύειν* is rendered *trahere*, to draw, they conceived that a notion of force was implied in it; at least, those who defended the notion of the irresistible grace of God, thought so; as if God led those who were predestined to salvation, even, notwithstanding their own reluctance, to faith in him. So even Calvin, following after Augustine, wrote: “Without controversy it is deducible from the words of John, that the hearts of the pious are so effectually governed by divine grace, that they follow with an inflexible affection.”<sup>1</sup> And, although they had

<sup>1</sup>This point is not easily settled, even by the acute criticism of Mr. Titmann. Men are too easily biassed by their own predilections. For instance, in this very passage of Calvin’s Institutes, on which Titmann seizes, in order to controvert the notion of a constrained reluctance on the part of the elect, it is evident that no such idea exists, or was intended to be expressed. It only affirms an invincible influence *on the hearts of the pious*. It assumes the pious turn and tendency, as co-existing with, coeval with, the influence; and this excludes the idea of reluctance and unwillingness, co-existing with the operations of effective grace. It shuts out the idea of dragging altogether. So difficult is it to settle controversial points, when, even with reference to the force of terms, a writer of such peculiar acuteness misses the plain and direct meaning of his opponent. Surely there is little more affirmed in this sentence, given, as it is, in an insulated form from the writings of Calvin, than that

the authentic interpretation of those former words given in ver. 65, whence it might be gathered that they meant only ἐὰν μὴ ἦ δεδομένον αὐτῷ ἐκ τοῦ πατρός μου, yet they adhered to this notion of *dragging*, and, therefore, taught that he to whom God gave the grace to come to him, was so controlled that he could not resist, and that this was given only to the elect. Our theologians, who teach the universal grace of God, regarding it as a thing which may be resisted, maintain, that in the word ἐλαχύειν there is not necessarily the idea of a certain constraint on the resisting and unwilling, but only the notion of leading and attracting.<sup>s</sup> Which,

“ They (*i. e.* the predestined to life) be called according to God’s purpose, by his spirit working in due season; *they, through grace, obey the calling*, they are justified freely, they are made the sons of God by adoption, they are made like the image of his only-begotten Son, Jesus Christ, *they walk religiously in good works*; and, at length, by God’s mercy, *they attain to everlasting felicity.*” Art. 17 of the Church of England. Neither in the terms of this article, nor in the above extract from Calvin, does the idea exist, which Tittmann condemns, with justice, as unscriptural, of a divine violence dragging a still reluctant heart to a worship, half-sincere and half involuntary.—*T.*

<sup>s</sup> Most probably we are right, in tracing ἐλαχύω, ἐλαχω, to **אָלַח**, *ambulavit, ivit, ire fecit, deducit*. It has the same sense also in all the cognate dialects. It occurs also in Childee, in the sense of *vectigal*, tribute drawn, and of the motions of the planets. The same general idea obtains

as it may be shown by many passages of the Greek writers, so especially will it be made to appear, if the word is compared with *σύρειν*, which is its synonym.

In this respect the two words agree, that in both of them there is the idea of *drawing*; *i. e.* of effecting that some thing, moved from its own place, should follow another. In this sense *ἐλκύειν*, (which very frequently means only to *carry along with*, as in Euripid. Ion. v. 750.) is used in John xviii. 10; xxi. 6, 11. But so far they appear to differ, that in the word *ἐλκύειν* may be understood a certain *drawing*, tending to a particular point; in the word *σύρειν*, a continuous and uninterrupted movement of the thing drawn. Wherefore, *σύρειν* is frequently used of those things which are drawn perpetually

in Greek. It is used of the weight causing the scale to descend; and of any attractive influence by which one thing is caused to move towards another. So also *ολκός* derived from it, is the track or course along which any thing has passed, as the plough, a vessel, a serpent, an arrow. The oriental word has reached us through the Gothic migration, in the German, *walch*, *peregrinus*, (Walachia?) and our own word, retaining the primitive sense, to walk. This etymology of *ἐλκύειν* quite justifies the author's critical remarks on it. The word *σύρειν*, may be referred to **נָסָס**, *decessit, amovit, detraxit*. In *ἐλκύειν*, the original idea is, influence causing motion; in *σύρειν* the leading notion is, separation, aversion—*T.*

on the ground, Lucian, i. Merced. Cond. 3. **655.** περιμείναντες ἐξελκομένου καὶ ἐμπεπηγότος, ἥδη συρόμενον καὶ πεὸς ἀνάγκην ἀγόμενον ὥσπερ. Speaking of a man, as of a fish caught by the hook, and dragged along. Conf. i. Catapl. 13. 635. ii. Luc. **56. 624.** In the same sense, *σύρδην* is used in Eurip. Rhes. v. 58. And so *συρμός* is spoken of a continual impetus, as *συρμὸν χαλάζης, οφετῶν*, v. c. Leonid. Alex. Ep. xii. Anal. ii. 192. and *πρηστήρων ἔξαισίους συρμάους*, Aeschin. Axioch. § 17. Probably they differ, as our words *zeihen* and *schleppen* (*zerren*.) And, as German writers only use this word when it is peculiarly applicable to some act or work. (v. c. *Schlepptau* and *die Schlepppe, σύρμα,*) so *σύρειν* is seldom found in Greek writers, except when the idea of drawing is combined with violence. The notion of violence is not necessarily inherent in either word; but it becomes attached to *σύρειν*, as it is inferred that the thing drawn, so follows as with reluctance or resistance, and as needing the application of a stronger force. The different notion is very evident in John xxi. ver. 6, 8, 11. For when the disciples, at their Lord's command, let down the net, οὐκ ἔτι αὐτὸι ἐλκύσαι ἕσχυσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἵχθύων. But afterwards came the others, and then it is said, σύροντες τὸ δίκτυον τῶν ἵχθύων. And, finally, when

they were landed, Peter εἴλκυσε τὸ δίκτυον ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς. Where it may be readily seen why, in the second instance, John uses the word σύρειν. Nor can we say that both words are used concerning the same thing in the same sense, in Acts xvi. 19, εἴλκυσαν εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν; Acts xxi. 30, εἴλκον αὐτὸν ἔξω τοῦ ιεροῦ; James ii. 6, ἐλκουσιν ὑμᾶς εἰς τὰ κριτήρια; and Acts viii. 3, σύρων τε ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας παρεδίδου εἰς φυλακήν. Acts xiv. 19, ἔσυρον ἔξω τῆς πόλεως. Acts xvii. 6, ἔσυρον ἐπὶ τοὺς πολιτάρχας. Certainly in the former passages there is not the notion of violence, but only that of efficacy, which cannot be separated from the idea of drawing. Often they are said to draw, who would prefer that the thing which they draw, as chains, calamities, &c. should not follow. The same form occurs in ἐλκύειν πόδα, and others; whence it appears that in this word there exists only the simple notion of drawing, independently of the additional idea of violence, which is only adventitious, arising out of the circumstances. Nor in the form ἐλκύειν εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν, εἰς κριτήριον, is there the notion of violence; as if the lictors were actually dragging the man to the forum, any more than in the Latin expression, *in jus rapere*. Which appears sufficiently in Acts xvi. 19, εἴλκυσαν εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀρχαῖς καὶ προσα-

*γαγόντες αὐτοὺς τοῖς στρατηγοῖς, εἰπον.* In fact, *σύρειν* is never used in that sense in which *έλκειν* frequently is, that is, in the metaphorical sense in which it occurs in the above named passage in John, and in c. 12. ver. 32; and in which it is used by others. For, as *έλκειν* is frequently used of those who by speaking or other means attract others, that they may conform to their way; so in these passages it means no more than to attract, to influence; the opportunity being given to bring over to a side; which is not done by violence, (frequently associated with the idea of drawing;) but only by the rational inflexion of the will. So in Lucian, i. Pisc. 46. 613, he is said *έλκόμενος πρὸς τὴν ὅψιν*, who is moved by the sight of riches and indulgences proposed to him; and i. Hermet. 74. p. 817, *ὑπὸ τῆς ἀκολουθίας ἔλκόμενος*, is said of him who, under a false influence, believes that to be true which is false. In the same manner, in James i. 14, it is said, *ὑπὸ τῆς ἴδιας ἐπιθυμίας ἔξελκόμενος καὶ δελεαζόμενος.* (Conf. Aelian. Hist. Anim. vi. 31, and Aristaenet. Epist. ii. 21.) Hence it is used with reference to sporting, concerning animals who are taken not by force but by guile. But *σύρειν* is not so used; which is not surprising, if we are right in the idea that it rather means to drag

after; (whence *σύρμα* and *ἐπισύρειν*;) whilst in Rev. xii. 4, *ἐλαχεῖν* and *ἐλαχύειν* mean, to draw to, or with. And, therefore, if the compounds of *σύρειν* are not used strictly, they will not have the notion of drawing to, but of drawing away, driving, propelling. As Lucian elegantly says I. Nigrin. 16. p. 55, *παρασύρεται αἰδώς καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ δίκαιοσύνη*. For *παρασύρειν* and *περισύρειν* are applied to rivers or torrents, which with swollen waters drag down all opposing substances before them. (See Hemsterhusius on this passage of Lucian.)

*Καινός· νέος,*

Agree in this, that both are opposed to *παλαιός*. But in *παλαιός* there are two ideas; it is used of that which was originated some time back, as *οῖνος παλαιός*, Luke v. 39, or of that which has existed long, and been in use, *ἰμάτιον παλαιόν*, Matth. ix. 16. To the first sense *νέος* is opposed; to the last *καινός*. That is *καινόν* which comes in the place of a thing that was formerly, and has not yet been used, *i. e.* *new*; *νέος* is that which has only lately been originated, *recent*.

That in the New Testament this notion of each word is distinctly preserved, appears from the references given in Lexicons. We will adduce a few instances: Matth. ix. 16. 17,

ιμάτιον παλαιόν — πλήρωμα καινόν οἶγον νέον — ἀσκοὺς παλαιούς — καινούς. (conf. Mark ii. 21; Luke v. 36).<sup>2</sup> Our Lord does not say νέους ἀσκούς, nor οἶνον καινόν. But in Matth. xxvi. 29, he says, γέννημα τῆς ἀμπέλου καινόν, because he refers to *another* wine than that which he poured out then to his friends, *not recent but different*. For, as in the word καινός is expressed that which has not been long, it follows that it must be other and different from that which had been formerly. And we also, in speaking of wine, draw the distinction between *new* wine and *recent* wine. Hence, the γλῶσσαι καιναί in Mark xvi. 17, *i. e.* tongues not formerly used by the Apostles, are, in Acts ii. 4, called ἔτεραι, other tongues. Some add to this the notion of superiority; but it does not necessarily exist in καινός, although it frequently arises out of the opposite term; for often that which is worn by use is corrupted by age. Yet the νέον and the καινόν are not always better than the older. Therefore, neither in the formula καινόν ἀμπέλου γέννημα does the notion of superiority exist absolutely, nor in these:—καινὴ διαθήκη, Heb. viii. 8. 13; ix. 15, καινὴ ἐντολή, John xiv. 34.

But καινός and νέος are used interchangeably with the same word. For instance, καινὴ διαθήκη and νέα διαθήκη Heb. xii. 24; καινὸς ἄνθρωπος Eph.

ii. 15; iv. 23. et *νέος ἄνθρωπος* Col. iii. 10. But although, *καινή διαθήκη* is always used, regard being had to the old covenants; it is once only in this passage called *νέα*, as a recent covenant, only lately established, of which the Jews were now participants. For the same reason Paul, in Epist. to Colossians, speaks of the *νέος ἄνθρωπος*, when he had been wont to say, *καινός*. For it is evident that regard is especially had in this place to the *ἀναγεννήσις*: the *καινὸς ἄνθρωπος* is one who differs from the former; the *νέος* one which is *ἀνακαινούμενος κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτὸν*, renewed after the image of his Creator. On the contrary, Paul does not say, *νέα κτίσις* but *καινή* (2 Cor. v. 15. 17; Gal. vi. 15, Eph. ii. 15,) because in the word *κτίσις* itself, there is the notion of *νεότης*, newness. And the difference of which we speak may be observed in the use of the words *ἀνακαινοῦν* and *ἀνανεοῦν*, which occur in the New Testament. They are both rendered, to restore, to renew; yet they differ. For who does not see in 2 Cor. iv. 16, ὁ ἔσωθεν *ἄνθρωπος ἀνακαινοῦται ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ἡμέρᾳ*, that the meaning is different from what it would have been, if the Apostle had written *ἀνανεοῦται*. On the contrary, in Eph. iv. 23, it was correct to write *εἰς κεύσθαι τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ νοὸς ὑμῶν*. For if in this latter passage he had

written ἀνακαινοῦσθαι, we should not gather what he wished us to know, that a new spirit should dwell in those who had put on the *κανός ἀνθρώπος*; but there would have been a tautology, as appears by what follows. But in the former place, ἀνακαινοῦται ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ἡμέρᾳ, does not mean that the inner man is daily born anew, but that it daily acquires new strength, which previously it had not; so that though the outer man perish, there is no need for the soul to despond. But properly in Rom. xii. 2, he writes μεταμορφοῦσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νότι ὑμῶν; for this ἀνακαινώσις is not the work of an hour, but of a whole life; wherefore also baptism, τὸ λουτρὸν τῆς ἀνακαινώσεως, as Luther says, must be brought into operation throughout the whole of life.<sup>t</sup>

<sup>t</sup> This is more easily said than explained. Even the great name of Luther will not make it the less obscure. The *effect* of a specific and terminated act may be realized throughout life; but how the act of baptism, which is completed at the instant, can be continued through a lengthened period, is yet a difficulty calling for elucidation.—T.

## CHAPTER V.

AN accurate observation of synonyms is peculiarly useful and necessary, in cases where they occur in juxtaposition. This fact occurs in all writers, but is especially worthy of notice in the books of the New Testament, and that on two accounts; first, because some think that this conjunction of synonyms may be neglected in studying the writings of less elegant authors; and, secondly, that many, in those places in which this accumulated junction of synonymous terms occur, have been accustomed to look for some emphasis or ornament. Both opinions, however, are false. For it is plain, that men who have acquired the language that they speak rather by custom than by study, more frequently make use of particular terms, which, taken together, go to express the universal or general notion present in their minds; whence it happens that the full force of their meaning must be gathered from a close consideration of the whole synonymous terms which they have used, collectively. And the notion about ornament is equally unfounded.

For, as the most elegant writers abstain from that kind of ornament which is merely verbal, so also should we take care, lest, in reading more simple writers, we conclude that words cognate as to a certain similitude of meaning, are introduced merely for ornament. For it is common enough to rapid writers to adopt a verbose style, which gratifies the idle and listless reader, but gives disgust to a better taste. But more elegant authors never insert a word, except its sense is fitted to impart some new light or additional view to the subject; and which pleases, because it leads the mind to consider the same point in various ways; so that the same topic, presented in different aspects, calls up in the mind of the reader different ideas respecting it. But less artificial writers, who are chiefly anxious to be understood by their readers, often use sentences of similar import or synonymous terms near together, not for the sake of ornament or variety, but that their readers may more fully apprehend the whole idea which they wish to convey.<sup>u</sup>

<sup>u</sup> I conceive this to be the primary source of that parallelism which is so celebrated among the Hebrew writers, especially in their poetical books, but in what mode, or by what laws, it is regulated, has not been shown with sufficient accuracy. For that which Herder has written in his work, (*vom Geist*

Hence not only among the New Testament writers, but among the more ancient Greek authors, and especially Homer, many passages occur in which synonymous words or sentences appear together; yet in vain would you seek for any intentional ornament, except that clearness which flows naturally from an accurate description of particular things, from which a general notion is derived. Yet they give pleasure, although not inserted by the author with that view; for although the enjoyment derived from mere ornament, would be lost if the writer abstained from the ornament, yet readers would not the less distinctly apprehend his meaning. But, in passages of this kind, the pleasure arises from this, that the writer has exhibited the matter by various terms of description to the eyes of the reader, not merely to please him, but to state more precisely his own way of thinking about it.

Before we demonstrate this by examples from the New Testament, it may be well to adduce a few instances from the writings of Homer, which will clearly illustrate my meaning; and of the many that immediately suggest

*der hebr. Poesie, Tom. I. Opp. p. 34. sqq.*) has well explained the beauty and force of such parallelism, but has not entered on the inquiry into its nature.

themselves. I will select those to which parallel cases may be found in the New Testament, μίνυνθά περ οὕτι μάλα δῆν. Iliad. *α.* 416. et saep. ἥμος δὲ ἡέλιος κατέδυ καὶ ἐπὶ κνέφας ἥλιθε Iliad. *α.* 475. μέγα κήδεται ἥδ' ελεαίρει. Iliad. *β.* 27. ὑπέσχετο καὶ κατένευσεν. Iliad. *β.* 112. ὕψιμον δύτιτέλεστον. Iliad. *β.* 325. νικήσῃ κρείσσων τε γένηται. Iliad. *γ.* 92. αἴσχεα δειδίότες καὶ ὄνειδεα πόλι. ἀ μοι ἐστίν ib. 242. ἀβλητος καὶ ἀνούτατος, Iliad. *δ.* 540. ἥμιθροτες οὐδὲ ἔτυχες, Iliad. *ε.* 287. ἔλωρ καὶ κύρημα ib. 488. Θανεῖν καὶ πότμον ἐπισπεῖν. Iliad. *η.* 52. Θάνατον καὶ πότμον ἐπισπεῖν, Iliad. *υ.* 337. μύθῳ ἐπιτέλλεαι ἥδε κελεύεις. Iliad. *π.* 61. κραδίη καὶ Θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ, ibid. *ν.* 220. 244. 319. (It only occurs in the Iliad in this instance, but in the Odyss. *δ.* 348. *σ.* 60.) οὕτι μετατρέπομ' οὕτ' ἀλεγίζω. Iliad. *μ.* 238. πόλεμον καὶ δηϊστητα. Iliad. *ν.* 250. πολεμίζειν ἥδε μάχεσθαι. Iliad. *λ.* 12. ἵπέμεναν οὐδὲ ἐρύθητεν. Iliad. *ε.* 499. σῆσιν ἔχε φρεστί, μηδέ σε λήπη αἰρεῖτω. Iliad. *β.* 33. οὕτ' εἴρομαι οὕτε μεταλλῶ. Iliad. *α.* 553. In these passages any one will perceive, that there is no ornament nor any particular emphasis; yet we deny that this union of synonymous terms is altogether otiose and futile. Similar instances occur among more elegant writers, which need not be enumerated;\* and they are found also in the sacred

\* We may subjoin a few passages, not dissimilar to those

writings. In following out, therefore, this discussion on the synonyms of the New Testament which we have begun, we must seek from passages of a similar kind, some examples in order to demonstrate what course, in our opinion, should be taken, to ascertain the real mind of the writer, and to define accurately the force of his synonymous expressions.

ἢρεμος ἡσύχιος.

Paul writes in 1 Tim. ii. 2. ἵνα ἡρεμον καὶ ἡσύχιον βίον διάγωμεν ; and correctly ; for both are to be desired ; for the two words agree in this, that in neither is there any thing of tumult, perturbation, agitation or solicitude ; yet they differ. He is ἡσύχιος who makes no disturbance ; he is ἡρεμος who is himself free from agitation or disturbance. That life therefore is ἡσύχιος which excites no disturbance in others ; and that is ἡρεμος which is not disturbed by others.<sup>y</sup> 'Ησύχιος is evidently used in this sense

of which we are about to speak. The following occur in Xenophon : σώματα κάκιστα καὶ αἰσχιστα, Cyneg, 13. 11, κακῶν καὶ ἀνάθρων, Lyc. 10. 6, ἀνοήτων καὶ ῥιψοκιδύνων, Memor. 1. 3, 9, ἀχρείον καὶ ἀναφελεῖς τοῦ σώματος, ib. 1. 2. 54, ἀπόρων καὶ ἀμυχάνων, ib. 2. 5. 3, ἀμίλειαν καὶ ῥαθυμίαν, ib. 3. 5. 5, παιδευθέντας καὶ μαθόντας, opposed to ἀπαιδεύτους καὶ ἀμαθεῖς, ib. 4. 1. 4.

<sup>y</sup> The word ἡσύχια is derived from ἡσύχη *amavit, appetivit, desiderium*, and is, therefore, *vita tranquilla, placida* ; a

in 1 Pet. iii. 4, *τοῦ πρόσεος καὶ ἡσυχίου πνεύματος*. Hence, *ἡσυχάζειν* is to rest, to do nothing; and it is said of those who make no reply, nor contradict further, as Luke xiv. 3. Acts xi. 18. xxi. 14, and 2 Thess. iii. 12. Paul exhorts those μεδ' *ἡσυχίας ἐργάζεσθαι*, τὸν ἑαυτῶν ὄγκον ἐσθίοντας, whom he heard ἀσάπτως περιπατεῖν, μηδὲν ἐργάζομένους, ἀλλὰ περιεργάζομένους, *i. e.* meddling with the affairs of others. (*Aristid.* p. 494.) *ἡσυχίαν* ἦγε καὶ μηδὲν περιεργάζετο. It is evident that *ἡσυχία* is frequently used in the sense of silence, 1 Tim. ii. 11, 12, compared with 1 Cor. xiv. 34. *Ηρεμός* is seldom used; but the more common forms *ἡρέμα*, *ἡρεμαῖος*, *ἡρεμεῖ*, *ἡρεμίζειν*, have the meaning which we have specified; although in these words the notion of tranquillity is often referred to external things; for he who is himself quiet, *i. e.* free from fear or other disturbing passions, does not annoy others. And hence *ἡσύχιος* is often used in both senses. We will add a passage from

placid life according with the desires and wishes, *quiete fruens*; it is rather a pleasurable repose. *Ηρεμός* is from **עַרְמָה**, and **הַרְמָה**, *nudus, vacuus, evacuatus, cava, spelunca*. From the same source is derived *ἴηρμος*, desert, and the words, *eremite, Hermii*. And the idea, therefore, which is conveyed by *ἥρεμος* is rather that of vacuity of cares, freedom from annoyance, the quiet of solitude.—7.

Lucian, ii. Amor. 29. 429. ἐγὼ δὲ ἡσυχῇ μειδιάσας καὶ ἡγέμα τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ παραβαλῶν (ὅμητα ἡσυχον, *Euripid. Orest.* 1217. *Troad.* 649.) They are in error who say that *ἡγέμα* is the same as *ἡμερος*. But Luther elegantly renders the words of Paul in the passage in question; *ein geruhiges und stilles Leben*. For although we also use the words *ruhe*, *ruhig*, and *stille*, *still*, promiscuously; yet that a similar difference exists between them is made evident by those formulae, which necessarily require the one rather than the other.

μάχεσθαι πολεμεῖν μάχαι πόλεμοι.

Among the former quotations from Homer, we gave *πολεμίζειν* ήδε μάχεσθαι. We must add to it *πόλεμοι τε μάχαι τε*. *Iliad. a. 177. ε, 891.* On the former passage Eustathius says, *τὸ πόλεμοι τε μάχαι τε, η ἐν παραλλήλον δηλοῦ τὸ αὐτὸν, η καὶ διαφορά τις ἔστι ταῖς λέξεσιν, εἴγε μάχεσται μέν τις καὶ λόγοις, ὡς καὶ η λογομαχία δηλοῦ καὶ αυτὸς δὲ ὁ ποιητὴς μετ' ὄλιγα φησί, μαχεσσαμένω ἐπέεσσι.* (v. 304.) καὶ ἄλλως δὲ μάχη μὲν, αὐτὴ η τῶν ἄνδεων συνεισβολή. ο δὲ πόλεμος καὶ ἐπὶ παρατάξεων καὶ μαχίμου καιροῦ λέγεται. *χεήσιμον δὲ ὅδε καὶ τὸ πολεμίζειν ήδε μάχεσθαι.* And this view of Eustathius is confirmed by other writers, and by the Scriptures especially. Paul in 2 Tim. ii. 23, commands *τὰς μωράς*

ζητήσεις παραιτεῖν, ὅτι γεννῶσι μάχας. In the same way he exhorts Titus, iii. 9, μωρὰς δὲ ζητήσεις, καὶ γενεαλογίας, καὶ ἔρεις καὶ μάχας νομικὰς περιέστασο. In 2 Corinth. vii. 5, the *ai ἔξωθεν μάχαι* are not bodily calamities, but the actual contentions with which the Apostle had to encounter. Compare John vi. 52; 2 Tim. ii. 24; Act. vii. 26, (Exod. ii. 13. **מִצְנָה**.) Πόλεμος, on the contrary, and πολεμίζειν are said of battles and combats, which take place in the way of actual collision. The word is so used, metaphorically, certainly in Rev. ii. 16, πολεμήσω μετ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ ἔμμαρτι τοῦ στόματός μου. (comp. v. 12.) But it is never applied to verbal disputes.

So far then they agree, that they denote contest, contention, fighting; but πόλεμος and πολεμεῖν are restricted to actual collision by physical force, μάχη and μάχεσθαι apply to any contention of mind as well as body, even though it come not to blows. In the former the actual struggle is expressed; in the latter, it is sufficient to have the idea of such contention as often leads to blows. For in the word μάχεσθαι there is not properly and necessarily the notion of physical collision, as appears from one passage of Homer. (Iliad. a, 298.) *Χεῖσοι μὲν οὔτι ἔγωγε μαχήσομαι εἰνεκα κούρης.* I

strongly suspect that the original notion of this word was that of impetus, or force by which one rushes on another;<sup>2</sup> wherein the verb has only a middle termination. Hence *μάχεσθαι τινί* simply rendered, is to be borne violently against any one, as Iliad. ζ, 329. *μάχαι* and *πολεμεῖς* are often joined as in the Iliad. α, 177. ε, 891. Xenoph. Hier. i. 38. *μάχη* and *μάχεσθαι* have a wide signification. *πόλεμος* and *πολεμεῖν* are restricted to the idea of war.

<sup>2</sup> The suspicion of Titmann is well founded; and this instance again illustrates the value of etymological inquiry. The original form of *μάχη* is more directly that of actual collision, than *πόλεμος*. It is derived from **נכה**, *to smite*; which according to the form of all Hebrew words beginning with **נ** drops the first radical, and takes the formative **מ**; **מכים**, *percutientes*, *percutiens*. With a slight variation it occurs in Chaldee **נחה** and **מחה**, *percussit* and in Arabic **مُقْ**, *fudit*; and hence *μαχαιρα*, a sword, *mactare* to slay, and *dimicare* to fight. From the same source, we have *nocuit* in Latin; and *knock*, through the Gothic. Unquestionably, therefore, the original notion of *μάχη* is a blow. *πολεμεῖν* has reference rather to the general confusion of an extended contest, and is probably derived from **בל**, *confudit*, *misicut*. It was very natural for *μάχη*, which more simply expresses the idea of contest by collision, to be used in a figurative sense for every kind of conflict. This is the natural course of language. *πολεμεῖν* originally expressed a more complex idea, and has been retained by custom in its proper meaning. Phavorinus, however, says: *πολεμίζειν ἡδὲ μαχίσται, τουτὸν σημαίνει ἐτι πορειᾶς λόγον.—τι.*

σύμφυχοι τὸ αὐτὸ (τὸ ἐν φρονοῦντες.)

The passage in which these expressions occur, is Philip. ii. 2. πληρώσατε μου τὴν χαρὰν, ἵνα τὸ αὐτὸ φρονῆτε, τὴν αὐτὴν ἀγάπην ἔχοντες, σύμφυχοι, τὸ ἐν φρονοῦντες. The word *σύμφυχος* occurs but once in the New Testament. It differs from *ἰσόφυχος*, which Paul used in the same epistle, c. ii. 20. For *ἰσόφυχος* is animated or moved in the same *way*; *σύμφυχος*, to think the same *thing*, to be of one mind. They may be *σύμφυχοι* who are not *ἰσόφυχοι*. For often men think the same thing, who differ materially as to mind. The *σύμφυχοι*, are the same with *οἱ τὸ αὐτὸ φρονοῦντες*. But we must inquire into the difference between *τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν* and *τὸ ἐν φρονεῖν*. For it cannot be credited that the Apostle would have so rashly introduced a mere tautology. Once only he writes *τὸ ἐν φρονεῖν*, and that in this passage. Six times he writes *τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν*. Now, *τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν* is to have the same opinion, to feel, to wish, to seek the same thing. So in Romans xii. 16, *τὸ αὐτὸ εἰς ἀλλήλους φρονοῦντες*. Rom. xv. 5, *τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν ἐν ἀλλήλοις*. 2 Cor. xiii. 11, *τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖτε, εἰρηνεύετε*. And again, in the Epistle to the Philippians, c. iii. 16, *τῷ αὐτῷ στοιχεῖν καὶ ὅμη, τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν*, if that is the true reading; and iv. 2, *τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν ἐν κυρίῳ*. We need hardly attempt to demonstrate that this formula is used by other writers in the same

sense. But  $\tauὸ\; ἐν\; φρονεῖν$ , is to wish one thing only, to agree in seeking one thing only. The Apostle wishes the Philippians  $\tauὸ\; αὐτὸ\; φρονεῖν$ , *i. e.* not to disagree, but to regard each other with the same mutual love, to be unanimous, seeking one thing. For, if each sought something different, they could neither be  $σύμψυχοι$ , nor would they have  $\tauὴν\; αὐτὴν\; ἀγάπην$ . But the one thing ( $\tauὸ\; ἐν$ ) which he wished them all to mind, he explains in ver. 4,  $μὴ\; τὰ\; ἐαυτῶν\; ἔκαστος\; σκοποῦντες$ ,  $ἀλλὰ\; καὶ\; τὰ\; ἐτέρων\; ἔκαστος$ . He wishes, therefore, all  $συμψύχους\; εἶναι$ ,  $\tauὸ\; ἐν\; φρονοῦντας$ , while all minded or sought one thing only, the convenience of each other. For, if  $οἱ\; πάντες\; τὰ\; ἐαυτῶν\; ζητοῦσι$ , ver. 20, they could not be accordant; but if all agreed in one thing, that each should expressly seek the benefit of the others, they would certainly live in concord and in mutual love.

Briefly, then,  $\tauὸ\ αὐτὸ\ φέρεῖν$ , is to have the same mind;  $\sigmaύμψυχον\ εἶναι$ , is to think the same thing, to be of accordant mind;  $\tauὸ\ ἐν\ φέρεῖν$ , is not to differ in council and purpose, but to seek one and the same object.

σπλάγχνα. οἰκτιρμοί.

In the same clause of the Epistle to the Philippians, ver. 1, we read, *εἰ τινα σπλαγχνα καὶ οἰκτισμοῖ, πληρώσατε μου τὴν χαράν*. If it were true, as is stated in the common lexicons to the

New Testament, that *σπλάγχνα* is put metaphorically for mercy, commiseration, Paul would have written tautologically. But that the word has a wider meaning, and that the notion of mercy only attaches to it adventitiously, will appear from Luke i. 78, *σπλάγχνα ἐλέους*, and Coloss. iii. 12, *σπλάγχνα οἰκτιεμῶν*. Certainly, as *σπλάγχνα* properly signifies the more noble *viscera*, the heart, lungs, liver, &c. (*σπλάγχνον ἡ καρδία*,) whence, *εὐσπλάγχνοι* and *εὐσπλαγχνα*, are terms for fortitude, so are all these terms figuratively assumed to express the more vehement feelings and passions, which are believed to arise more immediately from these viscera. Hence *σπλάγχνα* *θερμαίνειν πρὸς ὥργην*, *Aristoph. Ran.* v. 868, and *αινῆν* *σπλάγχνον* *Sophocl. Ajac.* v. 995. And thus, the *ἀσπλάγχνοι* are those who are destitute either of love and benevolence, or of hate and anger, ὡς ἡθοι ἀναίσθητοι *ὑπάρχοντες*, *κατὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν ἔνδον συναλγοῦν*. — μὴ *ἐλεοῦντες* *μηδένα*, *μὲτε φιλοῦντες*, *μηδὲ ὅλως φροντίζοντες* *ἢ ἐπανούντων ἢ φεγόντων, ἢ ἀδηούντων, ἢ ὀφελούντων*. (*Galen. de Dogm. Hippocr. et Plat.* iii. c. 4. *Tom. v. Opp. 316. ed Lips.* we say *herzlos*, heartless.) Luther renders *σπλάγχνα* *ἐλέους*, by *herzliche Barmherzigkeit* and *σπλάγχνα οἰκτιεμῶν* *herzliches Erbarmen*.

There is then a difference between *σπλάγχνα* and *οἰκτιεμοί*. The former denotes some vehe-

ment affection or regard, *στόχyή*, as of parents towards children, which is the most intense affection, and on which account children are called *σπλάγχνα* in Philem. v. 12; and often elsewhere.<sup>a</sup> The latter properly denotes mercy, a sense of grief for the distresses of others. These words of Paul should be rendered, therefore, If ye have any true love towards me, if any mercy. Luther writes, *herzliche Liebe und Barmherzigkeit*.

Let us now speak of the synonyms,

Ἐλεος· οἰκτιγμός· ἐλεεῖν· οἰκτείρειν·

*Oikteírein* and *oikteigmos* denote merely compassion, a sense of unhappiness for the ills of others, *barmherzig seyn. Barmherzigkeit, Mitleiden*; but *Ἐλεος*, *ἐλεεῖν*, denote the desire of relieving the miserable. In these latter, then, there is something more than in the former, viz: the additional notion of beneficence, of aid, which he who is *ἐλεῶν* is prompt to apply. Pity is easily enough called up in the soul, but the *Ἐλεος* is less frequently to be met with.

<sup>a</sup> This is perhaps assumed too easily. The Apostle uses a strong expression indicative of his love to Timothy, but it would not follow from this, that the word which he uses means children, or, my child; Theophylact thus paraphrases the passage: Μετὰ ἀγάπης δέξαι αὐτὸν, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἴματα σπλάγχνα, οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸν αγαπῶ καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ περιφέρω. See Suicer's Thesaurus Ecclesiasticus on the word.—T.

The LXX frequently renders רָחֵם by ἔλεος, but for רָחַם and תָּנוּ it has οἰκτείγειν. Hence also, ἔλεος and ἔλεεῖν (ἔλεημοσύνη) are put, in the New Testament, for those benefits which are bestowed on the miserable; but οἰκτιγμός, never. The same observation may be made on that very remarkable passage, Rom. ix. 15, ἐλεήσω ὅν ἀν ἔλεῶ καὶ οἰκτείργων ὅν ἀν οἰκτείρω, compared with Exod. xxxiii. 19. He who is ὁ ἔλεῶν, strives to relieve the miserable, and does if he is able; but he who limits himself to his compassion only, he is said, οἰκτείρει. The Latins appear to express both notions by the words *misericors* and *misericordia*, unless we are correct in distinguishing *miseratio* and *misericordia*, as that the first agrees with οἰκτιγμός and οἰκτος, the latter with ἔλεος. The passage, therefore, may be thus rendered, “I will succour whom I will to succour. I will pity whom I pity.” Certainly according to the mind of the Apostle; for the Hebrew words have rather the sense of certain and perpetual favour and Divine aid, than of absolute will in the distribution of blessings. But they err greatly who think that they deduce from these words, that God wills not to save some. For what follows, ἄρα οὖν οὐ τοῦ Θελοντος, οὐδὲ τοῦ τρέχοντος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἔλεοῦντος Θεοῦ, has certainly not the force, that even though any one desires the favour of God, he cannot

attain it, if God has negative (*noluerit*) that he should attain it. For, in the case of one who gives a benefit, the accepted benefit must be referred to his benignity, not to our desire; we receive benefits, therefore, from the mercy and clemency of God, not for our own works or deserving. Therefore, it is rightly said, *οὐ τοῦ θέλοντος, οὐδὲ τοῦ τρέχοντος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐλεοῦντος θεοῦ*, scil. *τὸ χάρισμα*; that is, the *χάρισμα*, a conferred benefit; cannot be referred to our effort or merit, but to the mercy of God, for from thence it comes; he favours and benefits whom he will. It does not follow, then, as some would have it, that even he who wishes cannot obtain, because God forbids the success of his prayer; but rather, what is most true, that labour as we may, it is by the grace of God we obtain the promise, and not by our own merit. It comes from God; he gives to the unworthy; some rejoice in it, some receive it not. These fail of the promise, because they seek it not in the right way: *ἰσραὴλ διώκων νόμου δικαιοσύνης, εἰς νόμου δικαιοσύνης οὐκ ἔφθασε, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, ver. 31*; those οὐκ ἐλεημένοι, ἀλλ’ ἐλεημέντες, μὴ διώκοντες δικαιοσύνην, καταλαμβάνοντι δικαιοσύνην, δικαιοσύνην δὲ τὴν ἐκ πίστεως. Has then God so had mercy (*ἐλεεῖ*) that those whom he willed not to save, ought to perish notwithstanding διώκωσι τὴν δικαιοσύνην. Certain it is, they do not

obtain what they wish, because ζῆτεν μὲν θεοῦ  
ἐχουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν. Had they sought  
the true δικαιοσύνη, they would have obtained it,  
yet, at the same time, οὐ τοῦ τρέχοντος, ἀλλα τοῦ  
ἐλεοῦντος, the gift would have been of God. I  
have often wondered, therefore, that those who  
held the notion of an absolute decree, have  
had recourse to these words for the support of  
their opinion. Certainly they have so under-  
stood the passage. It matters little, therefore,  
whether we seek or disregard the favour of  
God, if God only regard us; for however any  
one may strive and seek to attain salvation,  
yet he cannot attain it unless God has willed  
it. This is assuredly true, if God has nega-  
tived it; but this idea is repugnant to right  
reason and true religion; nor is it in the pas-  
sage in question.<sup>b</sup> Certainly it becomes every

<sup>b</sup> All this is very accurately and judiciously stated. But the author is fighting with a man of straw. Which of the Calvinistic divines asserts, that man seeks to be made holy, and that a holy God has put a negative on his desire? The great body of those divines who are advocates for the sovereignty of God's grace, which man's natural heart impugns, and who wear the epithet, Calviaistic, as an opprobrious brand, go no further than the statement of Titmann; and take the same view which he does, of the passage in question. There have been rash assertions on the subject of a decree of reprobation, but they were ever confined to a few.

one versed in the language, to inquire how they establish the fact, that *εἶναι τινός* signifies what they wish. For the word *ἐστί* is wanting. But what that is, which *οὐκ ἐστι τινός*, they have not explained. Luther renders it, *So liegt es nun nicht an dem*, &c. Beza, “Election is not of him,” &c. He completes this impersonal formula, by adding, rashly, the notion of election which was wanting. I say rashly, for in the whole chapter there is nothing said of the election of the schools, but only of the gift of divine blessings,<sup>c</sup> especially of calling to the

It would be well, however, if the great body of Pelagians and Arminians could be brought to adopt cordially the view laid down in the text. There would then be little material difference on this difficult point, within the limits of the Christian community. The grand testing question to man’s proud heart is: Is God a sovereign from first to last in the gifts of grace, in the *τοῦ θεοῦ*?—T.

<sup>c</sup> Titmann has hardly been just to this passage of the divine word. It is clear that the point mooted is, who are the Israel, the *πίστις τοῦ Θεοῦ*, ver. 7, 8. To illustrate this point, an example is given in the case of Jacob and Esau, in reference to which it is shewn, that the selection of Jacob to be the favoured seed, was before the children had done good or evil, according to the *πρόθεσις κατ’ ἐκλογὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ* not of works but of him that calleth. And then comes, in verse 16, the deduction from this example as applicable to the whole argument. *ἄλλα οὖν οὐ τοῦ Θεοῦ πειθόντος* &c. The ellipsis, then, cannot be the notion that Titmann has introduced, but must be of this kind: So then, to be the child of God, the child of promise, the true seed of Abraham, is not of Him that willeth, &c.—T.

kingdom of Messiah, ver. 24. Rightly, therefore, is it rendered by Schott, “divine gifts do not depend on him who seeks,” &c., for *εἴναι τίνος* is to have cause in any thing, *i. e.* to be so conjoined with any thing, as that it is the cause of being or doing any thing. And hence, it is to owe one’s origin to any one, to depend on any one, to be in the power of any one. Xenoph. Memor. i. 1. 9, *τοὺς δὲ πάντα τῆς αὐτοπίνης γνώμης εἶναι οἰομένους, δικαιοῦντα ἔφη.* (Mark xii. 23, *τίνος αὐτῶν ἔσται ἡ γυνή.*) Whether, therefore, it be rendered, “It is not in the power,” or, “it does not depend on,” yet it means no more than that the efficient cause is the mercy of God. Lastly, we must be careful not to attach to the particle *ἄν*, v. 15, the notion of uncertainty as to the will or determination, which there is no reason to suppose, that some persons have done. For the words *ἄν* *ἄν* *εἰ.εῖ* do not signify, *quemcunque volero*, whosoever I may wish, as if it were uncertain whether he wished or not; but, *si quem volo*, he whom I wish. So that the true sense of the passage is, if I have pity on any one, I will have pity on him; and therefore it is not uncertain whether he wills to pity, but it is most certain; for that he had willed to be graciously present with Moses, he had previously promised. So

in Xenoph. Polit. ii. 6, ἐὰν ἡ πόλις διδοῖς οἰκοδομησα-  
μένοις ἐγκεκτῆσθαι, οἱ ἀν άιτούμενοι ἄξιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι,  
i. e. those seeking the privileges of the city,  
who may appear worthy. Thucyd. vi. 14,  
δις ἀν for εἴ τις and vi. 16, and ii. 44. Demosth.  
c. Neaer. 1386, 17.

ψιλυγιστάς καταλάλοι.

In Rom. c. i. v. 30, 31. Paul enumerates together, ψιλυγιστάς, καταλάλοις· ὑβριστάς, ὑπερηφά-  
νοις, ἀλαζόνας· ἀσυνέτους, ἀσπόνδους· ἀστρόγονος, ἀνε-  
λεήμονας. On each of which terms I will speak  
briefly.

Ψιλυγιστάς and καταλάλοι so far agree, that they  
both mean, a calumniator. They differ how-  
ever; for the ψιλυγιστής, is he who spreads ca-  
lumny secretly and whispers it in the ear,<sup>d</sup>  
καταλάλος is he who slanders openly. So they  
are distinguished in 2 Cor. xii. 20, on which  
place Suidas says, ψιλυγισμός ή τῶν παρόντων κακο-  
λογία, παρὰ τῷ ἀποστόλῳ. Kuster prefers ἀπόντων.  
But it makes little difference. The slander

<sup>d</sup> From סתר *latuit, occultavit*, and from the same source  
the Latin *susurrus*; another instance of the Hebrew hard  
sound of ש being altered in two languages, into an *s* in the  
one, and an aspirated *t, θ*, in the other. *N. B.*—The same  
word, with the formative מ, **מִסְתָּרָה**, is the original of  
*μυστηρίον*, *mysterium*, mystery.—T.

traduces those who are present, *εἰς τὸ οὖς*, the absent publicly and *ἀδεῶς*. Theodoret says in loc. *Ψιθυριστὰς λέγει τοὺς πρός τὸ οὖς διαλεγομένους καὶ παρόντας τινὰς κακῶς ἀγορεύοντας* and on Romans i. 30, *καταλάλοι, οἱ διαβολαῖς κατὰ τῶν ἀπόντων ἀδεῶς κεχρημένοι*. The notion of accusation, *διαβάλλειν*, is common to both. But in James iv. 11, *οἱ καταλαλῶν ἀδελφοῦ, καταλαλεῖν νόμου*, some think that *καταλαλεῖν νόμου* means, to act contrary to the law. This is an error, for though we grant that sometimes, though rarely, the same word may be put successively in two different senses; yet care must be taken, lest in searching for a meaning in the writings of the Apostles, we should conclude that this has been done contrary to the usage of the word, and that thus we introduce uncertainty into the interpretation. Evidently here *καταλαλεῖν νόμου* is to slander the law itself. He who slanders his brother is as if he slandered the law. The Apostle adds also, *οἱ τὸν ἀδελφὸν κρίνων, τὸν νόμον κρίνει*. The law forbids to do either.

*ἀλαζόνες· ὑπερήφανοι (ὑβρισταί).*

*Ἀλαζόνες* and *ὑπερήφανοι* occur together also in 2 Tim. iii. 3. They agree so far that both are expressive of one who arrogates to himself more than he ought. But *ἀλαζονία* is more in speech, it is ostentation; *ὑπερηφανία* is pride

united with contumely and contempt of others. Ἀλαζών is a vain-glorious boaster ;<sup>e</sup> ὑπερήφανος, he who prides himself on the things in which he excels, or thinks that he excels. The one is arrogance, the other pride. The ἀλαζών puffs himself, because, as he admires himself, he seeks that others should admire him, without calumniating or despising others ; but the ὑπερήφανος acts contemptuously and insolently to others. The one makes men laugh at him, but seldom moves their hatred ; the other excites the contempt, hatred, and anger of those whom he contemns. The one only boasts of his own merits, the other brings down the contempt of men on his own deeds. Casaubon. ad Theophr. p. 353. rightly says, that ἀλαζών and ὑπερήφανος differ in this, that the boaster extols himself without injuring others, and deceives himself, φειαπατᾶ, Galat. vi. 3 ; but the ὑπερήφανος is contumelious, and despises every one but himself. As to the difference between ἀλαζονεύειν and περπερεύεσθαι, which occurs in 1 Cor. xiii. 4. see Valckenar. ad Lennep. Etymol. ii. p. 764. ἀλαζονεύειν is to boast falsely

\* Ἀλαζών is derived from λόγος, *lingua*, and means the use of the tongue in a bad sense exclusively, either for detraction or boasting. The old word, leasing, Psl. iv. 2. English version, is from the same source.—T.

of things that are false, but περπερεύεσθαι to boast conceitedly of things in themselves true.

The ὑβρισταί differ from both the former. These are the insolent, who, from pride, not only treat others with contempt, but with contumely and injury. The ὑβριστής cares for no man, but thinks himself at liberty to act towards any one as he pleases; who put forth their pride in injurious actions. Vid. Eustath. ad Odyss. α, p. 51. and Wettsten. ad N. T. ii. p. 28. The three words, therefore, differ in degree. In ἀλαζονείᾳ there is no contempt, but only silly ostentation. In ὑπερηφανίᾳ there is contempt of others and contumely. In ὑβρίᾳ there is contempt with injury. Xenophon contrasts σώργονες with ὑβρισταί. Cyrop. iii. 1. 12. Ages. 10. 2, and the ὑπερηφάνοι are contrasted with τυπενοί in James iv. 6. 1 Pet. v. 5.

To these words we may add a fourth, αἰδάδης, which occurs in Titus i. 7; 2 Pet. ii. 10. It signifies that viciousness of life which arises out of a self-satisfaction, that can approve of nothing but the doings of self. It designates him who does not accommodate himself to others; and is consequently unaccommodating and morose. Aristotle calls him δύσκολος. It is therefore often united with σκληρός and θρασύς; as in Pet. ii. 10, with τολμητής. (Eunap. de

Leg. p. 217, *τολμηστατοι και αιδαδεις.*) But in this passage *τολμηται αιδαδεις*, are not the rash, who seek only to please themselves, but the petulant and cruel, who care for no one; and certainly a bishop should not be *αιδαδης*, but mild and *σεμνος*.

*ἀσύνθετοι ἀσπονδοι*

So far are similar, that they prefer to live with others in enmity and strife, rather than in friendship and peace. But as the *συνθηκη* and the *σπονδη* differ, the one being made by those between whom there had been no previous enmity, the other being the covenanted termination of war, at least for a time, so the several adjectives will have a distinct meaning also. The *ἀσύνθετοι* are not, as is commonly stated, those who break a confederacy, but are rather those who will not come into a confederacy, nor be easily led to adopt pacific measures, *unverträglich*. The *ἀσπονδοι* are they who will not make peace, but prefer interminable war, *unversöhnlich*. The *ἀσύνθετοι* do nothing to preserve peace; the *ασπονδοι* do nothing to restore peace, *ἀδιάλλαχτοι ἀσπονδοις πόλεμος* is implacable war. But Demosthenes says *ἀσυνθετωτατον τὸν ἵχλον*, because they were *ἀνομόλογος* and *ἀσύμφονος* as Harpocrates explains the expression.

The difference between ἀστοργοί· ἀνελεήμονες may be readily traced from what has been already said on the word ἔλεος.

(ἀμαθεῖς) ἀστήρικτοι ἀσθενεῖς ἀρρώστοι.

The two former words occur together in 2 Pet. iii. 16, ἐ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ ἀστήρικτοι στρεβλοῦσιν εἰς τὴν ἴδιαν αὐτῶν ἀπώλειαν. We may admit at once, that, if used in their proper sense, they are not synonymous. But as, in this passage, the ἀστήρικτοι may be those who are not yet sufficiently established in religious knowledge, they may properly be compared with the ἀμαθεῖς. The ἀμαθεῖς are those who have not learned that which they might and ought to have learned, who have not had proper instruction and discipline. Xenoph. Mem. iv. 1. 4, παιδευθέντας καὶ μαθόντας — ἀπαιδεύτους καὶ ἀμαθεῖς. They are therefore the untutored; but the ἀστήρικτοι are they who have learned, but have not been adequately taught and confirmed, who yet need definite religious knowledge. It were scarcely necessary to notice this, but that interpreters have endeavoured to attach to the word ἀμαθεῖς, the idea of perversity and impiety, with the view probably to justify the further affirmation of Peter, that they pervert the difficult passages of Paul's writings to their destruction. But what then should we say of

the ἀστῆριτοι, unless we suppose that these also bear the blame of their own infirmity? For the ἀπώλεια is not the penalty of crime, but the evil which arises spontaneously from ignorance, although that ignorance be blameless. They render ἀμαθῆς, indocile; but they could not easily justify this rendering, unwilling to be taught. The case is different, if it is said αμαθῆς, s. ἀμαθέστερος πρός τι. But there is no need of this. For they who are so untaught and unstable, do pervert the δυσνόητα of Paul to their own hurt. They ought already to be σοφοὶ καὶ τέλειοι.

But in 1 Corinth. xi. 30, ἀσθενεῖς καὶ ἔργωστοι, are used together; and they are rendered by Luther, *Schwache und Kranke*. If we give heed to the old grammarians, ἔργωστοι and νοσοῦντες differ; and, on the contrary, ἀσθενεῖς and ἔργωστοι appear to be identical in meaning, if we consider their composition. Yet they differ; for they are ἀσθενεῖς who have not strength, infirm, imbecile; they are ἔργωστοι the strength of whose powers has failed, languid, sick. *Cicero de clar. or.* 180. *infirma atque etiam aegra valitudine fuit.* So in Xenoph. *Apol.* 30, ἔργωστος τὴν ψυχὴν is he who is sick in spirit; but in Agesil. 9. 5, ἀσθενεῖα ψυχῆς is weakness of mind, on account of which he avoids effort, as ἡ τῶν

ἀσθενεστάτων θηγίων βίον μημούμενος. He is ἀσθενής who has naturally no strength. He is ἀρρώστος who has lost his strength by disease. Xenoph. *Memor.* ii. 6. 12, *οἱ φύσει ἀσθενεστάτοι τῷ σώματι.* *Id. Oeconom.* 4. 2, *τῶν σωμάτων θηλυτορένων καὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ ἀρρώστοτορέας γίγνονται.* Although it must be at the same time admitted that both are predicated of the sick, both in the New Testament and other writings. Many suppose that the notion of sickness is intended by the word *κάμνων* in James v. 15, *καὶ ἡ εὐχὴ τῆς πίστεως ἐγενέτο τὸν κάμνοντα;* especially because the word ἀσθενεῖ occurs in verse 14. And, therefore, the papists bring forward this passage to prove the sacrament of extreme unction. But although we should concede that *κάμνειν* may mean to be sick, (vid. Wetsten, ad N. T. ii. p. 680,) yet it may be doubted whether, in this instance, it does not mean distress of mind. Such is evidently its meaning in Heb. xii. 3, *ἴνα μὴ κάμητε ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὑμῶν*, and Apocal. ii. 7. *κεκοπίας ἀλλ' οὐ κέκμηκας.* For *κάμνειν* properly is to be labouring or distressed with any thing; *κάμνων* is he whose strength gives way in consequence of excessive labour; whence *κάμοντες* and *κεκμηκότες* (but not *κάμνοντες*) are the dead, whose labours are ended. I do not press this conjecture, however, partly because it is

not altogether contrary to the truth that James may be teaching here in accordance with the forms and practices of the other Apostles, and with former custom ; and partly from the unwillingness to introduce a doubtful interpretation ; for the passage, even in their own way, is of no avail to the Romanists. James advises the application of anointing, together with prayer, for the healing of the sick ; they never administer extreme unction but when no hope of recovery remains ; and they never apply it with the view to recovery, but merely as a means of smoothing the path to heaven for the dying, as appears in the *Catechismus Romanus*.<sup>f</sup>

<sup>f</sup> The *Catechism of the Council of Trent*, used by the authority of Pope Pius V. It has been recently translated into English by Professor Donovan of Maynooth, and the Latin copies are exceedingly scarce. A Protestant controversialist, however, must never confide in the English version without comparing it with the Latin, as Mr. Donovan's text is in many instances softened, according to the present policy of the Romanists, to meet the spirit of these times. The Latin only has the authority of the church ; and Mr. Donovan's version will at any convenient season be thrown overboard. The whole tenor, however, of the teaching of the Roman *Catechism*, is completely at variance with the passage of James on which they profess to found their superstitious ceremony. Practically, their superstitious ceremony has no application whatever to the recovery of the sick. It is only regarded as a preliminary to death. It is called in the *Catechism* “ the sacrament of dying

persons ;" and its object is declared to be, " to calm the terror" attendant on death, and " to enable the soul to wait with cheerfulness" the coming event. This is surely in direct contrariety to a passage of Scripture which exhorts to pray, and the prayer of faith shall save the sick, and the Lord shall raise him up. Extreme unction is never administered till all hope of the sick being raised up has vanished ; and, for such a ceremony, no scriptural authority can be adduced.—*T.*

## CHAPTER VI.

A WANT of minute attention to the force of synonymous terms is not only a great impediment to those who are seriously engaged in the interpretation of the New Testament; but also in a point of still greater magnitude gives rise to many doubts, which, although they may wear to the unlearned the semblance of importance, will yet be smiled at by men of philological attainment, who, as possessed of extensive erudition, well aware of the usage of words, and wont to proceed themselves with the greatest caution, consider that theologians, in interpreting Greek writings, often confound rashly all words and forms, and conceive that our lexicons are sadly wanting in sound principles. For some persons, when they find words, or forms of speech, in any book of the New Testament, which are rarely or never met with in the others, make use of them as a test in a still higher matter, and deny that the books in which such words are found can be written by the same author as those are in

which similar things have been usually expressed in other words. The Epistle to the Hebrews affords a striking example of this wondrous subtilty of criticism. And they affirm of it, that, from its style of language, it must be set apart from all the other books of the New Testament; for that it cannot possibly have been written by any one of the authors of the other books. Now, in this matter, we give them up at once, their ἀπαξ λεγόμενα; but they must really allow us, in our explanation of synonymous terms, to make a few remarks on certain words and forms, which, in their estimation, are not synonymous, but identical, *ισοδύναμοιντα*; and with respect to which they affirm so confidently that if Paul had written on these points he would certainly have made use of different words and forms of speech; and, therefore, had he been the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, he would have adopted those words which are peculiar and familiar to his general style, and not those which are found exclusively in this epistle.

Λαλεῖν· λέγειν· εἰπεῖν· ἐρεῖν·

When lately I commenced the interpretation of the Epistle to the Hebrews, I came, at the very outset, into contact with the word *λαλήσας*, ch. i. 1, concerning which many in-

terpreters have differed as to the sense in which it is used by the Apostle. Those who delight in removing verbal difficulties to which they have themselves given rise, seem almost prepared to affirm, that the peculiar character of this Epistle may be known by the use of this word only. But let them point out what other word the Apostle could have used when he wished to say no other thing but that God had spoken. The four words which the Greeks used in this sense, and which are placed at the head of this section, are made use of in the New Testament; but of these no other but  $\lambda\alpha\lambda\epsilon\tilde{\nu}$  would have been properly fitted for this place. They agree so far, certainly, that they are spoken of those who utter words; yet they differ materially. For  $\lambda\alpha\lambda\epsilon\tilde{\nu}$  is no other than to speak, (*loqui*) *i. e.* to utter words of any language, independently of any reason why they are uttered; as we say the parrot speaks, because it enunciates words of human language.  $\lambda\alpha\lambda\epsilon\tilde{\nu}$  therefore, has no other force than the utterance of human voice. Rightly, therefore, they adduce the passage  $\lambda\alpha\lambda\epsilon\tilde{\nu} \ \ddot{\alpha}\rho\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon$ ,  $\lambda\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\tilde{\nu}$   $\dot{\alpha}\delta\mu\nu\alpha\tau\omega\tau\alpha\tau\sigma$ ; but they are quite in error who affirm that  $\lambda\alpha\lambda\epsilon\tilde{\nu}$  means to speak imprudently and inconsiderately. And the looseness and carelessness of lexicographers in admitting

such observations is quite surprising. Many passages occur in the New Testament in which this sense of imprudent and inconsiderate speech would be quite absurd, as Matt. ix. 18, compared with x. 19, 20. Hence *λαλεῖν τινι*, and *πρός τινα* mean only to speak to any one, and *λαλεῖν μετά τινος* to hold colloquy. And in James i. 19, *βραδὺς εἰς τὸ λαλῆσαι* is, slow to speak, according to the Rabbinical proverb, “ one mouth to speak with, but two ears to hear.” Therefore, in this passage of the Epistle to the Hebrews, the same signification must be strictly adhered to as in all other places where it is predicated of the prophets, or of God himself, as Luke xxiv. 25; Acts iii. 21, 24; Luke i. 45, 55; Acts iii. 21; vii. 6; John ix. 29; Acts vii. 38, 44; viii. 26. They would hardly adduce what Phavorinus states from Ammonius, to show that *λαλεῖν* means *ἀτάκτως ἐκφέρειν τὰ ἔργατα*. For Ammonius says other philosophers (Plato he had named previously), *διαιρεῖν οὕτως λαλεῖν μὲν τοὺς ἀτάκτως ἐκφέροντας ὅνπερ οὖν λόγον διαλέγεσθαι δὲ τοὺς μετ' ἐπιμελείας λέγοντας*. This is in fact a rhetorical distinction.

*λέγειν* and *εἰπεῖν* are so far similar that they have the common notion of words and things which we enunciate to auditors, and commune respecting them; and they differ therefore

from *λαλεῖν*, which simply implies the use of the human voice and of words. And often they are so made use of by the most elegant writers that they scarcely appear to differ. Yet they differ in the same degree as our *reden* and *sagen*. For *λέγειν* has reference to the sentiment and the connexion of words; *εἰπεῖν* relates only to the words which any one has successively spoken. This difference may be learned from those passages in which the two words occur in juxtaposition. Xenoph. Oecon. iv. 23, *καὶ ὁ Αἴσανδρος. εἰπεῖν τί λέγεις, φάναι.* Cyrop. i. 4. 12, *οἱ παιδες εἶπον πονηέον λέγεις τὸ πρᾶγμα.* Cyrop. v. 1. 10, *κάλλιστα, ἔφη, λέγεις. . . . τότε μὲν δὴ ταῦτ' εἰπόντες διελύθησαν.* Cyrop. vi. 4. 19, *εἰ μὲν τις εἰπεῖν τι βούλεται, λεξάτω.* Lucian. Hermot. 8. i. p. 747. *Μηδαμῶς, ἀλλ' εἰπὲ ὅ, τι καὶ λέγεις.* For in *λέγειν* the notion inheres of collecting (*colligendi*) words in a sentence or oration, whence, *λόγος*, *λογισμός*, &c. *διαλεγέσθαι*; but in *εἰπεῖν* the words only are considered which any one utters successively. Hence we may say, *εἰπεῖν λόγου*, and *λόγος* of the oration itself; but never *λέγειν λόγου*, or *ἔγημα*. In the same way *λέγειν* and *εἰπεῖν* are used in the New Testament, Luke xxi. 3, *εἰπεν ἀληθῶς λέγω.* xxi. 5, *τινῶν λεγόντων περὶ τοῦ ιεροῦ — εἰπε.* xxii. 34, *οὐ δὲ εἰπε λέγω σοι*, and elsewhere; and I suspect that it

is possible to give a good reason why *λέγειν*, is used in some places and *εἰπεῖν* in others. For when either word is added to other words, as *ἰδὼν εἶπε*, *ἐγόγγυζον λέγοντες*, &c. it may be observed that *λέγειν* is generally used, if in the word to which it is added, the notion of *speaking* already exists; but that if this is to be given as an additional notion, then *εἰπεῖν* is used, Luke xxi. 7, 8. *ἐπηρώτησαν λέγοντες*. (xxii. 64.) v. 12. *ἐδεήθη αὐτὸν λέγων*. v. 21. *ῆρξαντο διαλογίζεσθαι λέγοντες*. v. 30. *ἐγόγγυζον λέγοντες*. Contra. Luke xxii. 17, *δεξάμενος εἶπε*. v. 13. *ῆψατω εἰπών*. v. 20. *ἰδὼν εἶπε*. And if it is found to be otherwise in some instances, it must be remembered that the sacred writers did not in all places observe the rules of elegant composition. Yet frequently when *λέγειν* appears to have been put for *εἰπεῖν* it has not the meaning of speaking, but of thinking, feeling, commanding. So Mark. v. 28, *ῆψατο τοῦ ιματίου αὐτοῦ· ἐλεγε γάρ*. with the parallel passage in Matth. ix. 21, *ἐλεγε γάρ ἐν ἐαυτῇ*. Matth. ix. 23, 24, *ἐλθών — ἰδών — ἐλεγεν αὐτοῖς· ἀναχωρεῖτε*. There appears to be an opposition to this rule in the frequent form, *ἀποκρίθεις — εἶπε*. But that *ἀποκρίνεσθαι* is rather to be referred to the mind than to the actual words, is evident from the passages in which it occurs, where no interro-

gation precedes, which is often the case in the New Testament. So Luke xxii. 50, 51. And in Luke v. 31, our Lord answered the Pharisees not in his own name, but in the name, *i. e.* on the behalf of his Apostles.

The word  $\dot{\epsilon}\rho\dot{\epsilon}\tilde{\nu}$  only remains to be noticed. But this appears so far to differ from both  $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\dot{\epsilon}\tilde{\nu}$  and  $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ , that it should neither be considered as relating to the words only of the speaker, nor to the speech only, but to the mind and will of the speaker. It has almost always the notion of denouncing, affirming, objecting, or commanding; or some other thing which involves the mind and will of the speaker. It is, in fact, to enunciate or give forth the thought. Examples occur in the Lexicons to the New Testament. But let students be careful not to admit the idea that  $\dot{\epsilon}\rho\dot{\epsilon}\tilde{\nu}$  means sometimes, to interrogate. It may be used of him who utters his own mind, while he seeks to know the mind of another, as in the passages usually adduced, but simply and properly (*per se*) it cannot mean, to interrogate. In the same way as  $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu$  may be, to deny, because it often occurs that  $\delta\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ , denies, or as  $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\dot{\epsilon}\tilde{\nu}$  may be to reproach, if it is followed by reproaches. In fine,  $\lambda\alpha\lambda\dot{\epsilon}\tilde{\nu}$  is to speak or talk, *i. e.* to use

human language, *εἰπεῖν* is to utter words successively, *λέγειν* is to say, and *ἐρεῖν* is to express thought.

νέφος· νεφέλη.

The word *νέφος* occurs but once in the New Testament, Heb. xii. 1, *τοσοῦτον ἔχοντες προκείμενον ἡμῖν νέφος μαρτύρων*. Some therefore say, this word is peculiar to the writer of this epistle; that the others use *νεφέλη*: and thence they conjecture that Paul is not the author of the epistle, because he never, in speaking of a cloud, uses *νέφος*, but *νεφέλη*. A short statement will be sufficient to show that we cannot make this use of the passage.

The two words so far agree, that they signify a dense and humid vapour, which veils the sky; but they differ, inasmuch as *νέφος* denotes, cloud, indefinitely, (*das Gewölke*), but *νεφέλη* specific clouds, which, breaking from the mass, roll together in a certain form, (*die Wolken*.) For although in the most ancient writers, as Homer, they appear to be used indiscriminately, yet certain traces of this difference appears. In Homer we find *νεφέλη κυανέη* and *νέφος κυάνεος*, *νεφέλη μέλανα* and *νέφος μέλαν*. And certainly *νέφη* is said in the same way as *νεφέλαι*. But if the passages are accurately compared, this difference will be perceptible, that by *νέφος*

is intended an indefinite cloudy mass that covers the heavens, by *νεφέλη* a particular distinct cloud. And as *τὸ νέφος* is used for many indistinct and confused portions, so *τὰ νέφη* may be used to denote many clouds, but collectively, the clouds, for the whole veil by which the heaven, or a great portion of it, is covered. Hence Homer uses *νέφεα* and not *νεφέλαι* to describe the abode of the gods. Iliad. *v.* 523, ἀλλ' ὅγ' ἄρ' ἄνω  
 'Ολύμπω ὑπὸ χρυσέοισι νέφεσσιν ἥστο. Two observations here will suffice to point out the different force of these two words. The first regards the epithet of Jove, *νεφεληγερέτης*. For Jupiter is said to be *ἐ τὰς νεφέλας*, not *τὰ νέφη*, *συνάγων*. It could not be written without meaning in Iliad. *o*, *v.* 192. εὺς δ' ἔλαχ' οὐρανον εὐρὺν ἐν αἰθέρι καὶ νεφέλησιν. For it might have been *νεφέσσιν*, as in Iliad. *ε*, *v.* 867. ὅμων νεφέσσιν ἴών εἰς οὐρανον εὐρύν. Certainly it is, because he compels *νεφέλας* (*ἐ τοῦ νέφους*) *ἐν αἰθέρι*, over which he rules, not *τὰ νέφη* s. *τὸ νέφος*, behind which the abode of deity is imagined. Then never do we find in Homer *νεφέλαι* (plural) with an adjective as, *νέφεα σκιέντα*, *νεφέων ἐρεβεννῶν*, *νέφεσσι χρυσέοισι*; whilst, to the singular, some epithet is frequently added, to describe the particular cloud. We can conceive of clouds of colour widely different, but the colour of *τὰ νέφεα* (*τὸ νέφος*) is but one. It

may be shown readily, that later writers have made the same distinction. A few examples will suffice. Lucian. Icaromen. ii. p. 776. Luna, says: *κάν τινα ἵδω αὐτῶν μοιχεύοντα ἢ κλέπτοντα ἢ ἄλλο τι τολμῶντα νυκτερινῶτας, εὐθὺς ἐπισπασμένη τὸ νέφος, ἐνεκαλυψάμην.* Here if *νέφος* meant a cloud, he could not have written *τὸ νέφος*; it must have been without the article, that it might be indicated that the moon involved herself in *some* cloud. All will feel that he could not have written *ἡ νεφέλη*. Nor, elsewhere, is the article added to this word in the singular, unless a certain particular cloud is intended, as 1 Cor. x. 1, 2. But *τὸ νέφος* may be put absolutely, because it denotes an indefinite and indistinct mass. In that delightful passage, therefore, of Euripides, (Phoen. v. 166.) which Schiller had probably in his mind, *Ἄνεμώκεος εἴδε δρόμου νεφέλας ποσὶν ἔξανύσαιμι δὶ αἰδέρος πρὸς ἐμὸν ὄμογενέτορα*, the article is wanting. But there is no need *νέφος μαρτύρων ἐπισπώμεθα*; let us return from this digression.

The Apostle could not write *νεφέλην μαρτύρων*, he ought to say *νέφος*. For the Greeks, when they would express a great assembled multitude, which can scarcely be numbered, always write *νέφος*, never *νεφέλη*. Homer. Iliad. δ, 274. ψ, 133, *νέφος πεζῶν*. Iliad. ḡ, 243, *νέφος πολέμου*. ib. v. 755. *ψάρων νέφος ἡς κολοιῶν*; also *νέφος ὄρνεων*

Aristoph. Avib. v. 296, *νέφος στρουθῶν* ib. v. 579. and many other instances. But in this sense never, as far as I know, is *νεφέλη* found; neither is it ever used in the New Testament for a multitude. Therefore, since the Apostle could not use another word, it is vain to adduce this passage in proof of a difference of style. For if we should concede, that he might have written *πλῆθος μαρτύρων*, yet the word *νέφος* which he has used, in this sense cannot be compared with *νεφέλη*; neither is it necessary to suppose that this form is borrowed from the LXX, when it occurs among all writers, and that most frequently rare words and elegant forms of speech are found in those writers whose style is the least artificial; which forms, if they are found in any other writer whom he might have had before him, would still not give ground to suspect imitation; or to conjecture a common national origin of both writers; unless it were manifest also, that such words and forms were entertained by both, in some peculiar sense unknown to writers in general. Therefore, also, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, we must, in the first place, inquire, whether those forms of speech which, in the other books of the New Testament, are never or rarely found; and certainly not in the Epistles of Paul, are

used in a peculiar sense and manner foreign to other writers, which only occurs in cases where the quotation is made from the Septuagint.

But it bears still more closely on this point, that some think they have observed certain words, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, for which Paul, in a similar case, would have used different words; although, if we accurately examine the whole matter, it will appear that they are synonyms of the very same thing, but, which is of the nature and essence of synonyms, presented under a different aspect and mode of thought.

*διατάσσειν. διαστέλλεσθαι.*

Both these words occur often in the New Testament. Paul uses them in Galat. iii. 9, in speaking of the law, *διατάγεις δὶς ἀγγέλων*. Of this solemn interdict, Exod. xix. 12, 13, he thus speaks in the Epistle to the Hebrews, xii. 20, *οὐκ ἐφεγον τὸ διαστελλόμενον*. Some therefore say *διατάσσειν* has the same meaning as *διαστέλλεσθαι*, but that Paul never uses the latter word; for that, in a similar case, he writes *διατάγεις*, and that, therefore, had Paul been the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews he would have written in this instance as in others, *τὸ διατάγειν*. All, however, will surely see it rash to assume that *διατάσσειν* and *διαστέλλεσθαι* have

the same meaning; and that if Paul had been speaking of this particular interdict he would have said *τὸ διαταγέν*, because elsewhere he had written *ὁ νόμος διαταγέις*. But, before we show how these words differ, let us inquire of these persons whether they think Paul could have written *ὁ νόμος διαστελλόμενος*. Surely they will agree that he could not. For though the two words agree in this, that each word has the force of, disposing, yet they differ, inasmuch as they signify a different mode of the same power.

*Διατάσσειν* is so to dispose matters that each is in its own place, or to put in order, to arrange; *διαστέλλεσθαι* properly is so to separate, that nothing should be in a wrong place or mode. Hence *διατάσσειν* is used for any ordinance or prescribed arrangement; *διαστέλλεσθαι* frequently denotes separation, interdict. *Διατάσσειν* is to dispose, to constitute; *διαστέλλειν* to arrange in different parts, and, in the middle voice, *διαστέλλεσθαι* to interdict. Nor is it casually used in this sense in the middle voice. See Matth. xvi. 20, *διεστέλλατο τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἵνα μηδενὶ εἴπωσιν*. Mark v. 43. (Luke viii. 56, *παρήγγειλε μηδενὶ εἰπεῖν*); vii. 36; ix. 9. In these passages there is the notion of warning against an act, *i. e.* interdicting. (One passage occurs,

Acts xv. 24, where it appears to denote a mandate simply, as in Diodorus Siculus, xi. 38.) Hence, therefore,  $\tauὸ διαστελλόμενον$ , in this place, is an interdict; which was the fact. But a very different meaning exists in the passage  $ὁ νόμος διαταγέσ δι' ἀγγέλον$  viz. that the law is constituted and disposed by the ministry of angels.<sup>g</sup> This is evident, if we look at the origin of the words.  $\tauάσσειν$  is properly to place in a certain juxtaposition or series;  $στέλλειν$  is, not to send, according to the lexicons, but, to put in a place, or to deposit in a place, whence arise the notions of preparing, arranging, &c. It is not similar to the German *stellen*. Hence  $στέλλεσθαι ἀπό τίνος$  is to avoid a thing, as it were, to put oneself in another place, as 2 Thess. iii. 6,  $στέλλεσθαι ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ παντὸς ἀδελφοῦ ἀτάκτως περιπατοῦντος$ . The glossaries give it correctly *in loc.*  $στέλλεσθαι, ἀφίστασθαι, ἀναγωγεῖν$ . See also 2 Cor. viii. 20,  $στελλόμενοι τοῦτο, μή τις ὑμᾶς μωρήσεται$ . Erasmus is correct as to the sense, when he

<sup>g</sup> See a valuable paragraph on the word *διαταγή*, in Suerer's Ecclesiastical Thesaurus, a work of almost indispensable importance to theological students. It is a mine of erudite and apt quotation, from which many have drawn the means of their pretensions to learning, without having the candour to admit their obligation to the lord of the soil.—T.

says that the idea is taken from the fact of sailors avoiding a rock ; but it is, at the same time, an error in the scholiasts to say, that *στελλεσθαι* properly relates to a voyage or a naval expedition. In the same way, Polybius says, viii. 17, *οὐ δυναμένων καθόλου τὴν ἐκ τῆς συνθείας καταξίωσιν στέλλεσθαι*, *i. e.* to remove or reject. Therefore, as *ἀποστελλειν* is to send away, to dismiss, *ἀναστέλλειν* to repress or put down, *καταστέλλειν* to suppress, *συστέλλειν* to contract, or to arrange or confine in one place, so *διαστέλλειν* is to allocate in different parts or places, to separate ; and therefore *διαστέλλεσθαι* is spoken of an interdict, because he who interdicts from any thing is considered to do the same thing as if he actually separated him whom he interdicted, from that which he has interdicted. And this explains the use of the middle voice ; for it often occurs that middle verbs, while the proper relative notion is preserved, are at the same time referred to an object. In this passage, therefore, *τὸ διαστέλλόμενον* means an interdict ; neither could the author of the Epistle, be he whom he may, have written *διατεταγμένον*.

I will add another instance which is wont to be adduced from the Epistle to the Hebrews.

*ἀμετάθετος. ἀπαράβατος. βεβαιος.*

They say that in Hebrews vi. 17, 18, *ἀμετάθετος*

is used, and in vii. 24, *ἀπαράβατος*, when in other books of the New Testament, and by Paul himself, *βεβαῖος* would have been. But though sound philologists would smile at such a statement, let them bear with us while we touch this briefly. *Ἀπαράβατος* does not mean, as some say, immutable; (for *παραβαῖνειν* is incorrectly rendered to change,) but, that which does not pass away, or migrate; *ἀμετάθετος*, is that which is not changed; *βεβαῖος* that which remains in its place. It is true that there is in these words the common idea of firmness and constancy, as in *ἀκίνητος*, *ἀμετάκινητος*, *ἴδεαῖος*; but he would err who should say that they so signified the same thing that he who meant that which was *ἀμετάθετος* or *ἀπαράβατος*, could say also that it was *βεβαῖος*. Certainly to express the notion which the Apostle had conceived in the former passage, vi. 17, 18, he ought to have written *τὸ ἀμετάθετον τῆς Βουλῆς αὐτοῦ*. For *ἀμετάθετος* is constant and immutable, for it is frequently said of those things which consist and change not, but remain ever the same. But *βεβαῖος* is firm, immovable, certain, fixed. If, therefore, he had written *τὸ βεβαῖον τῆς Βουλῆς*, he would only have affirmed that the will of God is certain and fixed; but when he wishes to affirm that it is immutable, that which is

ever the same, and changes not with other things, then he uses ἀμετάθετον, as Diod. Sicul. xiii. 83, reads νόμους ἀμετάθετους. xvi. 69, ἀμετάθετον διαφοραν. i. 23, ἰσχυραν πίστιν καὶ ἀμετάθετον; and other authors. On the contrary, when he wishes to say no more than firm, certain, fixed, then Paul writes βεβαῖος, as vi. 19, ἀγκύσαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀσφαλῆ τε καὶ βεβαίαν. iii. 6, παρρησίᾳ βεβαία. ix. 17, διαθήκη ἐπὶ νεκροῖς βεβαίᾳ, &c. Nor in the other passage, vii. 24, would he have written βεβαία ιερωσύνη, but he ought to have written ἀπαράβατος. He wished to say that the priesthood of Christ did not pass from one to another priest, for that Christ was a priest for ever, εἰς τὸν αἰώνα, and this notion was expressed by the word ἀπαράβατος. He might have said ἀδιάδοχος; but if he had written βεβαία, he would have been very wide of what he intended; nay, he would have spoken foolishly, for the Levitical priesthood itself was βεβαῖος but not ἀπαράβατος, for that may be the one which is not the other, as a kingdom may be βεβαῖος although it passes successively into other hands, διὰ τὸ θανάτῳ κωλύεσθαι αὐτοὺς παραμένειν. Lastly, it is no ground for surprise that these words occur only in the Epistle to the Hebrews; for the same things are not treated of in all the Epistles. Neither has Paul demonstrated in

his other epistles that the priesthood of Christ is perpetual, and not to pass to others. Otherwise it appears absolutely certain to us, that he would have used the word *ἀπαράβατος*. Occumenius, *in loc.* rightly adds, *ἀδιαδοχον*, *ἀτέλευτον*, for that which in the same respect remains now, is in that respect, without end, *ἀτέλευτος*.

Several examples of synonyms might be adduced from the Epistle to the Hebrews, which by many persons would be accounted expressions of precisely equal force, and from which they would conclude rashly that the author had used peculiar terms in communicating the same idea, as v. c. *εἰς τὸ διηγεῖσθαι τοὺς αἰῶνας*. *ἀθέτησις, παλαιότης ἀντίτυπον, σκιά μέτοχον εἶναι, δεξιαρότης ὀλιγωρεῖν, καταφρονεῖν, νόθος, ἐκ πορνείας γεννηθεῖς, βραχύ τι, πρὸς ὥραν*; and many others which are brought forward as a cumulative proof that in this Epistle the same ideas are very differently expressed from what they are in other books of the New Testament, and that therefore it is not probable that Paul was its author. One example may suffice, which properly does not belong to our subject, but yet is not very foreign to that subtilty of distinction which the discussion of synonyms requires. There are constructions of the same words, with different cases, whence it results that although the same

thing is intended, yet the mode of thought in which it is presented is different. Among these we may notice,

*κρατεῖν τινός* and *κρατεῖν τι*.

These expressions are considered to mean the same thing; and even the Lexicons do not notice the difference of the force of the two constructions. Seeing, therefore, that in the Epistle to the Hebrews, *κρατεῖν* is only found twice with the genitive, but in the other Pauline Epistles always with an accusative, it is affirmed that this is idiomatic and peculiar to this epistle; and that Paul in those passages would have written *κρατεῖν* with an accusative. They should, however, have inquired first, whether *κρατεῖν* really has the same meaning with either case; and if not, then it is false that *κρατεῖν τινός* is idiomatic in this epistle. For it is true, that in this epistle the word is not found with an accusative: (It occurs but twice altogether, c. iv. 14, and vi. 18,) but the reason is, that the Apostle has only used the word where he wished to express that, which, to be understood by his readers, he must have written *κρατεῖν* with a genitive construction.

Generally speaking, with respect to words, which may be construed with an accusative or a genitive case, this rule appears to obtain;

that if they occur with an accusative, the relation is between them and the whole thing in question; if with a genitive, the relation is only to a part. So far, therefore, a difference appears between *κρατεῖν τινός* and *κρατεῖν τι* that *κρατεῖν τινός* signifies only to take hold of a thing, or to possess it; but *κρατεῖν τι* to have and to hold in his power. For although, *κρατήσας τινός* is often said of one who has possessed a certain thing, and has it now under his power;<sup>h</sup> yet I doubt whether passages occur in which *κρατεῖν τι* is put simply for to take, to possess, as *κρατεῖν τινός* occurs repeatedly (Luke viii. 54. Mark i. 31; v. 41; ix. 27. Matth. ix. 25,) except when the additional notion exists also of a certain force by which any one desires to seize a reluctant person, and bring him under control. So Matth. xiv. 3, *κρατήσας τὸν Ἰωάννην*,

<sup>h</sup> Fischer, in his Prolusions on the Faults of the existing Lexicons for the New Testament, p. 474. in remarking on the force of the word *ὑπασπίζω* in 1 Cor. ix. 27, that it has the same power as *ὑποτάττειν* and *κρατεῖν*, says in a note. “In the same way as love (Chariton vi. 3.) is said *κρατεῖν τῶν θεῶν*, that is, to rule over them. For *κρατεῖν* differs from *νικᾶν* in this respect, that *νικᾶν* means simply to conquer; but *κρατεῖν* so to conquer that the conquered party is subjected to, and in the power of the conqueror. Plato Orat. 12. Xen. Cyrop. vi. 1, 21.”—T.

ἔδησεν. xviii. 28, κρατήσας αὐτὸν επιλύε. xxii. 6. κρατήσαντες τοὺς δούλους ὑβρισαν. xxvi. 4, ἵνα τὸν Ἰησοῦν κρατήσωσι δόλῳ καὶ αποκτείνωσιν, in which instances the accusative must be rendered in connexion with both verbs, as in Matth. xii. 11, κρατήσει αὐτὸν καὶ ἐγεγένετο. And that this distinction obtains among other Greek writers, may be shown by examples. So in Sophocles Oed. Col. v. 1380. τοι γὰρ τὸ σὸν θάκημα καὶ τοὺς σοὺς θεόνους κρατοῦσιν, i. e. they hold ; but immediately afterwards in v. 1385, we find μήτε γῆς ἐμφυλίου δορὶ κρατῆσαι, to bring into subjection. So in Aristophanes Avib. v. 419. κρατεῖν ἀνὴρ τὸν ἔχθρὸν, ἢ φίλοισιν ὀφελεῖν ἔχειν. The Scholiast says, σημειωτέον, ὅτι τὸ κρατεῖν συνέταξεν αἰτιατικῆ. But this is made out by the text itself. The sense is : By which thou mayest control thine enemy, or benefit thy friends. For that the idea is, not that of conquering an enemy or reducing him to subjection, but rather that of having control over him, is made evident by the disjunctive conjunction ; for the opposition is not to the idea of procuring friends, but to that of doing them good. In the same way, it occurs in Xenophon. de Exped. Cyri. v. 6. 3, κέρατα τοῦ ὄζους ὑψηλά, ἢ κρατεῖν κατέχοντες καὶ πάνυ ὀλίγοι δύνανται. In which the notion evidently is, not that of occupying, but of holding, ob-

taining, in opposition to the enemy. Nor is this contradicted by a passage in *Hist. Graeca* vii. 3. 4, where the words, ἔγνω οὐκ ἀν δυνάμενος, τῶν Θηβαίων ἔχοντων τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, τῆς πόλεως κρατεῖ, are rendered “since he knew that he could not retain the city in his power;” according to a previous assertion, τοῦ μὲν ἀστεως ἔχοτει. I doubt, however, whether πόλις and ἀστυ have the same meaning here. It is contrary to the elegant accuracy of Xenophon, that these two words should stand in juxtaposition in the same passage to express a similar idea. Doubtless πόλις, in this passage, as is frequently the case in this author, means “the state.”<sup>i</sup> Euphron, therefore, understood, that although he occupied the city, he could not command the whole state, while the prefect Thebanus held the citadel, and he wished therefore to persuade the Thebans that they should eject the leading men who were with him in the tower, and then give up the state to him, (παραδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν.) The word occurs in a similar way in *Thucyd.* vi. 11, καὶ τοὺς μὲν, κατεργασάμενοι, καὶ

<sup>i</sup> Phavorinus, says πόλις, καὶ ὁ τόπος, καὶ οἱ κατοικοῦντες. both the place and its inhabitants; and the Lexicon Xenophontium gives a number of instances, in which Xenophon has used the word expressly in the sense of *civitas*, or the state.—T.

κατάσχομεν, τῶν ὁ' εἰ καὶ κρατήσαμεν, διὰ πολλοῦ γε καὶ πολλῶν ὅντων, χαλεπῶς ἀν ἔρχειν δυναίμεθα; and at the end of the chapter, χρὴ δὲ μὴ πρὸς τὰς τύχας τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπαίρεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰς διανοίας κρατήσαντας θαρρεῖν.

From these instances, it is evident that, in both places in the Epistle to the Hebrews, *κρατῆσαι* should be written with a genitive, for in both cases it denotes, to take, not to hold. For in c. vi. 18, it is said that God interposed a certain evidence of his unchangeable will, "that they might have strong consolation, who have fled for refuge to lay hold of the hope," &c. *κρατῆσαι τῆς ἐλπίδος*. The *καταφυγόντες* are the wretched who grasp at this hope, as suppliants do the altar. (Eurip. Iphig. in Aul. v. 911.) Neither should *ἐπὶ τὸν Θεόν*, be supplied after *καταφυγόντες*, for they have fled to the hope itself, of which they had not yet become possessed. Nor must the word be compared with *ἀποφυγῆν* in 2 Pet. ii. 20; but *καταφυγόντες* must be strictly connected with *κρατῆσαι* as an infinitive is often joined with a verb, signifying motion or desire, Matth. xi. 7, 8, 9. *Κρατῆσαι* therefore, in this place, means not to retain, but to apprehend, to take hold, as in Acts xxvii. 13, *δόξαντες τῆς προθέσεως κεκρατηκέναι* "supposing that they had obtained

their purpose." In the other passage the force of *κρατεῖν* is precisely the same, c. iv. 14, ἔχοντες οὖν ἀρχιερέα μέγαν — *κρατῶμεν τῆς ὁμολογίας*. For *ὁμολογία* here does not denote the religion which we profess, but the paction or covenant, that which is agreed on. For in c. iii. 1, Jesus is said to be *ἀπόστολος καὶ ἀρχιερεὺς τῆς ὁμολογίας*, i. e. *μεσίτης τῆς διαθήκης*, not because he is the teacher of religion, but because, as a priest, he provides that we should obtain *τὸ ὁμολογούμενον*, that is, the grace of God and salvation, concerning which the Apostle is treating. Hence, therefore, *κρατῆσαι τῆς ὁμολογίας* is not to be steadfast in the confession of our faith, according to the popular interpretation, but rather to act with all earnestness, so that we may obtain those blessings, of which our High Priest is the procurer, i. e. *κρατῆσαι τῆς προκειμένης ἐλπίδος*.

But if this criticism shall appear to some to have in it more of subtlety than truth, this, at least, I trust that equitable judges will concede to me, that when they exercise their own ingenuity in some deeper and more difficult crisis, they will permit to me, in turn, in the explication of words, the same degree of license which they claim for themselves.

## CHAPTER VII.

THE right knowledge of particles, in which the Greek language abounds, is attended with much difficulty; but especially in those which, as they serve almost as a common, or at least very closely allied, mark of the relation which they express, are properly accounted synonyms. For although the degree in which they differ is often so subtle, that it seems to be not always preserved by men who write with less of accuracy and elegance, yet it must never be neglected, if we would strictly investigate the meaning of the sacred writers. And though we know well the great need of caution, lest we rashly judge the style of these men by the strict rules of elegant writing, or attempt to emend their composition by rigid grammatical rules; yet such is the force of custom in the use of words, that even unlearned men are compelled to obey it; and therefore it will always be worth while to consider accurately, the peculiar and distinct force of each separate particle which they use. As an example we will refer to

ἄνευ and χωρίς

which appear to differ so little, that it scarcely matters which is used in a sentence, when the idea to be expressed is the separation or absence of one thing from another. For undoubtedly they agree in this, that they both indicate that relation in which the object is regarded as separate or absent from the subject. As if I command any one to do something ἄνευ γογγυσμῶν, I Pet. iv. 9. I wish all murmurings to be absent; or when it is said of our Lord that he spoke οὐ χωρίς παραβολῆς Matt. xiii. 24; in the same way almost it would be thought, that he did not speak without a parable, and consequently there may be those who would think, that in this passage it might have been written οὐκ ἐλάλει ἄνευ παραβολῆς. But there is this difference between the two particles, that χωρίς is referred to the subject as separated from the object; ἄνευ is referred to the object which is regarded as absent from the subject. When, therefore, I say a thing is done ἄνευ τινός, I mean, *that* is done when *this* is not present; but when I mean, that that which was done was not present with a certain thing, then I must say it was done χωρίς τινός. It is therefore rightly said in Matth. x. 29, ἐν ἐξ αὐτῶν οὐ πεσεῖται ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ἄνευ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν, that is, not

even a sparrow dies, so that the Father is not present, *i. e.* unconscious or unwilling. (See Ducker. ad Thucyd. iv. 78.) But if  $\chiωρίς$  had been put instead of  $\ddot{\alpha}\nuεν$ , it would only have affirmed that no swallow is absent from the Father, when it falls to the ground. In the same way we find  $\ddot{\alpha}\nuεν λόγου$  1 Pet. iii. 1, but  $\chiωρίς \dot{\eta}\muῶν$  1 Cor. iv. 8; Heb. xi. 40, and  $\chiωρίς πίστεως$  Heb. xi. 6; vii. 7. 20. For  $\ddot{\alpha}\nuεν πίστεως$  would be, without faith aiding and assisting; but what he wished to say was, if any one was actually destitute of faith. And  $\chiωρίς \dot{\eta}\muῶν$  is not when we are not present with you, but when ye are actually separated from us. And if in Heb. xi. 40, it had been written  $\muὴ \ddot{\alpha}\nuεν \dot{\eta}\muῶν τελειωθῶσι$ , the false assertion would have been made, “that these men might not without us, *i. e.* without our aid and volition, be blessed.” But what was wished to be said was, that they should not be blessed otherwise than we, but even as we, through faith and piety, in the midst of calamities. The particle therefore must be  $\chiωρίς$ , separately, apart from.

The reason is quite evident also in John xv. 5,  $\chiωρίς ἐμοῦ οὐ δύνασθε ποιεῖν οὐδέν$ , *i. e.* separate from me,  $\dot{\epsilon}\grave{\alpha}\nu \muὴ μείνητε ἐν ἐμοί$ , v. 4, 6, (conf. John i. 3.) So Ephes. ii. 12,  $\dot{\eta}\tauε \chiωρίς Χριστοῦ$ , *i. e.* ye were far from Christ, as the context shews,

ἀπηλλοτριωμένοι τῆς πολιτείας τοῦ Ἰσραήλ. ἂνευ Χριστοῦ ἦτε, would be only, Christ was not present with you. And hence, therefore, οὐκ ἐλάλει χωρὶς παραβολῆς could not be changed into ἂνευ παραβολῆς, for this would refer it to the word παραβολῆς, when in fact χωρὶς applies more directly to the speaker; and ἂνευ παραβολῆς λαλεῖ, if indeed it could be said at all, would signify that he spoke without a parable being present. Nor is this opposed by Rom. x. 14, χωρὶς κηρύσσοντος. For though it might have been ἂνευ κηρύσσοντος, yet the whole formula required that which is written; πῶς δὲ ἀκούσουσι χωρὶς κηρύσσοντος, i. e. separated from him who teaches; for this appears to be the mind of the Apostle, rather than, if no teacher be present, as he is frequently interpreted. But ἀκούειν ἂνευ κηρύσσοντος would be—to hear alone, without a teacher.

Besides, unless I am altogether mistaken, an abundant proof of this distinction lies in the fact, that χωρὶς is not only used with a genitive, but by itself, absolutely, as an adverb; whilst ἂνευ invariably has as its adjunct the genitive of the thing assumed to be absent. For since χωρὶς is referred to the subject, and ἂνευ to the object, it is necessary that, to the particle ἂνευ, the object should be added; but χωρὶς expresses absolutely and alone the full idea of the rela-

tion to be noted; and therefore the introduction of the object is needless. So that we may say *χωρὶς εἶναι*, or *χωρὶς ποιεῖν τι*; but we cannot say *ἄνευ εἶναι*, and *ἄνευ ποιεῖν*; neither did the Greeks say *ἄνευ ποιεῖν*, but *ἄνευ τινὸς ποιεῖν τινα*, as in that passage of Plato, *τοὺς μέλλοντας ἔστιασθαι* *ἄνευ ὄφου ἀν πάνυ γενναίου ποιήσειν*. So in the New Testament, John xx. 7, *χωρὶς* is used simply and alone, but not *ἄνευ*.

But since it is to be feared that, in the interpretation of important passages of the New Testament, the notice of this distinction may be thought unnecessary, as though it were of no moment whether any one is noted as absent from a certain thing, or whether the thing is regarded as separated from him, we will adduce one example in those expressions so abundantly discussed,—viz. *χωρὶς νόμου*, and *χωρὶς ἔργων*, Rom. iii. 21, 28; iv. 6; vii. 8, 9; James ii. 20. Many have interpreted them as if Paul had said, that faith only is sufficient to a man's salvation, even though he lived wickedly; and, therefore, that man, although he do the works of the law, yet is accepted on account of faith alone; which idea is not only opposed to Paul's statement, but even to that of James, with which Luther was somewhat dissatisfied. For when Paul said, in Rom. ii. 13, *οἱ ποιηταὶ τοῦ*

νόμου δικαιωθήσονται, he could not, after a short interval, have said also, that man shall be justified, even though the works of the law are wanting. James, however, appears as if he were opposing that idea; for he writes οὐδὲ ἔργων δικαιοῦσθαι ἀνθερώπον καὶ οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως μόνον. But the accordance is complete if we only consider accurately the proper force of the two particles under discussion. If Paul had written, ἀνευ ἔργων, then his sentence would have contained the notion with which he is charged, and the argument of James would be in contradiction to him. For, if it is true that man is justified ἀνευ ἔργων, *i. e.* works being altogether wanting or absent, then it follows, that works are not needed; that they may be wanting with perfect safety; and that is false which Paul has affirmed, τοὺς ποιητὰς τοῦ νόμου δικαιοῦσθαι; and the assertion of James would be false also, τὴν πίστιν χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων νεκρὰν εἶναι. But it is written, χωρὶς ἔργων, that it may not be supposed that works may be altogether wanting to him who has faith, but that his justification is separate from his works, *i. e.* although he had not done the works. Therefore, as in the first instance (iii. 21,) it is rightly stated; νυνὶ δὲ χωρὶς νόμου δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ περιφανέρωται, viz. that the divine compassion is manifested separately from the law (as it were not

in connexion with the law, for by the law, which all have violated, is manifested not the δικαιοσύνη, but the wrath of God;) so also in another passage that Apostle has written, with equal correctness, δικαιοῦσθαι πίστει ἀνθρώπον, χωρὶς ἔργων νόμου; i. e. this δικαιοσύνη is altogether separated from the works of the law, and therefore applies itself to man, not because of the works of the law which he has done, (for he has not done them) but by faith. He does not say δικαιοῦσθαι ἀνθρώπον πίστει χωρὶς ἔργων, i. e. τῇ οὐκ ἔχούσῃ τὰ ἔργα, as James says; but δικαιοῦσθαι χωρὶς ἔργων πίστει, so that the δικαιοσύνη is shown not to be conjoined with the ἔργοι νόμου, (as if any one, because he had done certain works of the law had therefore attained the δικαιοσύνη;) but simply by faith, although hitherto he had been utterly destitute of works. Wherefore, it is said, with equal accuracy in the third passage (iv. 6.) ὃ ὁ Θεὸς λογίζεται δικαιοσύνην χωρὶς ἔργων, i. e. although he have been destitute of works, in fact, although he has sinned, yet he describes him as blessed: μακάριος ἀνὴρ ὃ οὐ μὴ λογίσηται κύριος αμαρτιῶν. On the contrary, James has spoken of faith, which, χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων, is dead; that is, καθ' εαυτὴν, ἐὰν μὴ ἔργα ἔχῃ. For πίστις χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων, is faith separate from works, ἡ οὐ συνηργοῦσα τοῖς ἔργοις, as Paul writes in Rom. vii. 8, 9, χωρὶς

νόμου ἀμαρτία νεκρά. ἐγὼ δὲ ἐζων χωρὶς νόμου ποτὲ. If it had been ἄνευ νόμου, both would have been false; for, νεκρά ἡ ἀμαρτία ἔστι, sin is dead, not because the law is not present, but because sin is without the law; neither is the law the cause of sin, for the law is holy. And he did not live ἄνευ νόμου, *i. e.* so that the law was not present, for the law was present, but he lived ignorant of the law. As ἄνευ νόμου ποιεῖν τι is to act contrary to law, so ζῆν ἄνευ νόμου is to live contrary to the law, or not to regard the law, to live as though there were no law. The Apostle says, that there was a time in which he lived unconstrained by the law, and in that time “sin was dead,” but when he understood the precepts of the law, οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, then the power of evil arose in him. Chrysostom erroneously supposes (and is followed, as usual, by Theophylact,) that this refers to a time in which the law was not present with him. Truly, therefore, Paul writes, ἐξ ἐργῶν νόμου οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σάρξ ἐρώπιον αὐτοῦ πάντες γὰρ ἦμαρτον, but περιφερεῖται νῦν χωρὶς νόμου δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ, not restricted by the law, without regard to the law; for if God had had respect to the law, he would not have given the δικαιοσύνη, he would have punished. Therefore, χωρὶς ἐργῶν νόμου δικαιοῦται ἀνθρώπος. But with equal truth James says,

$\tauὴν πίστιν χωρὶς ἔργων$ , i. e. free from works, is dead. For as all have come short of the glory of God, and therefore none  $\varepsilonἰς ἔργων δικαιοῦνται$ , shall be justified by works, but by faith; so also faith should  $συνεργεῖν τοῖς ἔργοις$ , and exhibit by acts its real and living energy. And this is the view of our church, as it is accurately shown by Melancthon in his *Apologia*.

And hence students should be admonished in the use of common and popular lexicons, not to suppose that particles of the same kind mean precisely the same thing, because they are often rendered in the lexicons by the same Latin word; for although

$οὐπω$  and  $μήπω$

are both rendered by *nondum*, yet undoubtedly they differ. For as  $οὐ$  and  $μή$  differ (on which point Hermann has written in his edition of Viger,) so also of necessity  $οὐπω$  and  $μήπω$  will differ; and so will their compounds  $οὐκέτι$ ,  $μη-$   
 $κέτι$ ,  $οὐδέποτε$ ,  $μηδέποτε$ , &c. Neither would we regard it as a mere accident, that in Matth. xxiv. 6, we have  $οὐπω$   $ἐστὶ τὸ τέλος$ , in John ii. 4,  $οὐπω$   $ἥκει ἡ ᾖρα μου$ , but in Rom. ix. 11,  $μήπω γὰρ$   $γεννηθέντων μηδὲ προξέντων τι ἀγαθὸν ἡ χακόν$ , and in Heb. ix. 8,  $μήπω πεφανερῶσθαι τὴν τῶν ἀγίων οἰδόν$ . In the two former passages, we have a negation of the presence of a future thing. In the

others, it is intimated, that one thing is done before that another thing is considered to be present, to which that appertains. If, therefore, (which could scarcely have been), it had been written *μήπω ἡκεὶ ἡ ὥρα μου*, it would have appeared uncertain whether that time would come, which many believed to be already present. But this was certain, that it would come, and it was beyond a doubt that the time was not yet come. The point denied, therefore, was, that the time was come. On the contrary, Paul could not have written *οὐπώ γὰς γεννήσεντων αὐτῶν ἐργάζεθη*. For he did not wish to intimate that such a thing was said, when the children were not born, as if they were born, but that it was said with a direct reference to their not being born; *μηδὲ πράξαντες τι ἀγαθὸν ἡ κακόν*. For the force of the argument lies in this, that in the decree of God all regard to fortuitous events is put out of the question. Wherefore if the Apostle had written *οὐπώ γεννήσεντων*, he would have said, that the children were not born when this was said, yet that God knew that they were about to be born, and to act well or ill; and therefore that God decreed concerning men yet not born, as though they were; which idea is foreign to the mind of the Apostle, and has given rise to many painful

discussions respecting the divine prescience. He wrote, therefore, *μήπω*, that the negation might be referred to the mind of God in the matter. There is a similar reason for the use of *μήπω* in the other passage, Heb. ix. 8. For it is not denied that the way was then opened; but it is said that the Spirit taught this; and therefore the negation is not to be referred to the matter itself which was absent, but to the thought, for the Spirit admonished men not to think that the way was opened. If he had written *οὐπω πεφανερώσθαι*, the notion of future time would have been introduced, as if the Spirit would teach that the *όδος τῶν ἀγίων* was not opened, but that it would be subsequently, which it is evident the Apostle did not mean. Besides, as *οὐ* negatives a thing simply, and *μὴ* as regarded in the thought, (Hermann ad Viger. p. 807.) so also *οὐπω* and *μήπω* differ in the same way. If I should say, *οὐπω τοῦτο*, speaking of any act, I deny that it is yet done, but I infer that it may be done hereafter; but if I say *μήπω* I not only regard it as not done, but I doubt, or at least I do not in any way imply, whether it shall yet be done at any time. I doubt, therefore, whether it could be said in the two passages formerly quoted; *μήπω ἐστὶ τὸ τέλος*, and *μήπω ἥκει ἡ ὥρα μου*, for by

the particle *μήπω* the thought of the event occurring subsequently is put away. And therefore in Xenoph. Memorab. iv. 4. 23, we find opposed to each other *τὰ ἀκμάζοντα*, *τὰ μήπω ἀκμάζοντα* and *τὰ παρηκμαχότα*. Xenophon did not write *τὰ οὕπω ἀκμάζοντα*, because the time of the future *ἀκμή* was not thought of, and therefore it occurs immediately afterwards, *τὰ τῶν μὴ ἀκμαζόντων οὐ σπουδαῖα*. But to proceed.

I have at different times observed, that the lexicographers get into error in the explanation of compound words; thinking that as the one common notion of the simple word exists in its compounds, therefore the compounds cannot differ between themselves. For although at times it may seem to matter little which compound word a writer makes use of in a particular place, yet it is often needful for us to consider what is the specific force of each.

*καταφρονεῖν*. *περιφρονεῖν*. (*ὑπερφρονεῖν*)

are either of them rendered, to despise, to contemn, and so far they agree, that each signifies contempt. But the contempt of others is twofold in the cause and the mode of it, either when we think less of others than they deserve, or more of ourselves than we ought. The former idea would be expressed by *καταφρονεῖν*, the lat-

ter by *περιφρονεῖν*. To this ὑπερφρονεῖν stands nearly related, as appears from a passage in Aristophanes, (Nubb. v. 226, 227.) where Socrates says, ἀεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν ἥγιον, Strepsiades would malignantly turn this, ἐπειτ' ἀπὸ ταξέρου τοὺς θεοὺς ὑπερφρονεῖς. For he had said *περιφρονεῖν*, which, as the Scholiast observes, διπλοσήμαντόν ἔστι, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ περισκοπῶ, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ ὑπερφρονῶ. Strepsiades suggests therefore the word *ὑπερφρονεῖς*, ἵνα διαβάλλῃ τὸν Σωκράτην ὑπερφρονοῦντα τῶν θεῶν, as another Scholiast notices. For he who *περιφρονεῖ*, *i. e.* studiously and ambitiously seeks divine things, runs the risk of thinking that he knows more than the Deity, *i. e.* ὑπερφρονεῖ. They therefore are said, ὑπερφρονεῖν who appear to themselves to be wiser and more prudent than others. If it is said simply, as in Rom. xii. 3, μὴ ὑπερφρονεῖν, παρὸ ὃ δεῖ φρονεῖν, it signifies to think more of oneself than is right; for the words παρὸ ὃ δεῖ φρονεῖν, explain the word ὑπερφρονεῖν, so that unless the consent of the various codices had confirmed the text, it might have been regarded as an explanatory gloss; for a few codices omit it. The contrary to this is *σωφρονεῖν*; whence Hesychius writes, *περιφρονεῖς· περισωφρονεῖς· ὑπερφρονεῖς*. In Titus therefore we find in c. ii. 15, ἐλεγχε αὐτοὺς μετὰ πάσης ἐπιταγῆς, μηδείς σου περιφρονείτω, “warn them most

seriously, with all authority, that no one think himself above the need of admonition." For if the admonition be only given *κατὰ συγγνώμην* (1 Cor. vii. 6,) it is to be feared lest the hearers should not regard it as applicable to them, and should treat it lightly. So also in Aeschines, *ἥδη περιφρονῶ τοῦ ζῆν*. For he is foolish who despises life. Neither was this the notion of Socrates; but he had learned from the instructions of this wonderfully wise man, *ὅτι, η̄ κάτω, η̄ ἄνω, εὐδαιμονεῖν δεῖ τὸν βεβιωκότα εὐσεβῶς*, and therefore he now feels himself to be superior, both to the pleasures of life and the fear of death, *ἄτε εἰς ἀμείνω οἶκον μεταστησόμενον*. But a little before he had said *καταφρονῆσαι ὑπερβαλλόντων θηξίων βίας*. But Paul writes to Timothy, 1 Tim. iv. 12, *μηδεὶς σου τῆς νεότητος καταφρονείτω*, let no man despise thy youth, but be thou an example. It were false to say that here *καταφρονεῖν* involves in it the having cause of contempt. The proper force of the word is evident in Matth. vi. 24, *η̄ ἐνός ἀνδέξεται, καὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου καταφρονεῖς*, he will disregard, neglect the other. So in Rom. ii. 4, *τῆς μακροδυμίας τοῦ Θεοῦ καταφρονεῖς*, despisest thou, not knowing that the goodness of God, &c. In 1 Timothy vi. 2, it is used in the same sense, *οἱ πιστοὺς ἔχοντας δεσπότας μὴ καταφρονείτωσιν, ὅτι ἀδελφοί εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δουλευέτωσιν*,

but elliptically, the object being omitted. Finally, when in Heb. xii. 2, Jesus is said, *αἰσχύνης καταφεοήσας*, it is manifest that the meaning is not that our Lord held himself above the force of contumely, but that he so disregarded or despised the shame, as that he was willing to endure the cross; which is the real force of the word.

Take another example of the words  
*ἀπαλλάσσειν*   *διαλλάσσειν*   *καταλλάσσειν*   *ἀποκαταλλάσσειν*.

These compounds of *ἀλλάσσειν*, which means strictly to change, (as it were, to do differently), either as to the thing itself, or the external condition and place of it, agree so far as this, that this original force of a change of state or mind exists in them all; but they differ as to the mode of thought, and are therefore properly accounted synonyms.

For *ἀπαλλάσσειν* properly is to remove, and *ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι ἀπό τίνος* is to set free from something; and therefore, in Heb. ii. 15, it is said of one who, by a certain cause, is delivered and absolved, whether by a friendly paction or a judicial sentence; and more especially of the creditor or the accuser who dismisses the debtor or the guilty. So, Luke xii. 58, *ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ δὸς ἐγγασίαν ἀπηλλάχθαι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ*, which is usually

rendered “ Give diligence, that thou mayst be delivered from him, lest he should take thee to the judge.” It differs from ἀφείναι; Demosthenes pro Phorm. (p. 952, Reisk.) καὶ ὅσα τις ἀφῆκεν ή ἀπήλλαξεν et adv. Pantaen. (p. 966.) περὶ ὃν ἀν τις ἀφεῖς καὶ ἀπαλλάξας δικάζεται (vid. vv. dd. ad Harpocrat. v. ἀφεῖς). It is worthy of notice also, that ἀπαλλάσσειν is said not only of the creditor who sets free the debtor, but of the debtor who satisfies his creditor; which has been shown in many instances by Raphelius and Elsner<sup>k</sup> on the above passage, and in Dresigius de verbis mediis, p. 180. In this case, therefore, ἀπαλλάσσειν must be understood of the debtor who, before he reaches the judge, would endeavour any how to satisfy his creditor, that he may let him go, and rather to sacrifice something than to stand a trial. And I rather agree with those who do not consider δὸς ἐργασίαν a Latinism, *da operam*, (in which sense I never met with the word), but

\* Elsner, on this passage, says, “ Beza has rendered this incorrectly, *ut libereris ab eo*, when its real force is, that thou mayst depart from him,” referring to Acts xix. 12, ἀστε ἀπαλλασσοθαι ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τὰς νόσους; or rather, “ that you may be released by him, as appeased;” and quotes, in support of this, Aristoph. Nubib. 1194.

παρόντες οἱ φεύγοντες ἡμέρα μιᾶ

πρότερον, ἀπαλλάττοινθ' ἔκοντες.—T.

that it refers to the sum or compensation given to appease the creditor. The same idea exists in the parallel passage Matth. v. 25, *ἵθι εὑνοῶν τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ σου*. These words are rightly explained by Zonaras, (p. 920, and Phavorinus), from an old commentator, *καταδέχου μᾶλλον αδικεῖσθαι*; and hence it appears, that the word *ἀπαλλάττειν* does not involve in it properly the notion of reconciling or appeasing, unless it flows from the thought that he who is sent away satisfied is appeased. But this idea will appear more plainly in the words

*διαλλάττειν* and *καταλλάττειν*.

They, however, differ; for *διαλλάττειν* is said of many, *καταλλάττειν* of one. The former is to cause a mutual enmity to cease, as in Xenophon, *διαλλάττειν τὰς πολεμοῦσας πρὸς ἄλλήλους πόλεις*. So it occurs once in the New Testament, Matth. v. 24, *διαλλάγητι τῷ ἀδελφῷ σου*. It does not mean here, see that he be reconciled to thee, but, see that ye be reconciled to each other. It is not sufficient that he should be no longer angry, but that both parties should be on good terms. And hence, *διαλλακτής* is one who reconciles hostile parties. (See Hemssterhusius ad Thom. Mag. v. *διηλλάγη*.) Whilst *καταλλάττειν* is strictly, so to act as that the opposite party may lay aside his enmity. Ac-

curacy, therefore, required in the above passage of Matthew, διαλλάγητι, not καταλλάγητι; for the latter refers but to one party; the other to both. Neither is this contradicted by a passage in Thucydides (iv. 59.), where the Scholiast says, τὸ δὲ καταλλαγῆται τὸ διαλλαγῆται. For he does not say this without addition, and simply; but περὶ ἀλλήλους καταλλαγῆται, which is in fact διαλλαγῆται. Hence, καταλλαγὴ, properly in the singular, is not a mutual reconciliation, but the conciliating of one party. Nor does Aristophanes, Avibus, v. 1597, appear to us to have written rashly, περὶ πολέμου καταλλαγῆς, and not, as the Grammarians would have it, καταλλαγῶν. For πόλεμος is taken collectively, as the one enmity of those parties warring, on the subsiding of which the war ceases, and διαλλάττονται οἱ πολεμοῦντες. Certainly he could not have written περὶ πολέμου διαλλαγῶν, as it occurs in v. 1539, and v. 1584. So, in Romans xi. 15, the ἡ ἀποβολὴ τῶν Ἰουδαίων is said to be καταλλαγὴ κόσμου, the putting away of the Jews is the means of reconciliation to others; not that it is the cause of the union of Jews and Gentiles in the Christian community; for this would be unmeaning in itself, and foreign to the mind of the Apostle. Neither, in two other passages, Rom. v. 11, and 2 Cor. v. 18,

19, does *καταλλαγὴ* mean the remission of sins, as if God were appeased, and a mutual reconciliation takes place between God and man. In the former passage, undoubtedly, *καταλλαγὴ* means the actual reconciliation of men by the death of Christ; for we being enemies *κατηλλάγημεν*; and not that God *κατηλλάγη τῷ κοσμῷ*. In the other passage, the *διακονία τῆς καταλλαγῆς* is not the office of teaching the doctrine of the remission of sins, *i. e.* of the expiation; but it is the office itself, as exercised by the Apostle, of advising, exhorting, beseeching men, *καταλλάγητε τῷ Θεῷ*, *i. e.* the office of effecting the *καταλλαγὴ*. For it is not that God was the enemy of men; (John iii. 16,) nor was the object to be effected his reconciliation; but that men being *ἐχθροὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, should return into favour with God; *i. e.* since by sin they are become adverse to the divine sanctity, and possess a carnal mind inimical to God, (Rom. viii. 7, *τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς ἐχθρὸν εἰς Θεόν*,) and, therefore, have reason to fear his holy authority, (as it becomes those to do who have not been obedient to the law, and know that they cannot please God,) they may now return to favour with God; that, as is well expressed by Morus, they should not only cease to fear for themselves respecting God, but that they should cease from their resistance to his autho-

riety. We know how much it has obscured the doctrines of the Gospel, that interpreters have not distinguished with sufficient accuracy the words of sacred Scripture; but it is most abundantly shown, by means of this very word, how necessary it is to observe the strict and proper force of all words. We should be careful also not to confound *ἱλασσειν* and *καταλλάττειν*. *ἱλασμός* is the cause for the which men may and ought *καταλλαγῆναι τῷ Θεῷ*. Neither is Christ called ὁ *καταλλάσσων*, as *διαλλάσσων* God and man; the word is applied to God himself, for truly it was God who was ἐν *χριστῷ κόσμον καταλλάσσων ἐαυτῷ*, μὴ λογιζόμενος αὐτοῖς τὰ παραπτώματα αὐτῶν. Wherefore, we must not suppose that these words are said ἀνθρωποπαθῶς; for nothing can be said more truly worthy of the holiness and wisdom of the Almighty, than that which is contained in them; except we rashly mix up with them the unfounded notion of an appeasing of the divine anger.

But as the force of *καταλλάσσειν*, inasmuch as it differs from *διαλλάσσειν*, may be abundantly gathered from these passages of the New Testament, so also may it be traced in other Greek writers. So in the Cyrop. vi. 6, 2, Orontes is said *καταλλαγεῖς Κύρῳ*. Formerly he had made war on Cyrus, but now he dissembled with

him, ἐπιβουλεύει Κύρῳ, and professed friendship. Cyrus, however, having discovered his deceit, complained of him, and δεξιὰν ἔλαβον καὶ ἐδωκα. Josephus Ant. Iud. vi. 7, 4, παρακαλεῖν ἤρξατο τὸν Θεὸν, καταλλάγτεσθαι τῷ Σαύλῳ καὶ μὴ χαλεπαίνειν. vii. 8, 4, τῷ σαυτοῦ παιδὶ καταλλάγηδι καὶ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁργὴν ἄφει· opp. ἀπέχθεσθαι τῷ παιδί. And in Book iii. 15, 2, he says, that the Jews entreated Moses that he would be καταλλακτής αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, but that Moses refused, because God was not rashly, but deservedly angry with them. In Demosthenes we read, p. 189, 16, ed. Reisk. τοὺς Ἐλληνας ὡρῶν δεομένους διαλλακτοῦ, i. e. who would conciliate the offended. Euripid. Iph. in Aul. v. 1157, οὐ σοι καταλλαχθεῖσα περὶ σὲ καὶ δόμους. conf. Helen. v. 1251. And in Sophocles, Ajac. v. 744, Θεοῖσιν ὡς καταλλάχθη χόλου. Schol. ὅπως τὴν ἔχθραν ἀπόθηται. This is said of Ajax, who, through his insanity, was offended with the gods. Further examples are needless.

We have only now to notice ἀποκαταλλάττειν, which only occurs twice in the New Testament, Ephes. ii. 16, καὶ ἀποκαταλλάξῃ τοὺς ἀμφοτέρους ἐν ἐνὶ σώματι τῷ Θεῷ. and Coloss. i. 20, καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ ἀποκαταλλάξαι τὰ πάντα εἰς αὐτὸν. The meaning in the former passage is explained by the Apostle himself in v. 15, ὁ ποιήσας τὰ ἀμφότερα

ἢ; in the latter by *εἰρηνοποιήσας*, in both there is the same notion which we know to be the proper meaning of *καταλλάττειν*. For the notion of mutual alienation exists not so much in the word itself, as in the whole formula, as may be gathered from v. 22. But then in the word *ἀποκαταλλάττειν*, there seems a greater force than in *καταλλάττειν*; for *καταλλαγέντες*, are they who return into favour with any one; but *ἀποκαταλλαγέντες*, are they, who so lay aside their enmity that amity follows; nor does any impediment remain to their living accordantly ἐν ἑνὶ σώματι, the one head of which is Christ, Eph. i. 10, *ἀνανεφαλαιώσασθαι τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ*. For though in words compounded of two or more prepositions we must not expect to find proportional emphasis,<sup>1</sup> yet care must be

<sup>1</sup> That is emphasis, says Quintillian, ix. 2, where more is signified than is said; or as he says elsewhere, viii. 3, the existence of a deeper thought, than that which words seem to express. Ernesti states more correctly, (See Bibl. Cabinet, vol. i. p. 52.) "that emphasis is an accession to the accustomed meaning of the word; and he adds, in the next section, that no word is emphatic in itself; for every word has a certain definite meaning, and conveys a precise idea in which there can be no emphasis." And therefore emphasis, or additional force, must not be looked for, unless we gather from the mind of the speaker, that some additional force is intended to be added to the customary force of the word, or that the writer evidently meant more than the

taken, not to assume rashly that words of this kind mean only and precisely the same thing. The preposition *ἀπό* has this force, that if it be added to a compound verb, it increases its power, and indicates that the thing intended by that word is done altogether absolutely, or in a greater degree. So *ἀπεκδέχεσθαι* is to expect constantly, not only for a certain time, but even to the end, till the expected event happens, Rom. viii. 19; 1 Cor. i. 7. The same remark will apply to *ἀπομαραδοκεῖν*, which Fischer labours to show (de Vit. Lex. N. T. p. 128.) does not differ from the simple word *μαραδοκεῖν*. We grant indeed, that emphasis must not be looked for, and that both words may be rendered by the same Latin word, *expectare*; but we deny that the force and meaning of both words is precisely the same, or that

word which he has used conveys. Therefore in comparing such words as *μαραδοκεῖν*, *ἀπομαραδοκεῖν*, *ἐκδέχεσθαι*, *ἀπεκδέχεσθαι*, *δρίζειν*, *προορίζειν*, *γινώσκειν*, *προγινώσκειν*, we are not to expect emphasis arising from the compound, but to inquire whether the compound really in itself means more than the uncompounded word. But the whole figment about emphasis, has arisen from the misunderstanding of compound words, as I have shown in my dissertation on the force of prepositions in compound words in the New Testament. Emphasis is not in a word, because it means more by itself than another word, but because he who uses it means more by it, than the word itself would convey.

Polybius, sometimes writing ἀποκαραδοκεῖν, whilst in many other places he writes καραδοκεῖν, had no design in dropping the preposition. Certainly in those places which are adduced, it appears manifest that ἀποκαραδοκεῖν, is said of a man who expects an event, (as we say, *abwarten.*) So on that passage, in Zonaras and Suidas, the word ἀποκαραδοκία, which is attributed to Polybius, ὁ δὲ καθῆστο ἐν τῇ παρεμβολῇ, ἀποκαραδοκῶν, ὅποι καὶ τύχης χωρῆσοι τὰ πράγματα. And in Excerpt. de Legat. s. n. 9. (p. 23. ed. Ursin.) συνεβούλευον αὐτῷ, πρεσβευτὰς πέμπειν εἰς τὴν Ἀρμην ὑπὲρ συμμαχίας, ἵνα μὴ δοκῇ τοῖς καιροῖς ἐνεδρεύων ἀποκαραδοκεῖν τὴν Ἀντιόχου παρουσίαν and again (n. 32. p. 65.): ἀπεκαραδόκει τούς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἐπὶ τίνος ἔσονται γνώμης. In which passages, the notion here stated is very evident. Also in Polyb. xvi. 1, ἀπεκαραδόκει τὸν κίνδυνον. (conf. Joseph. B. i. iii. 7, 26.)

But καραδοκεῖν, which is properly to stretch forth the head, *i. e.* to direct the eyes to any thing, (as in Aristoph. Equit. v. 660, ἐκαραδόκησεν εἰς ἐμ' ἡ βουλὴ πάλιν. Schol. ἀπέβλεψεν) means by itself, according to my opinion, to observe diligently what may be done or may happen, and thence, to expect. And therefore, Hesychius says, καραδοκεῖ προσδοκεῖ, ἐκδέχεται, ἡ ἐπιτηρεῖ τὸ κεφάλαιον τοῦ πράγματος. And in this, Zonaras

the Etymol. Mag., Suidas, and Timaeus agree. Whence also, *διακαραδοκεῖν*, which word Toup. restores for the word *καραδοκεῖ* in Suidas, (See Emendat. in Suidam, p. ii. p. 310.) *τὴν νύκταν ἐκείνην διεκαραδοκήσαμεν*, that is, we passed the whole night through expecting.

In this sense, *καραδοκεῖν* is used by Polybius and others, but all will see that it is scarcely possible, but that in thought we shall subjoin the additional notion, which I have said to be peculiar to *ἀποκαραδοκεῖν*, viz. the expectation of the event, or happening, of a certain thing; for he who is interested in that which may happen, diligently watches all that is done, and does not expect in the sense in which the word *προσδοκεῖν* would be used, *i. e.* to await the event, as we say, *erwarten*; but in the sense of observing, that he may consider what he should do, if the event occurs either the one way or the other. It is used simply by Philo. (vita Mos. p. 604. ed. Paris.) speaking of the sister of Moses, *μικρόν ἀποθεν ἐκαραδόκει τὸ ἀποβησόμενον*, which Clemens Alex. expresses by *ἐπετήρει τὸ ἀποβησόμενον*. (vid. Diodor. Sic. xix. 16, Xenoph. Mem. iii. 5, 6.) In Herodotus vii. 168, we find, *καραδοκέοντες τὸν πόλεμον ἡ ποσέεται*. See Valckenar. who affirms that Diodorus Sic. speaking of the same thing, has written *καραδοκοῦντες*

τὰς τοῦ πολέμου ἁπάντας. That προσδοκεῖν and χαραδοκεῖν differ, will appear from Euripides, Rhes. v. 144. σάλπιγγος αὐδὴν προσδοκῶν χαραδόκει.

The word ἀποκαραδοκία occurs twice in the New Testament; in Philipp. i. 20, χατὰ τὴν ἀποκαραδοκίαν καὶ ἐλπίδα μου, and Romans viii. 19, ἡ ἀποκαραδοκία τῆς κτίσεως. In both places, the notion exists of an expected event. In the former passage, the Apostle said, however ill things went, yet he would be of good courage, because he knew ὅτι τοῦτο αὐτῷ ἀποβήσεται εἰς σωτηρίαν; and he calls this anticipated prosperous issue ἀποκαραδοκία καὶ ἐλπίς. And in the latter passage, the word could not properly be understood in the force of προσδοκία, or simple expectation. It would be sadly tame if it were so rendered, ἡ ἀποκαραδοκία τῆς κτίσεως τὴν ἀποκάλυψιν τῶν νιῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀπεκδέχεται, viz. the expectation of the creature (τῆς κτίσεως) expects. It is rather the solicitous and anxious regard to, and desire of, the probable issue in afflictive circumstances, which looks for the ἀποκάλυψις. Luther renders it well: *das ängstliche Harren.* But students should be warned not to allow themselves to imagine, that in the explanations of words given by the old lexicographers, all the words which they thus put down together have the same force and meaning; for

they frequently use synonymous terms<sup>m</sup> to explain an obscure word. Fischer is wrong in this respect when he endeavours to show that *καρδονία* and *ἀποκαρδονία* do not differ. He brings forward the authority of Hesychius, who says, that *ἀποκαρδονία* is *προσδοκία*. But, to return to the word *ἀποκαταλλάττειν*. In this passage is recorded that great and extensive conversion of the state of things on earth which God has decreed to effect by Christ, that all men, freed from pride, covetousness, and the love of foolish vanities, and at length reconciled to God, *καταλλαγέντες τῷ Θεῷ*, encouraged by one hope, and seeking eternal life through one Saviour, should unite in one society or communion, *ἐν ἐνὶ σώματι*, of which the Lord himself is the head, *ὅς παρεδόθη διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν καὶ ἡγέρθη διὰ τὴν δικαιώσιν ἡμῶν*. And if we do not yet see all nations, nor all professing Christians, realizing this wondrous benefit and blessing, though we do perceive *πᾶσαν τὴν κτίσιν συστενάζειν καὶ συνωδίνειν ἄχρι τοῦ νῦν*, let us cleave more earnestly to the *ἀποκαρδονία καὶ ἐλπίς* of the Apostle; and while not unduly confident of our own state, but certainly not despairing of a prosperous issue in

<sup>m</sup> That is, in the strict sense of the word synonym, as used by Titmann; words ranging together under a common genus, but having each a specific difference.—T.

eternal felicity, ἀπεκδεχώμεδα τὴν οἰδεσίαν, τὴν ἀποκάλυψιν τῶν οἰῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ. Εἰ γὰρ ἔχθροι ὅντες κατηλλάγημεν τῷ Θεῷ, διὰ τοῦ Θανάτου τοῦ οἰου αὐτοῦ, πόλλω μᾶλλον καταλλαγέντες σωθησόμεδα ἐν τῇ ζωῇ αὐτοῦ. For hereafter, πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις ἀπαλλαγήσεται τῆς ματαιότητος by him, by means of whom God has decreed ἀποκαταλλάξαι τὰ πάντα εἰς αὐτόν.

## CHAPTER VIII.

SUCH is the abundance of words in the Greek language, which may be accounted synonymous, that the further I proceed in these investigations, I see less reason to hope that I shall bring them to a close. For while my advancing years admonish me, the work grows on my hand; and the limits of such a work seem inadequate to include the many subjects before me. I would not, however, willingly fail those who have not been altogether dissatisfied with my labours, and therefore as yet I proceed in explaining the **synonyms of the New Testament.**

I would speak, therefore, now of those **synonyms** which are of frequent occurrence, but to which much difficulty attaches, because the difference existing between them is so frequently lost sight of in common use, that it may be doubted whether even the more elegant Greek writers have always correctly observed it. I speak of those words which relate to the **senses**, and to things applicable to the **senses**, such as words of **hearing**, **seeing**, **feeling**, and others;

which, when they are transferred to express the acts of mind, assume a very varied force and character. It occurs in all languages, that the notions of things which pertain to the mind and its various offices, must be expressed by words which have their origin in the several powers of the external senses. But since in all perceptions there is a triple mode of perception, either of the object perceived, or of the subject affected, or of the thought which arises from the relation of both, it follows that words drawn from the powers of the senses, when transferred to the mind, or from the relation of external things, may be used in all the various modes in which the mind is thus moved or affected; although all these several modes may be found conjoined in the same perception. Whence, it may arise, that words of this kind may appear to be capable of a promiscuous use, with no other object in view from their interchange except a certain gratification of elegant taste. So when Socrates, in Xenophon's Memorab. i. 4, 17, is related to have said, *τὸ σὸν μὲν ὄμμα δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια ἐξινεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁφθαλμὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὄμμα κάντα ὡρᾶν* there are few but would think that the difference between *ὄμμα* and *οφθαλμόν* was such only, that it might have been written

ὤμηα θεοῦ and ὁφθαλμὸν ἀνθρώπου; yet I am quite convinced that Xenophon did not in this instance avoid as a matter of mere elegance the repetition of the same word, but that the use of each was justified by its own peculiar force and meaning. ὁφθαλμός may be applied to the deity, but ὤμηα can only be applied with propriety to men. But let us notice other examples.

βλέπειν· ὄραν· οἶδεν· ὅπτεσθαι· θεᾶσθαι· (θεωρεῖν.)

Since the eyes are not only “the light of the body,” but the sedulous ministers and satellites of the mind also, it is not surprising that the Greeks should have so many words, which relate properly to the use of the eyes. And the German language also, like the Greek, abounds in words which express the widely extensive functions of the eyes. Of those which occur in the New Testament, we may consider their several relation to, and difference from each other.

βλέπειν is a word of wide extent. It is simply, to use the eyes, to see. He who has sight, βλέπει. It is used of those who recover sight, Luke vii. 21; Matth. xv. 31; John ix. 7. And often in the New Testament, τὰ βλεπόμενα are, the things seen by the eyes (ἴσατα are the things which may be seen). Hence

in Matth. v. 28, is simply to see or look at a woman, without reference to passion. That idea is expressed subsequently, *πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι αὐτῆς*. They who turn their eyes to any thing to look on it are said, *εἰς τὸ βλέπειν*; as in Luke ix. 62, *οὐδεὶς ἐπιβαλὼν τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ ἐπ’ ἀροτροῦ, καὶ βλέπων εἰς τὰ ὄπιστα, εὑθετός ἐστιν εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ Θεοῦ*, which passage is generally, but improperly rendered, “He who puts his hand to the plough, and *then turns back*.” For they say, *βλέπειν εἰς τὰ ὄπιστα* is to revert, to rush back; and they appeal to the Hebrew, in which words of seeing are sometimes used for journeying, as in Genesis xix. 26, where the word **בָּנָה**, and she looked back, is to be understood of the actual return, not only from its own force, but because of the explanation afforded by Luke xvii. 32. But though it is probable that the wife of Lot not only looked back, but returned, and in that return was suffocated; yet it does not follow from this, that *βλέπειν εἰς τὰ ὄπιστα* signifies to return, or that *βλέπειν* signifies, to journey; than which a more complete *non sequitur* could scarcely be found. In fact, the notion of return is neither required here, nor can it be admitted. For first, they have to insert the notion of the particular time, *and then*, which is not found in

the sentence; the composition of which requires that the time should be the same in which the man puts his hand to the plough and looks back. Besides, the person to which this relates, had asked permission, before he followed Christ, to bid his friends farewell, which would require him then actually to return home, whilst, at the same time, there existed in his mind the real intention of returning to follow the Lord Jesus, as others, v. 59, 60. It is not, therefore, the inconstancy and vacillation of the man that is thus reproved; for he had said without hesitation, “ Lord, I will follow thee ;” but that heavy and sensual mind, which even in such a crisis prevented the forgetfulness of external things, and by which the desire for the kingdom of God is repressed and deteriorated. Our Lord could not mean that this young man had *already begun the work*, which they affirm to be the meaning of  $\delta\epsilon\pi\beta\alpha\lambda\omega\tau\eta\gamma$   $\chi\epsilon\tilde{\eta}\alpha\alpha\tilde{\nu}\tau\omega\delta\pi'\tilde{\alpha}\gamma\sigma\tau\gamma\omega$ , and then wished to leave it as unwilling to return. Neither of these ideas agree with the account of this well-disposed youth ; for he had not yet put his hand to the plough. And he was evidently wishing to return to the Lord Jesus, that he might follow him altogether. To me it appears, that Christ used the image merely of a labourer, who with

his hand actually on the plough, looks back, and therefore moves not onward with alacrity, but pauses in his course. The meaning of the passage would seem to be, That man is not fit for the kingdom of God, who hangs back and still hankers after those things, which he is bound to leave resolutely behind him. For  $\beta\lambda\acute{e}peiv$   $\varepsilon i\varsigma$   $\tau i$ , properly means nothing more than turning the eyes to an object: as Xenophon. Anabas. iv. 1. 15,  $\beta\lambda\acute{e}ψov$   $\varepsilon i\varsigma$   $\tau\grave{a}$   $\ddot{\nu}\eta$ ,  $\chiai$   $\ddot{\nu}\nu$   $\dot{\omega}\varsigma$   $\ddot{\alpha}\beta\alpha\tau\alpha$   $\pi\acute{a}ντ\alpha$   $\dot{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{i}$ . It, however, means sometimes to observe accurately with desire; as Matth. xxii. 16, and Mark xii. 14,  $\dot{\omega}$   $\beta\lambda\acute{e}peis$   $\varepsilon i\varsigma$   $\pi\acute{e}ρσωπov$   $\dot{\alpha}\nu\ddot{\nu}\zeta\acute{w}\pi\omega\gamma$ . See concerning this formula vv. dd. ad Lucian. i. M. D. p. 378. In the same way it may be transferred to the mind. But it is sufficient to keep by the proper notion of the word, which corresponds with the German, *sehen*. Nor is it strange that  $\beta\lambda\acute{e}peiv$ , although it is used for the actual sense of seeing, should not only be applied to things which do not see nor perceive the things placed before them, as in Acts xxvii. 12; but is also affirmed of things to be perceived by other senses. Yet it cannot be said, that  $\beta\lambda\acute{e}peiv$  is, to hear. For in the passage  $\beta\lambda\acute{e}ψoντας$   $\chi\omega\phi\grave{u}\varsigma$   $\lambda\alpha\lambdao\tilde{u}nτa\varsigma$ , we must not render it, *hearing* the dumb to speak, for then it would have been

written  $\lambda\alpha\lambda\varepsilon\tilde{\eta}\nu$ ; but it is properly *seeing*, for the word  $\beta\lambda\acute{e}p\acute{o}n\tau\alpha\varsigma$  belongs not only to  $\chi\omega\phi\acute{o}\varsigma$ , but to  $\chi\omega\lambda\lambda\phi\acute{o}\varsigma$  and the other words in the sentence. Men may quote, Apoc. i. 12,  $\acute{e}\pi\acute{e}s\tau\phi\acute{e}\varphi\alpha\beta\lambda\acute{e}p\acute{e}i\nu\tau\eta\nu\varphi\omega\eta\nu\,\eta\,\tau\iota\varsigma\acute{e}\lambda\acute{a}l\eta\omega\mu\acute{e}\tau'\acute{e}\mu\acute{o}\bar{\eta}$ . But even here,  $\beta\lambda\acute{e}p\acute{e}i\nu$  is not *to hear*. It were needless to say: “He turned to hear the voice,” for he had heard it; but he turned that he might ascertain from whence the voice came. Equally wide of the mark are the passages adduced from Greek writers. For in these the words  $\acute{e}\pi\acute{e}s\tau\phi\acute{e}\varphi\alpha$  and  $\acute{e}\pi\acute{e}\varphi\alpha$ , do not mean to hear; but to perceive mentally whether by seeing or hearing, as in Aeschylus. (Prom. vinc. v. 21.)  $\acute{i}\nu'\,o\acute{u}\tau\phi\omega\eta\nu$ ,  $o\acute{u}\tau\phi\tau\iota\mu\acute{o}\phi\eta\nu\acute{e}\psi\iota$  (conf. Sophoc. Trach. v. 365.

That  $\beta\lambda\acute{e}p\acute{e}i\nu$  only denotes the act of seeing, without any thought of the object presented to the sight, will appear also from the fact that  $\beta\lambda\acute{e}mu\alpha$  does not signify the thing seen, as  $\acute{e}\pi\acute{e}\varphi\alpha$ , but the eye, or the aspect in which we see. And hence, finally, we arrive at the explanation of that formula, which occurs twice in the New Testament,  $\beta\lambda\acute{e}p\acute{e}i\nu\acute{a}\pi\acute{o}\tau\iota\nu\varsigma$ . There it is said, that  $\beta\lambda\acute{e}p\acute{e}i\nu$  is to beware; but, at the outset, they rashly confound this formula with another,  $\beta\lambda\acute{e}p\acute{e}\mu\acute{h}\iota$ , from which it widely differs. But, besides this, it is impossible to make out

that  $\beta\lambda\acute{e}peiv\ \grave{a}p\acute{o}\ tiv\acute{o}s$  means to beware for oneself; for he who wishes to beware of any thing does not turn his eyes from it, (as they say the swallow does), but steadily looks at the object to be avoided;  $\beta\lambda\acute{e}peiv\ \mu\grave{n}\ p\acute{a}s\chi\grave{h}\ t\acute{i}$ . But as  $\beta\lambda\acute{e}peiv\ s\acute{i}s\ t\acute{i}$  is to turn the eyes to a thing, so  $\beta\lambda\acute{e}peiv\ \grave{a}p\acute{o}\ tiv\acute{o}s$  is to turn away the eyes, as flying from it. In this formula, therefore, the idea is rather to avoid, and to fly from, than to beware of; and this is evident in Mark viii. 15,  $\grave{o}\rho\grave{a}te, \beta\lambda\acute{e}pete\ \grave{a}p\grave{o}\ t\grave{h}\acute{s}\ \zeta\acute{u}m\acute{h}s\ t\grave{a}n\ \varphi\acute{a}gi\grave{s}ai\acute{w}n$ , *i. e.* beware of them, fly from them. Surely he would not twice say, beware; but he wished his disciples not to follow the hollow professions of these men, as xii. 38. And Matth. xvi. 6,  $\grave{o}\rho\grave{a}te, \pi\acute{r}o\acute{s}\acute{e}χe\grave{t}e\ \grave{a}p\grave{o}\ t\grave{h}\acute{s}\ \zeta\acute{u}m\acute{h}s\ t\acute{o}\ \varphi.$  But, in fact, these pages would not contain the examples, if we are to show how frequently all such formulae are confounded together in our lexicons.

The word  $\grave{o}\rho\grave{a}n$  differs from  $\beta\lambda\acute{e}peiv$  in this, that although it means to see, yet it is referred to the thing seen, or presented to the eye.  $\beta\lambda\acute{e}peiv$  is said of one who uses his eyes, even though he sees nothing; ( $\beta\lambda\acute{e}pete\acute{s}\ \grave{o}\grave{n}\ \beta\lambda\acute{e}peou\acute{s}i$ ;)  $\grave{o}\xi\grave{a}$ , of one who sees something. Hence  $\grave{o}\xi\grave{a}ma$  is that which is seen,  $\grave{o}\xi\grave{a}si\acute{s}$  the species or form of the thing which falls on the eye,  $\grave{o}\xi\grave{a}t\acute{o}n$ , that which

it submitted to sight, which is visible. And *ἴσταν* is never used absolutely, but as associated with the thought of that which is looked at. But as it becomes him who would avoid error or deception, diligently to circumspect and to observe all things, we may comprehend how these expressions, *ἴρα*, *ἴρατε*, *ἴρατε μὴ* signify, take care, see that, beware lest. And in this way we explain Heb. viii. 5, *ἴρα ποιήσῃς*. Moses is warned to observe accurately the intended building, that it may be made according to the pattern. But when we say *ἴρατε*, *ἴρατε μὴ*, we require those who are about to do any thing, to examine in the first place cautiously, lest they do that which they ought not to do. And although in both forms, *ἴρατε μὴ* and *βλέπετε μὴ*, the notion of being ware, exists; yet they differ. For as *βλέπετε*, without a negation, signifies only, use your eyes, that you may see correctly, as in 1 Cor. x. 18, Philip. iii. 2, so *ἴρατε* has this force, that we command the eyes or the mind to turn to the object. It is said, therefore, correctly in Acts xxii. 26, *ἴρα τί μέλλεις ποιεῖν*. And *βλέπε* could not have been used, for the centurion is admonished that he may look at what he is about to do, lest he command a Roman citizen to be scourged. On the contrary, in Mark iv. 24,

it is *βλέπετε τί ἀκούετε*, for which in Luke viii. 18, we have *βλέπετε πῶς ἀκούετε*, as in Ephes. v. 15, *βλέπετε πῶς ἀκοιβῶς περιπατεῖτε*. For in all these passages the proper force of the word is referred to the mind, and therefore *βλέπειν* may be joined with *ἀκούειν*; but it could not have been, *ἴρατε τί ἀκούετε*; for *ἴραν* is always referred to the object seen, and no good writer would have used it otherwise. And as there is in the word *ἴραν* this force, which we call objective, hence it arises that it is joined with those prepositions only, by which the thought is referred to the object seen. For in the compound word *ἀφορᾶν* there is a twofold force in the preposition; one, by which the force of the word is removed, so that it signifies, to look away, as in Cyrop. vii. 1. 36, *παίουσιν ἀφορῶντας*, for they smote the backs of the Egyptians; another which intimates that the thing itself is removed from the subject to which the word refers. So Herodot. viii. 37, *ἀπώζεον τὸ ἴρον*. For it was to the Delphi, and not to the temple, that the barbarians had approached, as the sequel shows. Although, therefore, it is allowable to say *βλέπειν ἀπό τινος*, yet it would be absurd to say *ἴραν ἀπό τινος*. And if any one says that, in the interpretation of the New Testament, such subtleties are unnecessary, I would have him

to consider why he would himself feel it improper to say, *βλέπειν τὸν Θεόν*, *βλέπειν τὸν πατέρα*, speaking of the Deity, or *βλέπειν ἑαυτόν*, (*βλέπειν εἰς αὐτόν* is a different matter,) or why the Greeks speaking of the situation of a region, &c., always use *βλέπειν* and never *ἴραν*.

We come next to consider *ἰδεῖν*, which so far differs from *ἴραν*, that it must be referred rather to the mind of him who sees; so that as *ἴραν* regards the object, *ἰδεῖν* should be referred in thought to the subject. No accurate observer will deny that this is the force of the word. For what other reason is there why the word *ἰδεῖν* does not occur even among the most ancient writers in the present, whether it is used to denote seeing or knowing, except it be that there exists in it properly the notion of a thing past, from which that very thing arises, which is now thought to be, *i. e.* the having seen or known something; and therefore now to know it and to have it ascertained; whence it follows that *ἰδα*, *ἰδού*, *ἰδὼν*, have the notion of time present. Nor do I fear the adduction of some passages in Homer, in which the present time is read. For in these the word either has a future sense, as Iliad. 9, v. 18, *ἴνα εἴδετε πάντες*. σ., v. 53, *πλύτε -- ὄφρα εὖ πᾶσαι Εἴδετ' ἀκούουσαι*. Odyss. 1, v. 17, *ὄφρα καὶ ὑμεῖς Εἴδετ'*; or a passive

sense, in which the idea is not that any one has seen a certain thing, but that this thing appeared to him, that it was seen, as Iliad. *a*, v. 228. *τὸ δέ τοι κῆρε εἴδεται εἶναι*, *Ω*, v. 559. *πάντα δέ τ' εἴδεται ἄστρα*. *ν*, v. 98. *νῦν δὴ εἴδεται ἡμαρ. ξ*, v. 472. *οὐ μέν μοι κακὸς εἴδεται*. *ω*, v. 197. *τί τοι φρεσὶν εἴδεται εἶναι*. Hence also, *εἶδος* denotes not that which we see, *τὸ ὄφαμα*; but the image of the thing, the species or form presented to the mind. In this sense it occurs in 1 Thess. v. 22, *ἀπὸ παντὸς εἴδους πονηροῦ ἀπέχετε*, which some render, “ abstain from every kind of evil.” But Luther more correctly, *meidet allen bösen Schein.*<sup>n</sup> For it might have been written according to the former rendering, *ἀπὸ παντὸς εἴδους πονηρίας*, (Joseph. Antiq. x. 3, 1. See Wetstein in loc.) but it should have been *ἀπὸ παντὸς εἴδους τοῦ πονηροῦ*. But *εἶδος πονηρόν* is a disreputable or wicked appearance or mode, as *εἶδος αἰσχεύν* in Euripides is an ungraceful form. On the other hand, in 2 Corinth. v. 7, the words *διὰ πίστεως περιπατοῦμεν*, *οὐ διὰ εἴδους*, Luther has very accurately given, as to the general sense: *wir leben im Glauben nicht im Schauen*. And interpreters say that in this place *εἶδος* is the same

<sup>n</sup> The English version is, “ from every appearance of evil,” which accords with M. Titmann’s view. It does not mean evil presented to us, but evil appearance or semblance in us.—T.

as ὥψις. Yet it may be doubted whether εἰδός has not still its proper sense; not only because it is never used for ὥψις; but that the Apostle does not appear to have entertained this idea: we now believe these things only, but we do not see them, *i. e.* have not realized them. For he exhorts them to be cheerful, and to trust God, who gives the earnest of the Spirit, inasmuch as they know that now they are pilgrim exiles from God, and should therefore desire rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord. Finally, περιπατεῖν διὰ πίστεως appears to differ from the expression περιπατεῖν ἐν τινί, which sometimes occurs. For I doubt not but that these words may be explained from usage among the Greeks, as Valkenar. has shown on Euripides, Phoeniss. (p. 177. to v. 482. compared with v. 1555,) so that περιπατεῖν διὰ πίστεως is shown to be equivalent to πιστεύοντα περιπατεῖν, *i. e.* to live by faith. So in Aeschylus. Prometh. v. 120, τὸν πᾶσι θεοῖς δὶ απεχθείας ἐλθόντα, *i. e.* is hateful to the gods; and in Euripides, Hippol. v. 1164, δὶ ἔχθρας μῶν τις ἦν ἀφριγμένος, *i. e.* by my hostile mind, and in the Orestes v. 755, διὰ φόβου γὰρ ἔχομαι. So also in the Epist. to the Romans, c. iv. v. 11, τῶν πιστευόντων δὶ ἀκροβυστίας, and xiv. 20, τῷ διὰ προσκύμματος ἐσθίοντι. And in the same way we

may explain that difficult passage in 2 Pet. iii. 5, δι' ἦν ὁ τότε κόσμος ὑδατι κυτακλυσθεὶς ἀπώλετο. See Markland on Lysias, p. 329. Reisk's edition. In fact *εἶδος* is the external form and species of things, as is generally admitted; and therefore δι' εἴδους περιπατεῖν is so to live, that the *εἶδος* is as it were the companion of our life, to live intimately associated with the external form of things. But it becomes not the Christian to yearn after outward things, or to be ensnared by their glitter. It behoves him to seek higher things, and therefore θαύμοῦσι μᾶλλον ἐκδημῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἐνδημῆσαι πρὸς τὸν Κύριον. I conceive the meaning of the passage, therefore, to be: Our life is governed by our immortal hope, not by the vain hope of present things, we prefer, however, to leave the body, that we may go into the presence of God.

Between *ἴδεν* and *ἰδεῖν* there is a middle term, *ἴπτεσθαι*. For it is referred, at the same time, to the object presented to the eye, and to the subject which sees and perceives. And hence it will appear why the word is only used in the passive and middle voice, and why it is not found in the present tense. For, as it does not denote the action of seeing, but the state of him to whose eye or mind the object is presented, the active power would not properly

express this; and therefore, the word must be in the middle or passive voice; in the passive when any thing is said to be presented, or to appear to our mind; in the middle, when the thought is rather of some object presented to, or fixed in the eye or the mind, that we may perceive it. Whence also, it is put either in the past or the future, since the accurate notion of the word requires that that must be regarded as to have been done, or to be about to be done, by which we are to arrive at cognizance. For the specific power of this word is not that it denotes the action of seeing, but the state or affection of the mind to which the object is presented. It differs, therefore, from the words *βλέπειν* and *ορᾶν*, which denote the action of seeing, and from *ἴδεῖν*, which is referred only to the subject. Nor are passages wanting in which this specific force of the word is evident. It is rightly said in Matthew v. 8, *ὅψονται τὸν Θεόν*; for this does not mean that they shall actually see God, which could not be; but they shall truly comprehend and know him; as 1 John iii. 2, *ὅψόμεθα αὐτὸν καθώς ἐστι*, and Heb. xii. 14, *χωρὶς ἀγιασμοῦ οὐδεὶς ὅψεται τὸν κύριον*. For I doubt whether, in these words, *ὅψονται τὸν Θεόν*, we have the notion of a more familiar and nearer intercourse with God, as the lexicons tell us.

I rather think they intimate the felicity of those who more accurately perceive and appreciate the wisdom, holiness, and love of God, which felicity can only be realized by the *καθαροὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ*. For truly is it said by Callimachus, (in Apoll. v. 7. 9,) ὁ Θεὸς οὐκ ἔτι μανεάν, yet οὐ παντὶ φαίνεται, ἀλλ’ ὁ, τις ἐσθλός. And therefore, when (Eurip. Bacch. v. 501,) Pentheus inquires impiously, “Where is God?” he is answered deservedly, *παρ’ ἐμοὶ σὺ δὲ αὐτὸς ἔν, οὐκ εἰσορᾶς*; where *εἰσορᾶν* is the same as *ἐπτεσθαι, inne werden*. Acutely, therefore, Plutarch (de Ei) says, that Apollo was πύθιον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις μανθάνειν καὶ διαπυνθάνεσθαι, Δήλιον δὲ καὶ Φανατὸν, οἷς ἦδη τι δηλοῦται καὶ ὑποφαίνεται τῆς ἀληθείας. And Homer says, οὐ γάρ πω πάντεσσι θεοὶ φαίνονται ἐναργεῖς. (Odyss. π, v. 161.)

It must not be denied, however, that the words *ἐπτεσθαι* and *ἴραν* are sometimes interchanged, so that *ἐπτεσθαι* appears to mean no more than *ἴραν*. So in Xenophon, (Cyneg. v. 31.) βαδίζοντα δὲ οὐδεὶς ἐώρακεν οὐδὲ *ἐψεται*; and in the New Testament it is often put for *ἴραν*, as Matth. xxiv. 30; xxvi. 64; John i. 51, 52; xi. 40; Acts xx. 25. But it does not follow from this that it has the same force altogether as *ἴραν*, *ἰδεῖν, βλέπειν*; so that in any place in which it occurs, any one of these might be substituted.

Nor do I fear the remark, that ὅπτεσθαι is used, because the words ὁρᾶν and εἰδεῖν would change the time from the future. For we have yet to learn why the future of ὁρᾶν is unused, as the same verb is without the aorist.<sup>o</sup>

◦ I rather think that we must look for the explanation of these irregularities and deficiencies in verbs of very early use, to their etymology rather than to the caprice of later nations, into which the word was introduced, in the neglect of certain tenses and inflections. The more simple explanation of these anomalies is, that the word has continued to be used in the later language, into which it has been derived, in the same tenses only in which it occurred in the primitive form, and has not undergone all the artificial grammatical inflections to which words of more recent formation were submitted. Such is probably the case in this instance. The Greek word ὁρᾶω is one of the few remnants of the Hebrew word רָאַה, *to see*. The word being composed of one consonant, and two almost, if not altogether, vowel sounds, would be a bad subject for all the niceties of Greek inflection; and hence, as more convenient words would readily occur, the word ὁρᾶν, except in the instances in which it would slide gradually into use in its primitive form, would be avoided. That the Hebrew word רָאַה has been thus brought into use in later languages is evident from other remnants of it. It is found in the English words ray and array, and the French, *rayon*. And it is the etymon of the Latin, *ratio*, and our English word, reason. Both in Chaldee and in Arabic, the word رَأَى, رَأِي, occurs in the sense of mental perception, understanding; and it is in this sense that it has been retained in the words *ratio* and reason. I have no doubt that an accurate examination of

There is yet something more in the word ὅπτεσθαι, because, as I have said, it should not be referred only to the object, but to the subject also. It may be sometimes written ὅψει; as μείζονα τούτων ὅψει ὅψει τὴν δόξαν τοῦ Θεοῦ, when nothing more is intended than that something is to be seen. But Matth. xxvii. 4, and Acts xviii. 15, σὺ ὅψει and ὅψεσθε αὐτοί were written. For there is a difference between σὺ ὅρα, and σὺ ὅψει. For σὺ ὅρα, is, look accurately, consider, examine; but σὺ ὅψει is like the Latin, *tu videris* (from which formula, *tu vide*, differs.) It means, it is for *you* to examine, consider, regard. He who says σὺ ὅρα commands it to be done; he who says σὺ ὅψει only permits another to do it, and denies that he himself will do it. Wherefore σὺ or αὐτοί or some other pronoun is added, as putting away the duty from the speaker; for instance in Arrian diss. i. 17. ὅψονται οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰ λυσιτελεῖται αὐτοῖς παρὰ φύσιν ἔχειν. This appears distinctly in Acts xviii. 15, εἰ ζήτημά ἔστι περὶ λόγου — ὅψεσθε αὐτοί for it is added κριτής γὰρ ἐγώ τούτων οὐ βούλομαι εἶναι. In this sense σὺ ὅρα is never found.

We have yet to notice θεᾶσθαι and θεωρεῖν. Both differ so far from the words noticed above, the defective Greek verbs, and their anomalous combinations, would fully bear out the remarks made above.—T.

that they denote the intention of mind with which a man regards or contemplates an object. They are frequently used, therefore, when the desire of seeing is to be expressed. So Matth. xi. 7, *τί εξῆλθετε θεάσασθαι*, i. e. *τί εξελθόντες ἐθέλετε ὥρāν*. Matth. xxii. 11. And in John xiv. 17, *ὅτι οὐ θεωρεῖ αὐτό οὐδὲ γινώσκει αὐτό*, we must not render this simply, sees, knows, understands, (which is in the force of the word *γινώσκει*, for it is a very unsound remark made by some, that in this place *γινώσκειν* and *θεωρεῖν* may be used for one another.) It should be translated, he did not studiously and attentively consider, and therefore he did not understand. For in Matth. vi. 1, *πρὸς τὸ θεαθῆναι αὐτοῖς* (and Matth. xxiii. 5,) does not mean simply, to be seen, but to be seen with regard and admiration. There are passages undoubtedly in which *θεᾶσθαι* means only to see, as Matth. xvi. 11; Luke v. 27. But there are others in which the peculiar force is manifest, and in which it has always the adjunct notion of the desire and intention to consider and know the thing looked at. In Rom. xv. 24, *ἐλπίζω διαπορευόμενος θεάσασθαι ὑμᾶς*, Paul not only says that he would see them, but that he would look diligently into their affairs. So Lucian (Nigrin. 2. i. p. 40.) *βουλήμενος λαργὸν ὥφθαλμῶν θεάσασθαι τινα*, i. e.

convenire. In Xenoph. Cyrop. v. 5. 1, Θεασάμενος τὸ στράτευμα, and vii. 5. 7, τεθεάμεδα κύκλῳ τὴν πόλιν. ἐωράκαμεν κ. τ. πόλιν, would be, we looked at the city, which would not express the author's meaning. See also Hiero, 2. 5, διὰ γνώμης Θεᾶσθαι κάλλιον ἢ διὰ τῶν ὡραλυῶν. Euripides Orestes, v. 909, Θεᾶσθαι ὁ ἄδει χρῆ τὸν δεσπότην ιδόντα. What the older grammarians have said on the word Θεωρεῖν is well known.<sup>p</sup> But

<sup>p</sup> The peculiarity of the word Θεωρεῖν is very beautifully illustrated by a reference to the etymology. This is one of those instances in which the more extensively the inquiry is carried on, the more bright and certain is the result. Instead of wild and uncertain conjecture, we arrive at little short of demonstration and definite certainty. In the first place, there is evidently a close connection between the words Θάω. *video cum stupore*, Θέάωμαι, *specto, contemplor*, Θέω *spectatio*, Θέω, *cum admiratione specto*, (Ionice) Θεωρέω, *contemplor*, and the Latin *Tuco, Tueor*, to behold, to look stedfastly. Both in the Latin and Greek word, there is the idea of stedfast considerate observing, and contemplation. The probability then is, that these words had a common origin. On turning to the ancient oriental tongues, we find the word, תְּבִנָה used in Hebrew, Chaldee and Syriac, very extensively in the sense, to see; but generally in a still stronger sense, as intimating serious and intense contemplation. In all these three cognate dialects, it signifies the seeing into obscure, mysterious, and future things: *videns, propheta, or seer, attentio, consideratio, contemplatio, spectatio cum voluptate*.

In the first place, we find, on examination, some remains

although it is true that Θεωρός and Θεωρία are frequently used with reference to sacred rites and ceremonies, yet it may be shown by many

of the word θεωρία in this form, with the previous guttural sound distinct, as in Gothic, *kisawi*; in Francic and Alemannic, *geseon*; in Greek ἀγάζομαι *admiror*; in English, to gaze. All these words have the idea of steadfast looking or contemplation. But the union of the sound of η with that of ι was so close, that the distinction was likely to be confounded and lost. We have some indication of this in the German word *Schauen*, *spectare*, to look at, and *schau*, a sight, an examination; from whence the English word, show. And it appears that finally the sound of the η was dropped altogether; when the word gradually assumed the form in which we are more familiar with it. The dental sound of ι, has always been peculiarly liable to variation in the transfer of words to different dialects, as it may be pronounced more hardly, or softly, or with aspiration. In all these several aspects, the word θεωρία, or abbreviated θεωρί, to see, is found. In the aspirated form we have Θάω and all its derivatives, Θεάματι, Θαύμα, Θαυμαζω, Θεάρειν, &c. And Θέος, the name of God, is from this source: He that seeth. In the Gothic migration it assumed the soft sound; Chaldee יְהָן, *ecce, see!* Anglo-Saxon *seon*, Belgic *zien*, German *schen*, English, see, Eolic Greek, *σεαοματι*, and *ζενη*. (See Junius Glossarium Gothicum, p. 287.) And in the Thracian or Etruscan migration, which developed itself in the Latin language, the word occurs with the hardest sound of the dental, *tueo*, *tueor*, *intuitus*; and probably this will explain those other words which occur for the Deity, Tuito, (Tacitus de Moribus Germanorum) Thoth or Theut, and the Gaelic, Ti'erna. They are all terms for the seer, or Him

examples, that, by the most elegant Attic writers, the word θεωρεῖν is applied to any spectacle whatever, as passages quoted from Xenophon have proved. So also it is used repeatedly in the New Testament, except that in one place (Acts ix. 7,) it appears to be put simply for ὅραν. In all others there is evidently the notion of considering with attention or admiration. It is the same in Acts vii. 56, θεωρῶ τοὺς οὐρανοὺς ἀνεῳγμένους; although certainly the idea of joy and pleasure, which some interpreters have assumed to exist there, cannot properly be found. Nor is this view of the word opposed by John viii. 51, θάνατος οὐ μὴ θεωρήσῃ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, which is often compared with the formula formerly noticed, ζωὴν οὐκ ὄψεται. For in that passage θεωρεῖν does not mean to experience, to attain; it says, θεωρεῖν

that seeth. After this extensive view of the etymology, it will be quite evident that the view of θεωρεῖν given in the text, as established by the *usus loquendi*, is quite accurate. It is justified by the original word, and by the force of the great majority of its derivatives in all languages. It is of little moment whether the word is a compound of θεω and ὅρα, or not. The peculiar force of it flows from the specific meaning of its etymon **תְּהִלָּה**.—*N. B.* It is worthy of remark, *en passant*, how forcibly such etymological inquiry vindicates the Scripture account of the peopling of the world by migration from an oriental source and centre.—*T.*

*εἰς τὸν αἰώνα*, “to look on or regard for ever;” and it could not have been *ὅπτεσθαι θανάτον εἰς τὸν αἰώνα*, since *ὅπτεσθαι* is the act of a moment; and how then could the sentence have meant to experience for ever? But since *θεωρεῖν* is not merely the act of an instant, (for the things on which we *θεωρεῖν*, are considered as contemplated for a lengthened period), therefore, this word is very properly made use of in conjunction with *εἰς τὸν αἰώνα*. For this clause could not properly be rendered “he shall never die.” For they also die who walk in the way of heavenly truth; but then their death is not *εἰς τὸν αἰώνα*. Here, however, we must for the present pause.

## CHAPTER IX.

MANY affections and conditions of the mind are so nearly allied, that they appear to differ in a very slight degree; more especially as the mode in which they arise and show themselves is very similar. On this account, we find that many words by which the condition of mind is expressed are not only used indifferently by inaccurate writers and speakers, but even by lexicographers are rendered by the same Latin words, as if they had no difference; and, by these means, recent and raw scholars are misled to suppose that they are identical in meaning. But where terms are really synonymous, their force should be most minutely observed; for this is absolutely necessary to the right understanding of the writers of the New Testament. Although, at the same time, it must be admitted, that in the customary style of language which these men used, the difference between such words was not always observed, especially those which properly express the different grades of the same affection. For those whose affections are more easily moved would natu-

rally use stronger language to express the emotions and habits of others; and in such instances a strict interpretation would lead at once to error. And this calls therefore for a more accurate observation of the specific force of each word, that it may be more certainly determined what precise meaning best expresses the idea in question. For often, when a writer has applied a word accurately in its specific sense, we do not perceive his real meaning; because only analogous notions of the same things occur to us, instead of the one accurate thought intended. Finally, in those words which denote any fault, we must take especial care lest we confound those which signify a defect of the mental powers with those which denote a fault of the will. Therefore, on the present occasion, I shall notice some synonyms of this class; and I shall begin with two words, which, among those expressive of affections of the mind or will, are more extensively used. In the New Testament, we frequently meet with

Ὥλω· βούλομαι.

Although Buttmann on Homer (Lexilogus i. p. 26,) has treated very accurately of these two words, I purpose to add a few remarks more directly relating to their use in the New

Testament. These words agree, inasmuch as they both mean, *velle*, to will ; and the lexicons more strictly theological, scarcely point out a difference between them. But as far as the decree of the mind by which we will, (and which the schools have called, volition,) differs from that propension of mind, by which we address ourselves to the thing which we have willed, so far  $\delta\acute{e}λειν$  and  $\betaούλεσθαι$  differ from each other. For  $\delta\acute{e}λειν$  is simply, to will ; and has not in it the notion of propension.  $\betaούλεσθαι$ , denotes the propension. And hence the word  $\betaούλεσθαι$  is very generally used to express a variety of modes, by which the mind addresses itself to what the will has determined. This distinction, however, which I have marked, is in all the more elegant writers accurately observed. Who would suppose that Plato had written carelessly, and only with the desire of varying the word, in a passage in the Gorgias,  $\varepsilon\acute{i} \mu\acute{e}n$   $\delta\acute{o}j\acute{e}i\acute{r}\acute{e}$ ,  $\nu\acute{u}n$ .  $\acute{e}\acute{a}n \delta\acute{e} \betaούλη$ ,  $\acute{e}\acute{s}a\acute{u}m\acute{h}i\acute{s}$ . —  $\acute{o}\acute{u}kou\acute{n} \acute{o}\acute{t}a\acute{n} \betaούλεσθai$   $\pi\acute{a}g\acute{r} \acute{e}m\acute{e} \acute{h}kei\acute{n} o\acute{i}k\acute{a}d\acute{e}$  —  $\pi\acute{a}g\acute{r} \acute{e}m\acute{e} \acute{G}o\acute{z}g\acute{y}i\acute{s} \chi\acute{a}t\acute{a}l\acute{u}e\acute{v}i\acute{s} \kai$   $\acute{e}\acute{p}i\acute{d}e\acute{z}e\acute{x}e\acute{t}a\acute{s} \acute{h}m\acute{u}n$ . —  $E\acute{u} \acute{L}e\acute{g}e\acute{y}i\acute{s} \acute{a}\acute{l}l\acute{a} \acute{a}\acute{g}a \acute{e}\acute{d}e\acute{l}\acute{h}se\acute{e}i\acute{v} \acute{a}\acute{n}$   $\acute{h}m\acute{u}n \acute{d}i\acute{a}l\acute{e}\acute{x}h\acute{z}h\acute{n}a\acute{i}$ ;  $\betaούl\acute{o}m\acute{a}i \gamma\acute{a}\acute{g} \pi\acute{u}m\acute{e}s\acute{h}a\acute{i} \pi\acute{a}g\acute{r} \acute{a}\acute{u}t\acute{o}u\acute{n} \acute{a}\acute{x}$ . Certainly of Gorgias he rightly used the word  $\acute{e}\acute{d}e\acute{l}\acute{h}se\acute{e}i\acute{v}$ ; for Socrates doubted of the mere will of the Sophist, (*wird er auch wollen?*) whether he will ; but  $\acute{e}\acute{a}n \delta\acute{e} \betaούl\acute{e}$  is, if he de-

sires, ὅταν βούλεσθε, if he pleases, βούλομαι πυθέσθαι παῖς' αὐτοῦ, I wish to know from him (*ich wünsche von ihm zu hören.*) Xenophon Cyrop. i. 4, 10, ταῦτα λαβὼν διαδίδου ὅτῳ σὺ βούλει, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅπόσα ἐθέλεις. And iv. 5. 12, (31.) σοὶ ὑπάρχειν, οὐχ ὅπως ἀν ἐθέλωσιν, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἀν σὺ βούλῃ, χεῖσθαι αὐτοῖς. And vii. 2. 4, (9.) ἀτάρ, ὁ Κροῖσε, ἀρ' ἀν τι μοι ἐθελήσαις συμβαλεῖσαι; Καὶ βούλοιμην γ' ἀν, ἔφη, ἀγαθόν τι σοι εὐρεῖν. There is something bland and respectful and courteous in the reply of Croesus, but in the question of Cyrus nothing but this: what is your will? Whence it occurs often that he who replies to such an interrogation, that he wills; does not reply by θέλειν but by βούλεσθαι. I will add two passages from Euripides, which will illustrate the difference I wish to point out. The first is in Iphig. Aul. v. 338, where Menelaus reproves the altered manner of Agamemnon, as widely differing from that which he dissembled, before he obtained the kingdom, τῷ δοκεῖν μὲν οὐχι χρήζων, τῷ δε βούλεσθαι θέλων. The other is in the Hyppolytus v. 1329, 1330, οὐδεὶς ἀπαντᾶν βούλεται προδυμίᾳ τῇ τοῦ θέλοντος, ἀλλ' ἀφιστάμεσθ' αεί. Arrian. Diss. Epict. i. 12. 13, βούλομαι γιάφειν τὸ Δέωνος ὄνομα ὡς θέλω. And so in Matth. i. 19, δίκαιος ὁν καὶ μὴ θέλων αὐτὴν παραδειγματίσαι, εἰ βούλειθη λάθεα ἀπολῦσαι αὐτήν. But in this use

of these words, I think I perceive other traces of the specific sense of each.<sup>q</sup> First, it is well known that *βούλεσθαι* ἡ is frequently used in the sense of *malle*, to prefer, so that *μᾶλλον* should be understood. But as far as I know, *θέλειν* is never so used. For the passages adduced in support of the notion appear to me insufficient. And first, we may notice in the New Testament, 1 Cor. xiv. 19, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ θέλω πέντε λόγους διὰ τοῦ νοός μου λαλῆσαι, ἵνα καὶ ἄλλους κατηχήσω, ἡ μερίους λόγους ἐν γλώσσῃ. But here, to my mind, the ἡ must be referred rather to *πέντε* than to *θέλω*. I would, in the church, rather use five intelligible words, then ten thousand which were unintelligible. Another passage is in Xenophon de Mag. Equ. 9. 5, οἵς καθήκει τὸ

<sup>q</sup> The only trace of an oriental etymon of *βούλομαι* that I can find is, **בָּעַז**, a word existing in Hebrew and its cognate dialects, and implying complete power and authority. It is used in the sense of, *dominus*, *maritus*; used of those who are understood to have the right to express a sovereign will. And all the derivatives of *βούλομαι* remaining in Latin and Gothic, and in modern languages, *volo*, *wilgan*, *vouloir*, *wollen*, to will, are expressions of a positive determination. This rather makes against the distinction which the author has endeavoured to establish. At the same time, the *usus loquendi* might have affixed a specific sense to the Greek derivative. And this is very probable, for in this limited sense we find in German the word *willig*, *unwillig*, implying propension. Anglice, willing, unwilling.—T.

*ἰππικὸν, ἐθέλουσι τελεῖν ἀργύριον ὡς μὴ ἵππεύειν*, in which they render *ἐθέλουσι* by *malunt*, they prefer; *μᾶλλον* being understood. But it is not *ἢ*, but *ὡς μὴ* that follows, to make the sense: they would rather pay the fine than serve in the cavalry. And it may even be doubted in those passages in which *μᾶλλον* is inserted, *ibid.* 2. 8, and 9. fin. For in both it may be rendered, more freely, more readily, to fight or to counsel, as *Cyrop.* iv. 3. 1, *μᾶλλον μάχοντ' ἀν., εἰ τὰ φίλατα παρείη.* comp. *Memorab.* iv. 4, 17. The reason of this use of the word must be sought in its specific signification. For since *θέλειν* means simply to wish, if *ἢ* is added or understood, it would then signify, to wish this or that, v. c. *θέλεις μάχεσθαι ἢ φυγεῖν.* And if *μᾶλλον* is added, it is not to be referred to *θέλειν*; but to the thing itself which is willed; as appears in the passages already referred to. On the two passages in *Homer Il. 9, 319. Od. α, 234.* see *Buttmann*, l. c. p. 30. *Justin. Mart. Apol. ii. θέλει γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ ὁ οὐρανίος τὴν μετάνοιαν τοῦ ἀμαρτωλοῦ, ἢ τὴν κόλασιν αὐτοῦ*, where *Sylburg* supplies *μᾶλλον*, and adduces *θέλω τύχης σταλαγμὸν ἢ πίθον φρενῶν.* See *Eustath. ad Il. p. 1363, 42.* I add a passage from *Epigr. Agathiae xxv. Anal. iii. 43, ἐπεὶ σέο μῆδον ἀκούειν" Ηθελον, ἢ κιθάρης καρούματα Δηλιάδος.* But the Greek language was then

declining, of which this is an example, among many others.

A second proof of the specific signification of these words, is to be found in a different use of them, in passages where neither of them means properly, to will. There are many passages in which  $\varepsilon\theta\acute{e}l\epsilon\iota\upsilon$  appears to have the same force with  $\delta\acute{u}n\alpha\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$  or  $\mu\acute{e}l\lambda\epsilon\iota\upsilon$ . Gregory of Corinth says, that this was Attic Greek. In this sense, however, the word was only applied to inanimate objects. For the observation of Buttmann (Addenda to Plato Charm. p. 60) is quite true, that  $\varepsilon\theta\acute{e}l\epsilon\iota\upsilon$  for  $\mu\acute{e}l\lambda\epsilon\iota\upsilon$  or  $\delta\acute{u}n\alpha\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ , is only used respecting inanimate objects, and then only in a negative sense. For the passages adduced do not prove that later writers have used it. Certainly Reisk ought not to adduce that passage from the 37th epigram of Macedonius. "Επταρον ἄγχι τάφοιο καὶ ἡθέλον αὐτὸς ἀκοῦσαι, Οἴδα περ ὠϊσάμην, μοῆραν ἐμῆς ἀλόχου. For he did not hope that he should hear the death of his wife; but he thought, since he had sneezed, that he heard the presage of her death; (as we say, *er wollte das selbst gehört, gesehn haben.*) And therefore the word  $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}s$  is not to be pressed. Wherefore Schaefer, *apud Gregorium*, p. 135, has said, that we should read  $\varepsilon\delta\acute{u}n\alpha\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ . Plato in Phaedr. p. 230. D.  $\tau\acute{a}\ \mu\acute{e}l\lambda\epsilon\iota\upsilon$

οὐν χωρία καὶ τὰ δένδρα οὐδὲν μ' ἐθέλει διδάσκειν. And Xenoph. Hist. Gr. v. 4. 61, τὰ πλοῖα ἐκεῖθεν οὐκέτι ἥθελε παραπλεῖν. Memor. iii. 12. extr. οὐ γάρ ἐθέλει αὐτόματα εἶναι. So also it is assumed that in the New Testament John vii. 1, and Matth. ii. 18, οὐ θέλειν is put for οὐ δύνασθαι. But there is no need in either case to abandon the proper meaning of the word. In the former case he would not (*noluit*) stay in Judea, because the Jews sought to kill him; in the latter, Rachel would not be comforted. (German, *sie wollte sich nicht trösten lassen*,) as in Gen. xxxvii. 35, οὐκ ἥθελε παρακαλεῖσθαι, λέγων. In the Hebrew, it is **וַיָּמָן לְהַתְנִיחָם**, *i. e.* she refused consolation.<sup>1</sup> Without the negative, however,

<sup>1</sup> It is somewhat strange that Titmann did not refer to Jeremiah xxxi. 15, as the original of the quotation in Matthew, and which completely bears out his idea. The words are **מַאֲנָה לְהַנִּיחָם**, refusing to be comforted. The word invariably occurs in the Hebrew Scriptures, in the sense of, determined refusal. And so in this case, it was not only that Rachel could not be comforted, because her children were not; but she refused all consolation, of whatever kind, from the bitter sense which she had of their loss. The full force of the word may be seen in Exod. ix. 2, **אִם־מַאֲנָתָה**, if thou refuse to let them go. And seeing that the meaning of **מַאֲנָה** is so unequivocal, it is not at all probable that the LXX used **οὐκ** **ἥθελε** in the unusual sense of **οὐ δύνασθαι**. The etymology of **מַאֲנָה** is probably the

Θέλειν is rather to be wont, to suit, to become. Herodot. vii. 50. 1. 2, μεγάλα πρήγματα μεγάλοισι ἔθέλει κινδύνοισι καταιρέεσθαι, (as we say: *wollen unternommen sein*); Callim. H. in Del. v. 4, Δῆλος δὲ ἔθέλει τὰ πρῶτα φέρεσθαι Ἐκ μουσέων. conf. Aristoph. Av. v. 532, et Raphel. ad Actor. ii. 12. And it is observed by some critics, as Valckenar, in the 2d vol. of his Opuscula, p. 307, on Mark vi. 5, that οὐκ ἤδυνατο is put for οὐκ ἤθελε, or οὐκ ἐβούλετο. And Henry Stephen had already remarked, App. de Dial. Att. p. 50, that the Attics sometimes put δύνασθαι for βούλεσθαι. But although there may be passages in which a man might say οὐ δύνασθαι, because he had good reason to refuse, as in our language we say, we cannot, because we will not, I suspect none will be found in which οὐ δύνασθαι has the same force with οὐ Θέλειν. Certainly, in the passage quoted from Mark, there is no reason to abandon the usual meaning of the word. The words are, καὶ οὐκ ἤδυνατο ἐκεῖ οὐδεμίαν δύναμιν ποιῆσαι. Evidently, as it is natural to admit that our Lord could have wrought miracles in

word for negation, יְאָ, and the formative נָ; and hence the whole force of the word is a substantive of direct negation, submitted to the inflections of a verb, and carrying a strength of expression which no translation can give without circumlocution.—T.

that place, if he would, it is said, *οὐκ ἤδύνατο*, instead of *οὐκ ἤδει*. For of that which cannot honestly and rightly be done, we may say with propriety, that a good man is unable to do it, although he could, if he would. And therefore, our Lord, although he was never without the power of working miracles, may be said properly to have been unable to do so among this people. For he never used the power of working miracles rashly, either in the presence of the wicked, or for the sole object of exciting a profitless surprise or admiration. He could not therefore work miracles there. He could not do so in accordance with his own wise moderation; for, “because of their unbelief,” this display of power would have been utterly useless. He would not, therefore, because he *could not with propriety*. The same explanation may be given of a passage in the *Anabas.* vii. 2. 18, *οὐκ ἤδυνάμην ζῆν εἰς ἀλλοτρίαν τράπεζαν ἀποβλέπων*, he could not, for he was ashamed. Sometimes, however, another passage is brought forward: Book ii. 2. 6, *ἥν δὲ αὕτη ἡ στρατηγία οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυναμένη, ἡ ἀποδρᾶναι ἡ ἀποφυγεῖν*; in which they say that *δυναμένη* is put for *θέλουσα*, *i. e.* it saw nothing else to be done. But there is no need to shrink from the usual meaning of the word. Certainly what the *στρατηγία* looked for

was already stated, that they might escape secretly and fly. Now, it is related that things took a turn for the better. He said therefore, the *στρατηγία* could do nothing else; but fortune *κάλλον ἐστρατήγησε*. Finally, in Cyrop. vi. 4. 11, they adduce *οὐ πρόσθεν ἐδύναντο θεάσασθαι αὐτόν*, because all were taken with the beauty of Panthea. This distracted their attention, and prevented them from looking at her husband, *i. e.* they could not.

But, to return; *οὐ θέλειν* is sometimes the same in force with *οὐ δύνασθαι*; but *βούλεσθαι* is never used for *δύνασθαι*; and undoubtedly *βούλεσθαι* and *δύνασθαι* are often opposed to each other. Plat. Hipp. mai. p. 1259. A, *οὐχ οἷα βούλεσται τις, ἀλλ' οἷα δύναται*. Lucian. ii. Abd. 179, *οὐ βούλομαι δυνάμενος, and μὴ βούλεσθαι, μὴ δύνασθαι*, ibid. p. 182. Aristot. Polit. v. 5. 9, *ῶστε καὶ βούλονται μᾶλλον καὶ δύνανται νεωτερίζεν*, ibid. c. 8. Vid. Valckenar. ad Phalar. ep. xcvi. p. 272. In the New Testament, it is improperly rendered *posse*, *valere*, as Acts xvii. 15, *χειτής γὰς ἐγὼ τούτων οὐ βούλομαι εἶναι*; as Plat. Phileb. p. 38. C, *βούλεσθαι κρίνειν*. It is rather *nolo*, I refuse, in the sense in which we say, *Ich mag nicht*, I may not. Such questions are not my duty. If it were a question of any crime (v. 14), then *κατὰ λόγον ἀν ἡνεσχόμην ὑμῶν*, I would hear you.

In the word *βούλεσθαι* there is rather the notion of the mind desiring, choosing, propensed to, a particular object. Often, indeed, we desire and choose that which cannot be; but to *will* impossibilities (*τὰ ἀδύνατα*) is the part of fools. Often, therefore, *βούλεσθαι* is only to choose, as *ἄνθρωπος, ὁ βούλεται, τοῦτο καὶ οἶται.* Charit. iii. 9; vi. 5; Platon. Ion. p. 532. D. *βούλοιμην* ἀν σε ἀληθῆ λέγειν. et in Euthyd. p. 278. E, *βούλόμενοι* εῦ πράττειν. And it is never therefore used of brutes, as Ammonius has already observed. For since brutes destitute of reason cannot deliberate whether an object is to be sought or avoided, in which is the force of *βούλεσθαι*, (whence *βούλη*), but are led by the blind impulse of instinct or habit, they cannot be said *βούλεσθαι*. Yet both *θέλειν* and *βούλεσθαι*, are applied to inanimate things, especially in the way of interrogation, *τί θέλει, τί βούλεται τοῦτο.* The former occurs in the New Testament, Acts ii. 12, *τί ἀν θέλοι τοῦτο εἶναι.* Valckenar on Herod. iv. 131, says, that *τί τοῦτο βούλεται* is more used, and *βούλεται λέγειν* or *εἶναι.* But the mode in which they are used seems to differ. Certainly, when it is said, *τί θέλει τοῦτο εἶναι* or *λέγειν*, the inquiry is made, what should or can this thing be or say; as in that passage of Herodotus and others, which Valckenar ap-

proves, (*was soll das seyn s. werden*), almost similar to  $\tauί μέλλει τοῦτο εἶναι$ . So, in Euripid. Hippol. v. 865,  $\eta\deltaω \tauί λέξαι δέλτος ηδε μοι. Νέλει.$  But  $\tauί βούλεται τοῦτο$ , although it may be rendered in that way, what does this will? yet it seems to be in that particular sense, that it inquires especially into the end or counsel of the thing, which is said  $\betaούλεσθαι$ . If, therefore, it is said,  $\tauί βούλεται τοῦτο εἶναι$ , the sense would be, to what does this tend? *was soll das vorstellen s. bedeuten*. For often  $\betaούλεσθαι εἶναι$  is said of those who wish to appear what really they are not, as in Lucian, ii. Alex. p. 214, concerning the woman,  $\varepsilon\gammaάσμιον \varepsilon\pi\tauι εἶναι βούλομένην$ ; he could not have written  $\varepsilon\theta\lambdaωσαν$ ; and hence it will appear why it is written  $\tauί σοι βούλεται τοῦτο$ , and never, if I remember accurately,  $\tauί σοι Νέλει τοῦτο$ . For there is in this interrogation a question as to the end and utility of the thing, as in Lucian, iii. p. 427,  $\tauί βούλοντο αὐτῷ τηλικαῦται κύλικες, τῶν κεραμέων ἵσα δυναμένων$ . and i. Dial. Mort. p. 446,  $οὐχ οὐδῶ, τί σοι βούλεται τὸ ἐρώτημα, i. e. for what reason you ask this? To what does the question tend? Compare also Hermot, p. 754.$

I have said that  $\betaούλεσθαι$  denotes propension and inclination of the will. This is confirmed by a passage from James, c. i. 18,  $\betaούλησθεις ἀπεκύνσεν ἡμᾶς λόγῳ ἀληθείας$ . A parallel passage

occurs in Plato, Legg. iv. p. 712, οἵσι δέ τι λέγειν  
 βουληθεὶς φράζει τοι σαφέστερον. One writer, however, most strangely supposes that *βουληθεὶς* is put elliptically for *βουληθεὶς* ἐν τιμῇ. But Wahl. properly compares it with εὐδοκήσας, he hath begotten us, according to his good pleasure. Hence also *βούλεσθαι τά τινας* means to favour the interests of any one. Thucyd. vi. 50. Certainly that person appears to have been deceived by some passages of the Septuagint, where θέλειν ἐν τινι is given as the rendering of the Hebrew **חִפּז**. But *βούλεσθαι* ἐν τινι never occurs; and it would be absurd. For, in the only passage, 1 Sam. xviii. 25, **אֵין חִפּז לְמֶלֶךְ בְּמַהְרָה**, in which the Septuagint has thus rendered the words, *אָנָה βούלεται הַבָּסִילֶנָס ἐν δόματι*, it is a weak version; for, in fact, desire, and not good will, is expressed.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Taylor, in his Hebrew Concordance, gives, as the meaning of the word **חִפּז**, desire, pleasure, delight; and the simple rendering of this passage, according to the Hebrew idiom, is, "There is not delight to the king in dowry." And the force of this expression may be softened to meet the style of later languages, as it is in our version, "The king desireth not dowry," and which has so far followed the Septuagint. But that version has very needlessly retained the Hebraism **בְּמַהְרָה** by rendering it *εν δόματι*; and has thus made the whole sentence weak and ineffective. It were better either to retain the simpler and more forcible style of

And we must not refer to this formula the words of Paul in Coloss. ii. 18, *μηδεὶς ὑμᾶς καταβραβεύετω θέλων ἐν ταπεινοφροσύνῃ καὶ θρησκείᾳ τῶν ἀγγέλων*. Many interpreters connect θέλων with the preposition *ἐν*, and render it, affecting humility, and taking pleasure in it. But, in the first place, such a barbarous formula is unknown to the New Testament. In the next place, there is no need to increase the number of solecisms, while another and more probable interpretation is fairly open to us; and finally, as it had been stated in v. 16, *μὴ οὖν τις ὑμᾶς κρινέτω ἐν βρώσει*, it was in accordance with this to say, *μηδεὶς ὑμᾶς καταβραβεύετω ἐν ταπεινοφροσύνῃ*. Let no man, he says, judge you in external things, or deceive you by that *ταπεινοφροσύνη* and *θρησκεία*. And θέλων therefore is, in my opinion, intentionally, wittingly, (*consulto*,) as in

the original, or to transmute it altogether into the more modern mode of expression. Nothing, therefore, can here be made of the force of *βούλεσθαι* *ἐν*, for it is only a servile rendering of the Hebrew preposition **בְּ**. The sentence is “done into Greek,” rather than translated. It may be remarked also, that in almost every instance in which the LXX has rendered **בְּ** by *βούλεσθαι*, the true force of the word goes beyond the Greek expression; and implies not only propension of the will, but delectation, and emotion of the affections. See Deut. xxv. 7; Ruth iii. 16; 1 Kings xxi. 6.—*T.*

Herodot. ix. c. 14, *πυθόμενος*, δὲ ταῦτα ἐβουλεύετο θέλων, εἴκως τούτους πρῶτον ἔλοι. For in the word θέλειν there is the notion of the will itself, and that, separately from the notion of consideration and consequent propension. He who does any thing θέλων does it at once spontaneously. He who does it βούλόμενος, determines to apply his mind to it, θέλων ποιῶ. I do it spontaneously, freely: *πάσχω*, I deserve it; as 2 Peter iii. 5, λανθάνει αὐτοὺς τοῦτο θέλοντας. But there is a difference from these forms of speech, when θέλω is put with an infinitive of another verb, as θέλω ποιεῖν. It is often rendered as if it were φιλεῖν, to be wont, John viii. 44. In all words therefore compounded with θέλειν there is the notion of spontaneity, but in those compounded with βούλομαι, that of option and propension. So in Plato de Legibus, Lib. v. τὸ βούλητόν τε καὶ ἐκούσιον and τὸ ἀβούλητόν τε καὶ ἀκούσιον are put in opposition. The formula καὶ θέλης, καὶ μὴ θέλης is well known. But καὶ μὴ βούλη is never said. It is, therefore, doubtful whether in the New Testament θέλειν ever means to desire, to choose, to be occupied or delighted with any thing, not even in Heb. x. 5, θυσίαν καὶ προεφορὰν οὐκ ἡθέλησας, where the Hebrew would appear to warrant the notion of delight and oblecta-

tion.<sup>t</sup> Certainly Marcus Antoninus has used the word according to the Hebrew sense, x. 8, οὐ κολακεύεσθαι οἱ θεοὶ θέλουσιν, ἀλλ' ἔξομοιοῦσαι αὐτοῖς τὰ λογικὰ πάντα.

θυμός· ὁργή.

It has been observed, both by Eustathius and others, that these two words are synonyms. And in fact, that they are not used indifferently in the New Testament, may be shown by those passages in which they occur together, Eph. iv. 31; Coloss. iii. 8; Rom. ii. 8; Apocal. xix. 15. We read also in Apoc. xvi. 19,

<sup>t</sup> The Apostle has, according to his usual practice, quoted from the Septuagint, as the established Greek version of the Scriptures; in which certainly ἀθέλησας does not give the whole force of צְפָנָה; but then it is somewhat remarkable, that the true meaning is given in the word εὐδόκησας, in verse 6, and is repeated again in v. 8, as if the Apostle, seeing the comparative weakness of the LXX version, gave, from his own knowledge of the Hebrew, the proper idea of delectation and pleasure, to complete the sense; for εὐδόκησας is not the true meaning of the parallel word שְׁאַלְלָה. Scholars must be aware that there is a still more remarkable discrepancy here between the quotation in the New Testament and the Hebrew, on which it would be out of place to enter here; but certainly to those who hold, with the translator, the view of the verbal inspiration of sacred Scripture, there is no point requiring more full and patient investigation than the quotations in the New Testament from the Septuagint, or some other Greek version of the Old Testament, and their discrepancy from the present Hebrew text.—T.

*θυμὸς τῆς ὁργῆς* which is generally considered to be an expression for extreme wrath. But young students should be on their guard against such observations, lest when two nouns are found together of which one is in the genitive case, and as it were dependent on the other, they conclude over hastily, either that this is a mere periphrasis, or an increment of the force of the word in the genitive. For although a substantive, followed by the genitive case, is often, both in Greek and other languages, put instead of an adjective, yet the true force of such an expression must be ascertained by the relation of the words themselves; for, frequently, this mode is adopted more for the full description and amplification of the subject, than for the increased intensity of the thought. Fischer has collected many examples, though some are foreign to the purpose, in Welleri Gram. Tom. iii. p. 269. It cannot, however, be shown, that if two synonyms are placed together, as *θυμὸς τῆς ὁργῆς*, that it is meant to express the superlative degree of the one in the genitive case. For the case is very different, when two nouns of different meaning are joined, in order to increase the force of the one, as *ζῆλος πυρός* Heb. x. 27. In this place, therefore, *θυμὸς τῆς ὁργῆς* means

only the boiling of rage, as we say, *Hitze des Zornes.*

But, to return to the difference of these two words. It is commonly asserted from too great confidence in some grammarians, that ὁργή and θυμός so far differ, that θυμός is exacerbation of mind, anger kindling into existence ; ὁργή is wrath daily enduring and inveterate. We are warned that this difference is not always the case. And rightly enough, for in fact it is false. For θυμός and ὁργή differ not as to the duration, but as to the nature of the feeling. For as θυμός strictly means the soul, from the spirit which we breathe out ; it is subsequently used to express a more intense passion of the mind as a more forcible exhalation. And therefore θυμός is thus described as ἀπὸ τῆς θύσεως καὶ ζέσεως τῆς ψυχῆς. Ὁργή, however, denotes anger, together with the desire of revenge.<sup>u</sup> Zeno says on Diogen. Laert. vii. 113,

<sup>u</sup> The word ὁργή is from **הָרָג**, which in Hebrew, Chaldee, Syriac and Arabic, means to kill, and all the tumults of passion which terminate in killing. There are traces of it in modern languages, in the German word *krieg*, war, contention ; in the French word *orgueil*, which is properly, *fierté*, and the English word, rage. The idea therefore of sanguinary revenge, attaches etymologically to ὁργή. The Hebrew word **הָרָה**, is expressive of a less violent feeling, and it has been transmitted to us in the same qualified sense,

ὅργή ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία τιμωρίας τοῦ δοκοῦντος ἡδιηηκέται οὐ προσηκόντως. For although *θυμός* often issues in anger or rage, *i. e.* in the actual desire of punishing the injurer, yet in the word considered separately, there is not the notion of anger or passion, any more than in ὁργή there is the idea of diuturnity. See Nemes. de Nat. Hum. c. 21. Xenophon says correctly (περὶ ἵππ. 9. 2,) ἔστι θυμὸς ἵππων ὅπερ ὁργὴ ἀνθρώπων. conf. §. 7. et de Venat. 10. 14. And hence we may understand why ὁργή is often put in the New Testament for vengeance and punishment, but *θυμός* never. Yet in 2 Cor. xii. 20, *θυμός* is said to mean anger. It stands in connection with other terms ἔρεις, ζῆλοι, θυμοί, ἐριθεῖαι, καταλαλαι. But even here *θυμοί* is rather the enmities of a morose and passionate man, (*Feindschaften, Erbitterungen.*) Plutarchus de Coriolano (init. p. 59. ed. Tubing. vol. ii.) θυμοῖς δ' αὖ πάλιν χρωμένον ἀνράτοις καὶ φιλονεικίαις ἀτέρπτοις, οὐ δέδιον αὐδὲ εὐάρμοστον ἀνθρώποις συνεῖναι παρεγγέν. And Aristotle in Problem. Sect. xxx. on the melancholic says, ἐρωτικοὶ καὶ εὐκίνητοι πρὸς *ira*, ire, irritate; and *aro, arsit*, to burn. *θυμός*, is probably from **רָמָה** *cogitatio, cogitavit, se ferocius gessit.* It is *animus*, mind, the working and fermenting of mind, and putting it forth in external demonstration of strong feeling or passion. This etymology justifies the remarks made by the author upon the usage of the two words.—*T.*

των δικαιων και τας ἐπιθυμιας, where evidently the idea of wrath is not at all intended. Other synonymous terms noticed by grammarians, do not occur in the New Testament.

ἐπιθυμεω. ὁρέγομαι, (ἐπιθυμια. ὁρεῖσ.)

Both these words mean desire. But ἐπιθυμεω denotes rather the affection of mind, and ἐπιθυμια the inward passion and concupiscence; ὁρέγομαι the appetite and tendency towards the external object. In ἐπιθυμια only the mental desire is thought of (*die Begierde selbst*); but ὁρεῖσ has conjoined with it the notion of the thing desired, (*Verlangen nach etwas.*) So that ἐπιθυμειν may be used absolutely as Rom. vii. 7; xiii. 9, but ὁρέγεσθαι never. And although ὁρεῖσ is sometimes used for appetites, without the notion appended of the objects desired, as Herodian, vi. 1. 12, τας ὁρεῖσ ακμαζούσας εις αισχρὰς ἐπιθυμιας, (comp. i. 6. 6.) ; yet ὁρέγεσθαι is never, to my knowledge, used absolutely and independently. For the same reason ἐπιθυμεῖν τινός is to be moved with the desire or passion for any thing. The word in the genitive, placed in regimen with the noun ἐπιθυμια, denoting the seat or fountain of the ἐπιθυμια; as in the New Testament frequently ἐπιθυμια σαρκός; and especially in that difficult text John viii. 44. But ὁρεῖσ τινός denotes the object desired. So ὁρεῖσ σαρκός would be the

desire to eat flesh, (*Verlangen nach Fleisch.*) For that one passage in the Book of Wisdom, xxiii. 6, *κοιλίας ὄρεξις καὶ συνουσιασμός μῆ καταλαβέτωσαν με*, cannot be adduced, not only because the sayings of this writer are altogether without authority; but also that *ὄρεξις κοιλίας* may very properly be referred to the desire of filling the belly. It is well known that words in the genitive, connected with another noun, frequently denote the object, not the subject. Modern grammarians have accumulated examples, and Hermann (on Viger, p. 877,) has shown the reason of this. But *κοιλία* may, in this passage, be used in the same sense in which it occurs in other passages of the LXX. as Job iii. 11, xxxi. 15, Genes. xxv. 23, with which *συνουσιασμός* agrees.

We must observe, in passing, that *ἐπιθυμεῖν* and *ἐπιθυμία*, are not always put for licentious passion, but for a virtuous and tender desire of the soul; the wish for a real good, as Luké xxii. 15, Phil. i. 23, 1 Tim. iii. 1. Finally, *ἐπιθυμεῖν κατὰ τίνος*, is not to be contrary to any thing, but, by passion, to be led contrary to any thing; as Gal. v. 17, *ἡ σάρξ ἐπιθυμεῖν κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα κατὰ τῆς σαρκός, i. e.* the tendency of the flesh is against the spirit, and of the spirit is against the flesh; and *ταῦτα ἀντίκειται ἀλλήλοις*, these are opposed to each other (scil. *σὰρξ καὶ*

πνεῦμα,) so that ye cannot do the things that ye would.

ἐκπλήσσεσθαι. ἐκθαυβεῖσθαι. ἔξιστασθαι.

These words are similar; for they all denote the affection of mind which arises out of the presentation of a new, unexpected, and great object to the eye or the mind. They differ, however, not only in degree, but in the nature of the affection. *ἐκπλήσσεσθαι* has the most extensive meaning. It is used of all things by which the mind is powerfully affected, not only with fear, sorrow, anger; but also of those more pleasing objects, the aspect of which stimulates us in a pleasing manner to love, reverence, or delight.\* Frequently, therefore, the cause by which any one *ἐκπλήσσεται* is added. So Xenoph. Sympos, 4. 23, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔρωτος ἐκπλαγέντα. Euripid. Hel. v. 1413. ἀνδρὸς χάρισιν ἐκπεπληγμένην. Rhes. v. 291. Θάμβει ἐκπλαγέντες. Med. v. 8. ἔρωτι θυμὸν ἐκπλαγεῖσα. In the New Testament it is applied to auditors, ἔξεπλάγησα. ἐπὶ τῇ διδαχῇ αὐτοῦ; and to the parents of Jesus, Luke ii. 48, ιδόντες αὐτὸν ἔξεπλάγησαν, *i. e.* with joy and admiration, when they found him in the midst of the doctors. But *ἐκθαυβεῖσθαι*, which occurs three

\* Query, **פָּלָל** *admirabile esse vel fieri, πλαστω, placebo,* please.—T.

times in Mark, is applied to those who, by the sight or consideration of some great or fearful thing, are horrified ; not only because the object itself gives rise to fear, but also because the mind is scarcely able to conceive of its magnitude.<sup>7</sup> So in Mark ix. 15, εὐθέως ὁ ὄχλος ἰδὼν αὐτὸν ἐξεθαυμάζει, *i. e.* were astonished as any one is wont to be, when the object then spoken of is presented suddenly. In Mark xvi. 5, 6, it denotes wonder, coupled with fear. Finally, xiv. 33, it is said of our Lord ἤρξατο ἐκθαυμάζεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδημονεῖν (Matth. xxvi. 37, λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδημ.). Luther has rendered this *zu zittern und zu zagen*, in a way more adapted to customary speech than to the true force of the word ; and not in accordance with our Lord's character, whose habit it was to regard his death as instant, and to foretel it. But when the hour of death arrived, it could not be but that his mind must be intensely affected by the immediate contemplation of a form of death, not only cruel, but of the severest suffering : not, as some older theologians have said, that he shrunk with fear from that death or those sufferings. For although it must be conceded to human nature, in its most resolute form, that the spirit, in such

<sup>7</sup> From מירט, *miratus est, obstupuit.* — T.

a crisis, would be considerably affected ; yet he who was conscious that he was in the path of duty, and who was endued with the very wisdom of Deity, and who knew himself to be commissioned by his Father expressly that he might die for the salvation of the human race, would regard all perturbation or dread as altogether foreign to him and unworthy. They therefore write either in folly or in malice who choose to aver from such passages as this, that our Lord only understood, at a later period of his course, the necessity of his death, when he saw that either death must be submitted or the cause of truth betrayed ; for that otherwise, he would not have been in such uneasiness if he had not hoped originally that the course of events would have been more prosperous. But of this I have spoken elsewhere.

Finally, *ἐξίστασθαι* is said of those who, by any event, are so far disturbed that they are not quite in their senses, and know not what they think or say. In this sense it is often used in the New Testament. It occurs also in Mark iii. 21, *Ἐλεγον γὰρ ὅτι ἐξέστη* ; where it does not mean that they said Jesus was out of his mind ; but they thought (this is often the force of *Ἐλεγον*) that he was so pressed by the crowd as to lose his self-possession (*ausser sich seyn.*)

For this was not the opinion of enemies, but of friends, *τῶν παρ' αὐτοῦ*. This is evident from the connection *ἀκούσαντες οἱ παρ' αὐτοῦ*—*ἥθελον*—*ἔλεγον γάρ*. For in the midst of the gathering crowd of Galileans, he held a great disputation with the lawyers who had followed him from Jerusalem, v. 22—30. His friends, therefore, feared on his account, lest any harm should happen to him, and therefore they went out to bring him in (*κρατῆσαι*), and rescue him from the multitude. The word is used peculiarly in 2 Cor. v. 13, *εἴτε γάρ ἐξέστημεν, Θεῷ· εἴτε σωφρονοῦμεν, ὑμῖν*. For there, since a man cannot think who has lost his self-possession, it is often said that *ἐξίστασθαι* is, in this place, to be excessive, to boast exceedingly. And this, because it is opposed to *σωφρονεῖν*. But it can scarcely be so understood, for what would be the meaning there of *ἐξίστασθαι τῷ Θεῷ*? For how could it be said that he did this to God, or for God's sake? Neither is it necessary to seek for an idea contrary to *τῷ σωφρονεῖν*. 1 Cor. xiii. 8. xv. 11, 2. Thes. ii. 15. I suspect, therefore, that *ἐξίστασθαι*, in this passage, means to yield to another, as to way, place, honour, to prefer another to one's self, in which it is not unfrequent in Greek writers. See *οὐδῶν ἐξίστασθαι*. Xenoph. Sympos. iv. 31. And evidently so in Lucian, Sat. 7.

iii. p. 390, *καὶ ἐξέστην τῷ Διὶ*. The sense, therefore, will be, “If I yield willingly, (*ἐν καρδίᾳ*) I do it for God’s sake;” for since all things are of God, I arrogate nothing to myself; if I behave with modesty *ἐν προσώπῳ* it is for your sakes, to whom especially I would be useful. See note on Herodian, vol. viii. 8, 13.

*φροντίζειν μεριμνᾶν.*

These words are generally supposed to differ. They are both rendered, to care, to be solicitous; except that in some passages of the New Testament it is said that *μεριμνᾶν* means to be too solicitous, to be over anxiously careful. For although both words carry the meaning of to care, yet they differ. For *φροντίζειν* means only to care, to aim, to meditate, to give diligence, that a thing may be done or be present. So it occurs once in the New Testament, Titus iii. 8. *ἴνα φροντίζωσι καλῶν ἔργων πρὸστασθαι*, to be careful. But *μεριμνᾶν* is so to care, as to be truly solicitous that the thing should not be wanting.<sup>2</sup> Wherefore our Lord

<sup>2</sup> *φροντίζειν* is from *φρονέω* *φρέν*; and the proper idea therefore is thought, consideration, the occupation of the mind with a subject of interest. *μεριμνᾶν* is derived from **מְרַע** *amarum esse*, *amaritudine afficit*; which, in all the cognate dialects of the Hebrew, is used not only in the sense of bitter, physically as a taste, but as bitterness of spirit, and fretful care and solicitude.—T.

rightly warns his disciples, Matth. x. 19, *μὴ μεριμνήσεται πῶς ἡ τί λαλήσετε· διδησται γὰρ ὑμῖν· τί λαλήσετε.* And also in Matth vi. 25, *μὴ μεριμνᾶτε τῇ ψυχῇ ὑμῶν*, *i. e.* be not solicitous, as if the things necessary to your life were about to fail you. And in verse 34, *μὴ οὖν μεριμνήσετε εἰς τὴν αὔριον*, be not solicitous about the morrow, so that although you know not what its events shall be, ye should so indulge mistrust as to increase by it the cares of to-day; *ἡ γὰρ αὔριον μεριμνήσει τὰ εἰαυτῆς*, for on the morrow it shall be seen that no needful blessing shall be wanting. It is not a care, even an earnest and solicitous care, for future things, which is reprehended; but that diffidence which originates in empty and baseless pride, and which agitates the mind and torments it during the whole course of life with fretful anxiety about earthly things. This is meant by the *μέριμνας τοῦ αἰῶνος*, which συμπνίγουσι τὸν λόγον. And therefore our Lord says (v. 32.) *πάντα ταῦτα τὰ ἔθινται επιζητεῖ*, *i. e.* as the most important and exclusively desirable; but as for you, *ζητεῖτε πρῶτον τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ Θεοῦ*.

In Themistius, Orat. 26, we find placed together, *φροντίσας καὶ μεριμνήσας, καὶ πολλὰς νύκτας ἀυπνεούσις καταμελετήσας*. See Wettstein on Matth. x. 19. *φροντίζειν*, we render, *für etwas sorgen*, but *μεριμνᾶν*, *sich etwas kümmern*. It is properly

therefore in this passage written,  $\mu\eta\ \mu\epsilon\gamma\mu\nu\eta\sigma\epsilon\tau\epsilon$ . For this is the habit of the unbelieving mind,  $\tau\tilde{\omega}\nu\ \dot{\alpha}\pi\sigma\tau\omega\nu\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \mu\epsilon\mu\gamma\mu\omega\tilde{\omega}\nu$ . The affections of mind, however, which these words express are so nearly allied, that often one word appears to be permuted for the other. See Moeris, *de Vocibus Atticis*, v.  $\mu\epsilon\gamma\mu\nu\tilde{\omega}\nu$ , and the examples therein adduced.

## CHAPTER X.

IN the former chapter we spoke of a particular class of synonyms. Some examples of this kind remain to be noticed. And of these I will now speak briefly.

*σκληρός. αὐστηρός.*

To many persons these two words appear to have little or no difference. They render either of them, by the terms, austere, hard, severe, harsh, inhuman. And so far certainly they agree, that neither character, so properly designated, has a regard to that which is equitable, but so uses his right, that he remits nothing, from a feeling of lenity or mercy. Yet they differ, (as in German our words *strengh* and *hart*.) For he is *αὐστηρός*, who although he is not altogether alien from the tenderness of humanity, yet represses it within him, because, under the force of reasons of justice, he thinks that nothing of his right, and of that which is due to him, should be conceded. But he is *σκληρός*, who asserts his right because the principle of humanity is wanting. The *αὐστηρός* would remit and indulge, but thinks that he

ought not; the *σκληρός* has no wish to do so. A father who is *αὐστηρός* cannot be condemned, but a father who is *σκληρός* is a bad man.

In Matth. xxv. 24, the same master is called *σκληρός*, whom the same servant, in Luke xix. 21, is made to call *αὐστηρός*. And hence it is concluded that the two words have the same meaning. We should take care, however, in treating parallel passages of this kind, if we find the same thing expressed in different words, not to conclude too hastily that the words do not differ in sense. This is a frequent error of lexicographers. For when two authors narrate the same fact in such a way, that they make use of different words, by which the general bearing of the narration is not affected, I ask on what ground are we entitled to affirm, that the two different words carry precisely the same meaning? So far we must admit, they are said, and may be said, of the same thing; but that they mean the same thing precisely is not yet proved. Neither, in the estimation of such men as the one mentioned in the parable, is there any great difference between a severe or strict master and a harsh and merciless one. He who is *σκληρός* is deservedly blamed, as in Aristotle's Ethics, iv. 8, *αγριοις και σκληροις*; but the *αὐστηρός* cannot

be blamed. Plutarch. Quaest. Gr. cap. 40, *καλὸς δὲ ὁν καὶ δίκαιος, οὐχ ἡττην ἦν σώφρων καὶ αὐστηρός.*

*πραῦς· ἡπιος· χρηστός· (πραῦτης· χρηστότης.)*

These words are the opposite of the two former ones; they agree as expressions of lenity of mind; yet they differ. For *πραῦς* is gentle, who endures all things with an even temper (*saufmüthig*;) *ἡπιος* is mild, especially towards the faults of others (*gelinde, mild*;) *χρηστός* kindly, who wishes well, and desires to benefit others (*gütig*.) Therefore in Matthew xxi. 5, *βασιλεὺς πραῦς* is not benign, but gentle, tender, free from proud ferocity; as in Pindar Pyth. iii. v. 124, *βασιλεὺς πραῦς ἀστοῖς, οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς.* Compare Matthew xi. 29, *ὅτι πρᾶος εἰμὶ καὶ ταπεινὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ.* And in 1 Peter iii. 4, *πραῦ καὶ ἡττήχιον πνεῦμα* is a meek and quiet spirit. Finally, the *πραεῖς* in Matthew v. 5, are free from that haughty self-sufficiency, in which the Jews made their boast of promised happiness; and therefore, it is said *κληρονομήσουσι τὴν γῆν*, see Wetstein on this passage. The force of *ἡπιος* may be sufficiently shown by one passage, 1 Thess. ii. 7, *δυνάμενοι ἐν βάρει εἶναι, ὡς χριστοῦ ἀπόστολοι, ἐγενήθημεν ἡπιοι ἐν μέσῳ ὑμῶν, ὡς ἀν τροφὸς θάλπη τὰ ἐστῆς τέκνα;* as in Homer, *πατήρ δὲ ὡς ἡπιος ἦεν.* *πρᾶος* denotes tenderness of spirit;

ἥπιος the exhibition of that tenderness in bearing with others; (*gelinde, mild bey der Behandlung andrer.*) In 2 Tim. ii. 24, the servant of the Lord must not strive (*i. e.* about useless questions,) but *ἥπιον εἶναι πρὸς πάντας*, *i. e.* he must be gentle in bearing with the opinions of others, διδακτικὸν, ἀνεξίκακον, ἐν πρεφότητι παιδεύοντα τοὺς ἀντίδιατιθεμένους. He is *ἥπιος* who seeks to the utmost of his power, not to annoy or distress others. So we find *ἥπια φάρμακα*, Iliad. δ. 212; and *ἥπια ἀκέσματα*, Aeschyl. Prometh. v. 481. And in Herodot. iii. 89, we find *ἥπιος* opposed to *χαλεπός*.

In the word *χειρότος* the presiding notion is benevolence, benignity. Our Lord says of the Father that he is *χειρότον ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀχαριστούς καὶ πονηρούς*, Luke vi. 35. For he who is *χειρότος* not only is kind to the good but to the evil. This injunction had preceded: Love your enemies. The *ἀχάριστοι καὶ πονηροί* are those who, regardless of benefit received, act wickedly, and are to all *ἀχειρότοι*. Compare Ephes. iv. 32, and 1 Cor. xv. 32, and Wetstein's notes. Often also *χειροί* and *πονηροί* are opposed to each other. In Matthew xi. 30, ὁ ζυγός μου *χειρότος καὶ τὸ φορτίον μου ἐλαφρέον ἔστι*, it is commonly thought that *χειρότος*, is easy, pleasant. But I rather think that here also it is, benign. For the yoke of

the law, especially in connexion with the traditions and comments of the Pharisees was πονηρός; (*φρεγτία δυσβάστακτα* Matth. xxiii. 4, Luke xi. 46.) and yet it was ἀχρηστός; but the ζυγὸς τοῦ χριστοῦ was χρηστός, *i. e.* benign (*ein wohlthätiges Joch*;) for he who bears it feels himself to be more blessed as he goes forward. But let young students be on their guard, lest they so conceive of the φρεγτίον ἐλαφρόν, as to suppose that the precepts of Christian duty are easy to be observed—which is very incorrect; for it may be easy enough to abstain from certain meats; but ζῆν κατὰ πνεῦμα, is not so easy; to overcome every rebellious passion, and constantly to obey the divine commandments, not by the fear of punishments or the hope of reward, but solely from the love of truth and virtue, and of the holy authority which commands it. And yet it may be said truly, ἐλαφρὸν τὸ φρεγτίον, *i. e.* εὔφροσον καὶ εὐβάστακτον, because it does not depress the soul, but nourishes and confirms it day by day; so that daily it is made χρηστότερος καὶ ἐλαφρότερος. For many are the κουφά to the narrow-minded man, especially if they are ἐπίχειρα; but ἀφύεται ἐλευθέρω ἀνδρί, as in Lucian, 1. Merc. cond. 13. p. 669. But to return. In Romans ii. 4, it will be granted by all that τὸ χρηστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ means the benevolence of God; but then they

say that *χρηστότης* in the New Testament, not only denotes benevolence or beneficence, as Rom. ii. 4, xi. 22, 2. Cor. vi. 5, &c., but also the benefit derived from benevolence, as in Ephes. ii. 7, *πλοῦτον τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ ἐν χρηστότητι ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*. But in this passage *χάρις* seems rather, as elsewhere, to express the benefit conferred on us, by divine benevolence, through Jesus Christ. In Titus iii. 4, also, who does not see that *χρήστότης* denotes not the benefit but the benevolence? If we are to give heed also to the lexicographers, even *ἐπιεικής* does not differ from those words of which we have spoken, for they render it mild, clement, indulgent, lenient, humane, and *ἐπιεικεία* clemency, humanity. But in *ἐπιεικής* there is not the notion of a mind moderate, mild, merciful; which renders the three former words synonymous; but *ἐπιεικής* is rather one who is easy, yielding, not obstinate, (*gefällig, nachgiebig,*) opposed to *χαλεπός*. But all this is well known.

*νήπιος· ἄφεων· ἀνόητος· ἀσύνετος·*

with the substantives

*ἄνοια· ἀφεσύνη· μωρία.*

All these words so far agree as they express a certain deficiency of intellect, whether this shows itself in thinking or acting. Yet they differ very widely.

The word *νήπιος* is properly expressive of age, and therefore it does not denote vice, absolutely; nor is it predicated properly of man only, but frequently it is used to express an incautious ingenuous man, unsuspecting of evil; it is put for that simplicity of mind which is so pleasing in youth.

But since in adults this quality is deservedly reproved, as unworthy of a mature mind, it is used as a term of reproach towards those who think, feel, and act like children, when from their years they ought to have made further advances. In the New Testament, however, it often occurs without the idea of reprehension. So Matth. xi. 25, Luke x. 21, Gal. iv. 3, Rom. ii. 20. Hence *νήπιοι* ἐν Χριστῷ 1 Cor. iii. 1. In the same way *νηπιάζειν* occurs 1 Cor. xiv. 20, *μὴ παιδία γένεσθε ταῖς φρεσὶν, ἀλλὰ τῇ κακίᾳ νηπιάζετε.* as in Xenoph. Ages. i. 17. *παιδά τῇ ἀπάτῃ.* In Ephes. iv. 14, they are called *νήπιοι*, who, like infants, are incautious and easily deceived. The word stands opposed to *ἀνήρ τέλειος* v. 15. (comp. Heb. v. 13.)

The word *ἄφεων* denotes one who does not rightly use his mental powers. And this is not always used in a bad sense. For what the lexicographers say, that it means foolish, senseless, pagan, impious, villainous, and even ostent-

tentious, must be rejected, together with their other frequent trifling. It answers, in fact, to our word *unverständlich*; which is not only applied to boys, but to any who, without actual blame, are destitute of the true knowledge of things; and it is said sometimes without the idea of blame. So it occurs almost invariably in the New Testament. In Rom. ii. 20, *παιδευτὴς ἀφρόνων* and *διδάσκαλος νηπίων* occur together; and in 2 Cor. xi. 19, we read *ἡδεῖς γὰρ ἀνέχεοθε τῶν ἀφρόνων, φρόνιμοι ὄντες*. Neither are the *ἀφρόνες*, impious, or vain and insolent boasters; for the *φρόνιμος*, could not properly bear with such; but they are rather men who find pleasure in light and trifling things; and are called *ἀφρόνες*, because they do not understand that such things are vain and perishing. Luke xii. 20, 21. Such men the *φρόνιμοι* not only bear with, but they may do so *ἡδεῖς*, *i. e.* without anger. In this sense Paul, in verse 16, calls himself *ἀφρών*, because after the manner of men he boasted, *ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ, i. e. ὡς ἀφρών*. For as they are *φρόνιμοι* who rightly estimate things around them, so men who are deceived by foolish vanities, yet boast themselves, are called *αφρόνες*. So in Xenophon Apol. we find *ἀφρόνεστέξα ἡ μεγαληγορία*; and Sympos. 4. 55, they are called *ἀφρόνες*, who were pleased with the deceits of a Sicilian. In

1 Peter ii. 15, it is joined with ἀγνωσίᾳ; which is put for the ignorance of men who are influenced by mere outward appearance. Commonly it is there interpreted, calumny, probably because it occurs thus, φιμοῦν τὴς τῶν ἀφρόνων ἀγνωσίαν. But φιμοῦν in this passage is simply to cōerce.

The word ἀνόητος differs from both the former. It is foolish, stupid, either that which is really wanting in right reason, (*unvernünftig*); or that it is not properly called out; so that, although a man may appear to himself to follow a certain rule in acting, yet he is in fact guided by false rules, both in thought and action. Paul, therefore, calls the Galatians ἀνοήτοι; because, although they thought themselves very wise, they were, in fact, decidedly false teachers, and had returned to the old superstition. And the ἀνοήτοι are rightly opposed to the σόφοι; Rom. i. 14; and Titus iii. 3. ἡμεν γάρ ποτε καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνόητοι, *i. e.* we followed a wrong course of living, not we were without a proper knowledge of religion. And when Jesus, Luke xxiv. 25, called his two disciples, ἀνόητους καὶ βραδεῖς τῇ καρδίᾳ, it is plain that he could not, and would not, upbraid their weakness and slowness of intellect; but he calls them ἀνόητοι, because they had formed from the Scriptures a false hope respecting the Messiah, and had consequently sunk into despondency.

Luther well renders it : *Thoren*. Neither, as we lately observed, is  $\beta\varrho\alpha\delta\epsilon\iota\varsigma\tau\bar{\eta}\chi\alpha\varrho\delta\iota\alpha$  slow of mind or stupid : nor  $\beta\varrho\alpha\delta\bar{\nu}\varsigma\tau\bar{\eta}\chi\alpha\varrho\delta\iota\alpha$  taken by itself, incredulous ; but the whole formula  $\beta\varrho\alpha\delta\epsilon\iota\varsigma\tau\bar{\eta}\chi\alpha\varrho\delta\iota\alpha\tau\bar{\nu}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\nu}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\iota}\bar{\nu}$ , expresses an incredulous man, one hard of belief. For when  $\beta\varrho\alpha\delta\bar{\nu}\varsigma$  is said of the mind of man, the kind of slowness is determined by the rest of the sentence. A man may be either  $\beta\varrho\alpha\delta\bar{\nu}\varsigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma\tau\bar{\delta}\lambda\alpha\lambda\bar{\eta}\bar{\varsigma}\bar{\alpha}\bar{\iota}$ ,  $\beta\varrho\alpha\delta\bar{\nu}\varsigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma\bar{\delta}\bar{\bar{\eta}}\bar{\gamma}\bar{\eta}\bar{\nu}$ . (James i. 19.)  $\epsilon\iota\varsigma\tau\bar{\delta}\sigma\bar{\nu}\iota\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\nu}\bar{\alpha}\bar{\iota}$ ,  $\epsilon\iota\varsigma\tau\bar{\delta}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\nu}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\iota}\bar{\nu}$ . But  $\beta\varrho\alpha\delta\bar{\nu}\varsigma$  alone never means slowness of intellect or stupidity. Theophrastus rightly says, ch. 14. (27.)  $\bar{\alpha}\bar{\nu}\bar{\alpha}\bar{\iota}\bar{\sigma}\bar{\bar{\theta}}\bar{\eta}\bar{\varsigma}\bar{\iota}\bar{\alpha}\bar{\nu}\beta\varrho\alpha\delta\bar{\nu}\bar{\tau}\bar{\eta}\bar{\tau}\bar{\alpha}\bar{\psi}\bar{\chi}\bar{\bar{\eta}}\bar{\varsigma}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\nu}\bar{\lambda}\bar{\bar{\gamma}}\bar{\bar{\eta}}\bar{\bar{\nu}}$ , which passage is sometimes adduced to show that  $\beta\varrho\alpha\delta\bar{\nu}\varsigma$  means stupid. Polybius also, whom (iv. 8. 7.) they say had affirmed the Thessalonians to be  $\bar{\alpha}\bar{\chi}\bar{\bar{\eta}}\bar{\bar{\sigma}}\bar{\bar{\tau}}\bar{\bar{\alpha}}\bar{\bar{\nu}}\bar{\bar{\chi}}$  and  $\beta\varrho\alpha\delta\bar{\nu}\varsigma$  useless and stupid, had said a little before that the same man was often  $\sigma\bar{\nu}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\tau}\bar{\bar{\omega}}\bar{\bar{\tau}}\bar{\bar{\alpha}}\bar{\bar{\tau}}\bar{\bar{\alpha}}\bar{\bar{\nu}}\bar{\bar{\chi}}$  and  $\beta\varrho\alpha\delta\bar{\nu}\bar{\tau}\bar{\bar{\alpha}}\bar{\bar{\tau}}\bar{\bar{\alpha}}\bar{\bar{\nu}}\bar{\bar{\chi}}$ . Certainly in both passages the word denotes slowness of action. But let students beware how they confide in examples brought from other writers. But to return. In 1 Tim. vi. 9, when the Apostle speaks of  $\iota\bar{\pi}\bar{\bar{\theta}}\bar{\bar{\eta}}\bar{\bar{\mu}}\bar{\bar{\iota}}\bar{\bar{\alpha}}\bar{\bar{\iota}}\bar{\bar{\nu}}\bar{\bar{\alpha}}\bar{\bar{\tau}}\bar{\bar{\nu}}\bar{\bar{\chi}}$   $\bar{\alpha}\bar{\nu}\bar{\bar{\eta}}\bar{\bar{\tau}}\bar{\bar{\alpha}}\bar{\bar{\nu}}$ , he does not mean passions which make men mad, as some render it ; but which are themselves wild and irrational, as  $\pi\bar{\theta}\bar{\bar{\eta}}\bar{\bar{\mu}}\bar{\bar{\iota}}\bar{\bar{\alpha}}\bar{\bar{\tau}}\bar{\bar{\nu}}\bar{\bar{\chi}}$   $\bar{\alpha}\bar{\bar{\eta}}\bar{\bar{\tau}}\bar{\bar{\alpha}}\bar{\bar{\nu}}\bar{\bar{\chi}}$  in Eurip. Herc. Fur. v. 310. Compare Schol. on Aristoph. Nub.

v. 426. *ἀνοίᾳ* frequently means want of mind, not want of piety ; as Luke vi. 11, and 2 Tim. iii. 9 ; but the word *ἀνοησίᾳ* appears to agree more fully with the proper meaning of the word *ἀνοητος* ; of which word Moeris gives some examples on the word *ηλιθιος*.

Finally, *ἀσύνετος* expresses density and inaptitude of mind to perceive that which is true and just. For the word *ἀξύνετος* s. *ἀσύνετος*, is used by the Greeks in two ways, both of a heavy and stupid man, who is wanting in intellectual acumen ; and of those things which are difficult of comprehension, and only to be apprehended by men of acuteness, by the *σύνετοι*. In this latter sense it does not occur in the sacred writings : See Valkenar on Euripid. Phoen. v. 1510 ; but in the former sense it is used both in the New Testament, and by other writers ; although it is somewhat surprising that the Greeks have used the same word both in the active and passive sense. And, in the same way, they use *συνετός*, both of him who readily and acutely perceives, and of the thing easily understood. There are some who affirm, that in Rom. i. 31, and x. 30, *ἀσύνετος* is wicked, wanting in true religion ; but without any ground, except that in Suidas we find *ἀσυνέτους τοὺς ἀσυνείδήτους*. But in the midst of

an enumeration of particular vices, we could hardly expect to find the general notion of wickedness or improbity; and in c. x. 30, ἔθνος ἀσύνετον evidently means a people so far inferior to the Jews in understanding, as to be the object of contempt. (οὐκ ἔθνος.)

In fine, *νήπιος* is one who is yet inexperienced, unknowing; *ἄφεων*, one who does not use his rational powers; *ἀνόητος*, who, although he appears to know, yet thinks and acts perversely; *ἀσύνετος*, one who, from density of mind, does not perceive truth and right. The fault of the *ἀφεόνες* is *ἀφροσύνη*, and the *ἀνοήτοι, μωρία*, in the *νηπίοι, ἀπλότης*, in the *ἀσυνέτοι, ἀσυνεσία*. We will turn now, however, to some other examples.

εὐσεβής. εὐλαβής. εὐσέβεια. εὐλάβεια.

These words are synonymous; for they are all used to express piety, Luke ii. 25, *ἀνὴρ δίκαιος καὶ εὐλαβής*. Acts x. 2, *εὐσεβής καὶ φιλούμενος τὸν Θεόν*. Heb. xii. 28, *μετὰ αἰδοῦς καὶ εὐλαβείας*. 1 Tim. ii. 2, *ἐν πάσῃ εὐσεβείᾳ καὶ σεμνότητι*. Passages, however, occur, in which their several and special significations must be observed. *εὐσεβής* and *εὐλαβής* differ, inasmuch as *εὐσεβής* expresses that reverence for the Deity which shows itself in actions, especially in the worship of God; but *εὐλαβής* indicates that disposition, which dreads and avoids the doing any thing contrary

to right, and diligently labours, therefore, to fulfil all the duties of piety and humanity.  $\varepsilon\nu\lambda\alpha\beta\eta\varsigma$  is the pious man, who is governed by the thought of the divine sanctity, and always fears lest he should do, or think, any thing opposed to the divine will, *gottesfürchtig*; a God-fearing man; but he is  $\varepsilon\nu\sigma\epsilon\beta\eta\varsigma$  who shows that piety by acting, *fromm*. Hence  $\varepsilon\nu\lambda\alpha\beta\epsilon\iota\alpha$  is that piety which governs the soul, *Gottesfurcht*;  $\varepsilon\nu\sigma\epsilon\beta\epsilon\iota\alpha$  is the energy of piety in the life, both internal and external, *Frömmigkeit, Gottseligkeit*. Luther properly renders 1 Tim. vi. 6,  $\varepsilon\sigma\tau\iota\ \delta\varepsilon\pi\sigma\iota\sigma\mu\delta\varsigma\ \mu\acute{e}g\alpha\varsigma\ \eta\ \varepsilon\nu\sigma\epsilon\beta\epsilon\iota\alpha\ \mu\acute{e}\tau\grave{a}\ \alpha\acute{u}\tau\alpha\gamma\kappa\epsilon\iota\alpha\varsigma$ , *wer gottselig ist*. For true piety has this power, that life is rendered desirable, even though destitute of external prosperity; and we find ourselves happy if it be only in an acquiescence in the providential government of God. That is  $\varepsilon\nu\sigma\epsilon\beta\epsilon\iota\alpha\ \mu\acute{e}\tau\grave{a}\ \alpha\acute{u}\tau\alpha\gamma\kappa\epsilon\iota\alpha\varsigma$ . On the contrary, they are said to be most miserably in error, who are  $\nu\omega\acute{m}\iota\zeta\omega\tau\epsilon\varsigma\ \pi\sigma\iota\sigma\mu\grave{\o}\nu\ \varepsilon\iota\eta\iota\ \tau\grave{\eta}\nu\ \varepsilon\nu\sigma\epsilon\beta\epsilon\iota\alpha\eta\varsigma$ , *i. e.* who look for mere earthly gain from their piety. It is piety  $\mu\acute{e}\tau\grave{a}\ \alpha\acute{u}\tau\alpha\gamma\kappa\epsilon\iota\alpha\varsigma$  which is gainful. And  $\varepsilon\nu\sigma\epsilon\beta\epsilon\iota\alpha$  in this passage, does not mean the Christian religion which leads to piety. It is  $\eta\ \chi\alpha\tau\grave{a}\ \varepsilon\nu\sigma\epsilon\beta\epsilon\iota\alpha\eta\varsigma\ \delta\acute{i}\delta\alpha\sigma\kappa\alpha\lambda\iota\alpha$  v. 13, which is the institution for producing piety. Neither is  $\tau\grave{\theta}\ \mu\omega\sigma\tau\grave{\eta}\grave{\iota}\sigma\eta\varsigma\ \tau\grave{\eta}\varsigma\ \varepsilon\nu\sigma\epsilon\beta\epsilon\iota\alpha\varsigma$  1 Tim. iii. 16, as it is usually rendered, the mystery of

religion, *i. e.* the Christian doctrine; but *μυστήριον τῆς εὐσέβειας* is that doctrine or matter to which all piety, *i. e.* Christian religion is to be referred. *στύλος καὶ ἐδραίωμα τῆς ἀληθείας*, namely, *Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκὶ κ. λ.* That *εὐσέβεια* is that especially which shows itself in the life, is evident from *Acts xxii. 12*; *ἀνὴρ εὐσέβης κατὰ τὸν νόμον*, as in *Xenoph. Hist. Gr. i. 7, 10.* *κατὰ τὸν νόμον, εὐσέβουντες καὶ εὐορχοῦντες, κρινεῖτε.* Compare *Acts xvii. 23, 2 Tim. iii. 5.* Wherefore Peter, *2 Epistle i. 6*, exhorts Christians to show in their continence, patience, in their patience, *εὐσέβεια*, and in their *εὐσέβεια*, brotherly love.

But as *εὐλαβῆς* properly denotes timidity and caution, it is so said of piety, as that it exhibits the effects of piety on the mind rather than the principle of the life of piety. It occurs in this sense in the passages quoted. But there are two places adduced in which it is supposed that *τοὺς εὐλαβεῖς*, means proselytes of the gate; who elsewhere are spoken of by the terms *φοβούμενοι* and *σεβόμενοι τὸν Θεόν*. So *Acts ii. 5.* *ἵσαν δὲ ἐν Ἱερουσαλήμ κατοικοῦντες Ἰουδαῖοι, ἀνδρες εὐλαβεῖς, ἀπὸ παντὸς Ἰδνους τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν.* But first, there is no reason why we should admit the idea of proselytes, since there is nothing said concerning these men which may not be said of Jews generally. For it is evident that *οἱ*

κατοικοῦντες ἐν Ἱερ. ἄνδρες εὐλαβεῖς are only mentioned; because Jews, not only those born in Palestine and speaking Hebrew, but all those who journeyed from different provinces to Jerusalem, and spoke different languages or dialects, each severally heard these Apostles, who were Galileans, speak ἐκαστος ἐν τῇ ιδίᾳ διαλέκτῳ αὐτῶν, ἐν ᾧ ἐγεννήθησαν. For when they are spoken of as κατοικοῦντες ἐν Ἱερουσαλήμ, this is understood, with little reason, to refer to those proselytes who are called נָרִי תֹשֶׁב; and who certainly received this appellation, not because they dwelt in Jerusalem, but because they were permitted to sojourn among the Israelites generally. For these sojourners lived not only in Jerusalem, but throughout the whole of Palestine, and amongst the Jews scattered through all the various provinces of the Roman Empire. Besides, they are called ιουδαῖοι which name was not applied to the mere sojourning proselytes, but only to those who were proselytes of the covenant. Peter himself, calls them ἄνδρες ιουδαῖοι καὶ οἱ κατοικοῦντες Ἱερουσαλήμ ἀπαντες; but in v. 22, ἄνδρες ισραηλῖται. In v. 10, however, a distinction is drawn between ιουδαῖοι τε καὶ προσήλυτοι. Finally, the whole line of argument which Peter adopts, would have been inapplicable to the sojourners among them.

whom the rulers of the Jews only required to observe the Noachic precepts; for Peter made use of examples which could only influence those who had embraced the whole law. That the term cannot be referred to proselytes of the covenant may be understood from this, that these could neither be distinguished from Jews by this term, neither could they be called *κατοικοῦντες*. For this word, if it indeed accords with the Hebrew term **תושב**, is applicable only to the sojourners, to whom the rest of the description does not apply. They appear to me, therefore, to have been men, not born in Judea, yet of the Jewish nation, who were dwelling for a time at Jerusalem, among whom also it appears by v. 10, some were proselytes. For it is evident that *κατοικεῖν* may be affirmed of all the dwellers at Jerusalem, and not only of the sojourners, *Acts i. 19.*

A second instance occurs of the use of the word *εὐλάβεις*, where *ἄνδρες εὐλαβεῖς* are said to have buried Stephen. But there is no reason to suppose them proselytes either. And, lastly, there is a passage, *Heb. v. 7*, in which *εὐλάβεια* appears to be said of anxiety of mind, *καὶ εἰσακούσθεις ἀπὸ τῆς εὐλαβείας*. This is rendered: “and was heard and delivered from anxi-

ty." But seeing that by this view, the series of thought is manifestly interrupted, (offering up ardent prayers, he was freed and accomplished a perfect obedience,) I would prefer to understand *εὐλαύεια* in the sense of piety, for the sake of which he was heard. For he received this reward of true piety, that he obtained that for which he prayed. For he did not ask to be set free from the suffering of death, but that in the enduring of death, he might experience that constancy and perseverance of mind which Luke relates to have been conferred on him, c. xxii. 42, 43. It would appear, therefore, that all these words *Καίπερ ὡν θύσεις ξυαθειν—ιπακούν*, should be included in a parenthesis, that the other parts of the sentence may cohere together, *δεήσεις προσενέγκας, εἰσάκουθεις — καὶ τελειωθεις ἐγένετο αἴτιος σωτηρίας..* On this use of the preposition *ἀπό*, see Abresch. Dilucid. Thuc. p. 144, and Morus ad Isocr. Paneg. p. 55.

It is a groundless complaint which some persons have made, that some vocables in the New Testament are used so vaguely and indefinitely, that among their various meanings it is not always apparent which is to be attached to them in each particular instance. Whence it arises, that to the same vocable

sometimes they affix the generic and sometimes a certain specific signification. But any one may perceive that this would be an erroneous mode of interpretation. For if a word denotes any thing which has several forms united under one common genus, but different in species, it is certainly possible that the generic word may be predicated of each particular species; but it would be very absurd to say, that the word denoted all the particulars which class under the one genus. It were ridiculous if any one in a German lexicon, among the meanings of the word *Holz* (wood), should enumerate all the species of wood as if they were expressed by the generic term; and should state, that it sometimes means the genus and sometimes the several species which compose the genus, and then give all the different kinds of trees, as *Bauholz*, *Brennholz*, *Nutzholz*. And is it not then equally ridiculous, when, in the lexicons to the New Testament, we see, affixed to any word, all the notions of the several things which are associated under it as separate species? It is one thing for a word to be predicated of several things, because the common or generic notion inherent in it, applies to those several things; it is another for that word to denote these se-

veral specific things. The examples of this error are innumerable, but in this discussion a few will suffice.

*ἀκαθαρσία· ἀσέλγεια· ἀσωτία·*

These words are said to have at times a wider signification than at others; and sometimes to denote all improbity of manners and of life, at others, to represent only some special form of that general pravity. So that it must be sometimes doubtful what notion is in each place to be attached to the word. The cause, however, of such ambiguity and hesitation, must be sought not in the negligence or carelessness of the writers, but in the ignorance of the true force of the word which they have used. These words may have been accounted synonymous, because each has the common notion of impurity of life—defiled by intemperate passions; yet each has its specific and proper force, which, if we observe accurately, we need never remain in doubt as to the meaning in each particular instance.

The word *ἀκαθαρσία* has the most extensive meaning, for it denotes every kind of impurity of mind and conduct. But *ἀσέλγεια*, and *ἀσωτία*, although they also are truly *ἀκαθαρσία*; yet they denote a certain kind of *ἀκαθαρσία* only; so that they cannot be permuted, as if it were the

same thing whether ἀσέλγεια, ἀσωτία, πορνεία, or ἀκαθαρσία, ἀνομία were written; and they are not so promiscuously used in the New Testament. For ἀκαθαρσία is used to express any kind of mental or moral impurity or uncleanness, and not merely impure passions and indulgences. So in 1 Thess. ii. 3, the παράκλησις is said to be made οὐκ ἐκ πλάνης, οὐδὲ ἐξ ἀκαθαρσίας, οὐδὲ ἐκ δόλου, neither in error, nor by impure council, nor in guile; and in c. iv. it is opposed to δικαιοσύνη. And in Romans vi. 19, it is not synonymous with ἀνομία, but it is said generally of all impurity of life. The sense is, as ye formerly παρεστήσατε τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν δοῦλα τῆς ἀκαθαρσίας καὶ τῆς ἀνομίας, i. e. to impurity, and to improbity, εἰς τὴν ἀνομίαν, so as to lead an impious and flagitious life; so now consecrate them to probity and virtue, (τῆς δικαιοσύνης) εἰς ἀγιασμόν, that you may lead a pure and holy life. I know not but that the words εἰς ἀνομίαν and εἰς ἀγιασμόν might be taken in connection with παρεστήσατε; so that the sense would be, your members which formerly in the service of impurity, were devoted to impiety, now δοῦλα τῆς δικαιοσύνης, consecrate to holiness and chastity. There is a very similar passage in Ephes. iv. 19, οἵτινες παρέδωκεν ἑαυτοὺς τῇ ἀσέλγειᾳ εἰς ἐργασίαν ἀκαθαρσίας πάσης ἐν πλεονεξίᾳ. It seems, however,

opposed to this, that *παριστάναι* is joined sometimes with the dative, as v. 16.

The word *ἀσέλγεια* differs from *ἀκαθαρσία*. *ἀσέλγής* is properly petulant, saucy, impudent; one without modesty or retiredness, but who acts immoderately and with wantonness; and *ἀσέλγεια*, therefore, is the forwardness and peevish impertinence of the *ἀσέλγής*, and not the obscenity and uncleanness of lust. This is proved by innumerable passages, which, after Henry Stephen, the lexicographers have heaped together. See also Westein on New Testament, vol. i. 588. In this sense it occurs in 2 Cor. xii. 21, joined with *ἀκαθαρσία* and *πορνεία*, as in Cicero, pro Cael. 29, c. 12, there is a long harangue, *de corruptelis, de adulteriis, de protervitate, de sumtibus*. Rom. xiii. 13, *μὴ κοίταις καὶ ἀσέλγειαις*; and in the list of vices given in Gal. v. 19. It is probably used to express filthy lust in 2 Peter ii. 7, 18; but in 1 Peter iv. 3, it seems rather to intimate wantonness. It is doubtful in what sense it is specially intended in Mark vii. 22. *κλωπαί, πλεονεξίαι, πονηρίαι, δόλος, ἀσέλγεια, ὀφθαλμὸς πονηρός, βλασφημία, ὑπερηφανία, ἀφροσύνη*. It cannot mean lust, for it is classed with vices of another character, and that has been already noticed in v. 21. The interpreters, therefore, generally

render it injury; but it is rather insolence; the insolence of men, who, indulgent to their own passions, have no regard to that which is just and equal, but trample down every right of others, while they hurry on to their own object.<sup>a</sup> In this sense it often occurs, among

\* I cannot trace satisfactorily the oriental root of this word. Probably if we could, we might arrive at a more distinct determination of its generic force, and thus reconcile the seeming discrepancy and obscurity which evidently attend it. There are traces of the original word in the whole of the Gothic family of languages. In the Gothic translation of the Gospel by Ulphilas, *unselgam* is the wicked. This word is still retained in German, *unselig*, miserable, fatal, condemned. And it occurs also without the negative particle, German *selig*, Danish *salog*, Anglo-Saxon *saelig*, in the sense of good, virtuous, and therefore in a secondary sense, happy. The Greek word  $\alpha\sigma\lambda\gamma\eta\varsigma$  is evidently compounded of the negative or privative  $\alpha$ , and some oriental root corresponding in its consonants to the letters  $\sigma\lambda\gamma$ , and identical with that word which came into Europe with the leaders of the Gothic migration, and which has retained its place even in modern times. If it shall be yet discovered through the film of some slight orthographical difference, it will most probably throw light upon the use of the Greek term. It is very probable that *seligo*, in Latin is not a compound, as the Lexicons state of *se* and *ligo*; but is another form of the yet undiscovered etymon of *selig*.

I am inclined to think that the original word is צְלָה which, in the Hebrew, is *prospere fecit, profuit*. It has the same sense in Chaldee and Syriac; and in Arabic is not only used in this sense, but carries also the idea of worth and

other writers, but especially in Polybius; and in those passages which are sometimes compared with the text already quoted from Mark. In the same way Demosthenes charges Philip with ἀσέλγεια καὶ πλεονεξία. He puts together also δεσποτικῶς καὶ ἀσελγῶς, ἀσελγῶς καὶ προπετῶς, and also ἀσελγῶς καὶ πολυτελῶς, as Aeschinus in Ctesiphon, p. 78, 5. διὰ τὴν ἀσέλγειαν τῆς δαπάνης. Nor does the word in the Epistle of Jude, v. 4, vary from the particular sense. For οἱ ἀσεβεῖς, τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν χάριν μετατιθέντες εἰς ἀσέλγειαν are not altogether the impious and wicked, but the wanton, the insolent, οἱ τὸν κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἀρνούμενοι.

Finally, ἀσωτία is properly the worthless debauchery of a man, who leads a desperate life, as ἀσωτός is a worthless man. (See Cicero Tusc. iii. 8, et Gellius vii. 11.) Hence it is generally said of the profligate and dissolute, whom

excellence.  *recte habuit res, Probus fuit homo; Integer, bonus, idoneus.* It seems scarcely probable that a word should occur in the whole Gothic family of languages, and also in the cognate dialects of the mother tongue, expressing the same two ideas of worth and happiness, and composed of the same radical sounds, without a derivative connection existing between them. If we have been thus led to a right view of the origin of the word ἀσέλγεια, then the general idea attached to it is, that of a course of moral conduct contrary to right, and issuing in misery.—T.

Cicero describes to the life in his *Officiis* ii. 55, and 16. So in Luke xv. 13. the prodigal son is said ἀσωτως ζῆν. And in Ephes. v. 18. μὴ μεθύσκεσθε οἴνῳ, ἐν τῷ ἐστιν ἀσωτίᾳ, it is not spoken of every kind of wicked impurity, of which drunkenness is the fountain, but of ruinous debauchery particularly. (*Leiderlichkeit, libertinism.*) Paul also desires that no such person should be chosen to the pastorship, who had τέκνα ἐν κατηγορίᾳ ἀσωτίας ἢ ἀνυπότακτα. And in 1 Peter iv. 3, the class of impure vices there spoken of is called in v. 4, ἀνάχυσις ἀσωτίας, as a sort of outpouring or cess-pool of debauchery. Compare Westein on Luke xv. vol. i. p. 758. There is no need for further examples in a case already sufficiently plain, so that this word might have been dismissed in a very few words, had it not, in some few instances, been used differently from its proper and specific meaning. For there are two common places to which, in the explanation of words of this class, many interpreters have recourse; for if the proper meaning of a writer, in any passage, does not appear sufficiently plain, they either conceive that he intends to express some unclean vice, or that he uses a general term for any kind of wickedness and impiety.

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